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ABSTRACT 
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION 
AT SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL: 
MA TCHING ABILITIES TO THE DEMANDS OF THE CURRICULUM 
Ewa Okon Oboho 
University of Sheffield 
1998 
This investigation was designed to explore the relationship between pupils' cognitive 
level of development and their response to design and technology curriculum. The 
purposes of the investigation were to (a) analyse the cognitive level of the pupils, (b) 
analyse the cognitive demands of design and technology in the National Curriculum, 
(c) develop a series of cognitively based questions dealing with design and 
technology, (d) determine whether pupils respond successfully to design and 
technology that was appropriately matched to their cognitive level of development. 
To accomplish these goals, pupils from schools across two inner London Boroughs 
were selected. The investigator selected and analysed design and technology in the 
National Curriculum using a design and technology taxonomy developed for the 
investigation. The taxonomy was designed using a Piagetian-type framework and 
modelled after the taxonomy developed by Shayer and Adey. The investigator 
developed practical tasks and some written questions that were administered to the 
pupils. All responses to the investigator's practical tasks and written questions were 
recorded and analysed using not only the Structure of Observed Learning Outcome 
(SOLO) Response taxonomy, but also developmentally. Data from Piaget's test of 
formal reasoning was collected and compared to the pupil's performance in design 
and technology tasks. 
The results indicated that (a) analysing pupil's responses to questions that were 
cognitively rated provided a developmental sequence of the characteristics of the 
different cognitive levels. (b) pupils will respond to questions that are matched to their 
cognitive level of development. (c) the pupil's cognitive level of development and not 
the age of the student are related to hislher mean cognitive level of response. (d) in 
predicting a pupil's mean cognitive level, the most significant variables will be the 
mean cognitive level of the question and the pupil's design and technology 
achievement. (e) a taxonomy for estimating the level of thinking demanded by design 
and technology can be developed. (f) pupils in the early years tended to repeat actions 
(operation) illogically, then become increasingly logical (systematically as they 
progress through the years. (g) technological thinking judged from the tests 
administered, involves factors that include 'general ability (intelligence)" 'perceptual 
analysis (spatial ability)', 'function/structure', 'practical ability', 'systematic/logical 
thinking', and 'science reasoning'. Curriculum implications for the development of 
design and technology curriculum, teaching and in-service training are drawn. 
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SECTION - ONE - INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
1.0 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will attempt to relate the psychological characteristics of pupils to the 
demands of a technological curriculum. In pursuance of this aim, this thesis will be 
organised in the following way: 
Firstly, the literature will be reviewed both from psychological and philosophical 
points of view, and from the point of view of the curriculum (technology). Based on 
this review, technological thinking tests/tasks will be developed and administered to 
pupils at KS. 3&4. Also, the basis of some of these tests/tasks will be examined. The 
pupils' responses to the tests/tasks will be subjected to psychometric, developmental 
and qualitative analyses. 
Secondly, the curriculum (teaching and pupils' actual class work) will be analysed to 
determine the demands it makes on pupils at KS. 3&4. Both sets of evidence will be 
weighed side by side and curriculum implications drawn from the conclusions. 
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Whereas a great deal of studies using a Piagetian-type framework, which attempt to 
match the learning demands of the curriculum to the cognitive development of the 
pupils, have been done in many areas of the curriculum such as Mathematics, 
(Collins, 1975), English, (Mason, 1974, p.124), History, (Hallam, 1970, p.3), and 
traditional Science subjects, (Shayer and Adey, 1981, p.1), 'Technology' subjects 
remain an area of the curriculum in which similar studies are lacking and urgently 
needed. (DES. 1988, p.6). 
1 
The urgency is not just because of the importance which has been attached to 
technology subjects in recent times, and the strong desire by teachers who teach them 
to want to know more about the processes involved in learning and understanding 
within the subject given its new conception, but also because of the apparent difficulty 
that many of the KS. 3&4 pupils who study these subjects, have with learning some 
aspects of the subject in schools. Donnelly and Jenkins (1992) and McCormick (1995, 
p.173), have confirmed that design and technology tasks make greater demands on 
pupils' conceptual and procedural knowledge than often realized. So too have certain 
organs of the UK education system i.e .. (DFEE 1994) and (OFSED 1995). 
Thus, in an attempt to respond to this urgent need, this exploratory investigation, 
attempts to relate the psychological characteristics of the pupils to the demands of a 
technological curriculum. In the process, it is hoped that a framework will eventually 
emerge which can be of help to Technology teachers. 
In those other areas of the curriculum which have been similarly studied using the 
Piagetian framework, one of the things that has emerged is the great mismatch 
between the curriculum materials and/or expectations institutionalised in courses, 
textbooks, and examinations etc., and the ability of the pupils to assimilate or 
understand the experiences given. That is, between the logical demands of what is to 
be taught, and the operations available to the pupils. In theory, this should not 
happen. This mismatch is part of the explanation given for the difficulty that the 
majority of the pupils had with learning these subjects, e.g., science. (Shayer and 
Adey, 1981). This may possibly be the case in 'technology' subjects in view of the 
apparent difficulty which the majority of the pupils in secondary schools have with 
learning some aspects of it. But the nature and extent of this mismatch is unknown. 
Waetjen (1989), in his review of the field, did not address the nature of the problems 
and difficulties. Kimbell & Stables (1995), have started to investigate the different 
experiences that pass for problem-solving in design and technology at secondary and 
primary levels. 
2 
1.2 SOME EXPLORATORY QUESTIONS 
With respect to the theme of this investigation, one exploratory question which is to 
be considered is: (1) Could it be that the learners are presented with technological 
materials (teaching) that may be well beyond their ability or existing cognitive 
structures or thinking or, are teachers of technology subjects making 'reasonable' 
demands on their pupils? 'Reasonable demands', for the time being, means choosing 
curriculum materials which match with their pupils' power to understand them. This 
will involve the ability of the teachers to predict with a degree of certainty - just 
enough to increase significantly the probability of matching the material to their 
pupils' ability, that a class of pupils will not be able to assimilate a particular 
technological concept at a particular level, but, given the right teaching conditions, 
this class of pupils will be able to comprehend the concept at a certain level. Implied 
in the meaning of 'reasonable demands', is the expansion of pupils' cognitive level 
with teaching as an important factor. In other words, a demand if it is unreasonable, 
will be so called because pupils cannot immediately understand the material presented 
to them, but it is reasonable if the teaching fits in well enough with the pupils' 
conceptual level. In other words teaching and conceptual levels are integrated: so that 
the demand is not a question of challenge to the pupils, but that of expanding their 
cognitive level. For instance, if a teacher chooses material which is perfectly 
consistent with the pupils' ability to understand, then he/she has not taught anything 
new, because the pupils, in Piagetian terms, have just assimilated the material to an 
existing cognitive structure. Clearly, the teacher has to know about the cognitive level 
of his pupils. But the explanation of reasonable demand given above, is not a question 
of just getting the level of material right; instead, it is a question of presenting the 
material ahead of the pupils' existing cognitive structure. 
This draws attention to the fact that teaching is an important factor which actually 
promotes the expansion of pupils' cognitive level, or promotes pupils' development, 
from one level to the next level (the Brunerian view), rather than just follows the 
child's cognitive level. 
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The other exploratory question which complements the first one above is: (2) Could 
there be a means of knowing or determining in advance which technological 
curriculum materials will be appropriate for a given group of pupils? 
These questions implicitly call for a psychological model which will explain pupils' 
difficulties/failure, (as well as successes) and guide teachers not only in the selection 
of teaching and learning strategy, but also in the choice of materials. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
However, in order to tackle the exploratory and guiding questions posed above, this 
investigation will attempt to: 
(a) examine the extent to which Piaget and other systems are useful for 
some traditional subjects, e.g. English, Literature, Maths and Science, 
and for technology subjects. 
(b) establish typical levels of thinking in technology subjects and more 
specifically, answer the following questions: 
(i) will analysing pupils' responses, provide responses that 
can be categorised into each of the developmental levels 
and what are the characteristics of those response levels? 
(ii) will pupils respond with correct answers to questions 
when they are appropriately matched to their cognitive 
level? 
(c) assess the level of cognitive demands made on pupils by technology 
curriculum activities. Can a taxonomy for estimating the level of 
thinking demanded by technology developed? 
(d) Use the data from (b) and ( c) above to ascertain whether the pupils will 
perform better when they are presented with materials which match 
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with their level of technological thinking, i.e. determine whether pupils 
respond successfully to design and technology tasks that have been 
appropriately matched to their thinking (cognitive) levels of 
development. 
This information can be used by teachers to select objectives and/or activities suitable 
or appropriate to a given group of pupils with a wide range of abilities, and also to 
rank levels of attainment within a topic according to the cognitive demands that they 
make. 
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1.3 BACKGROUND 
In consonance with the concept of practical education, 'technology', in recent times, 
has been increasingly recognised and widely accepted as one of the areas of learning 
and experience in secondary schools' curriculum which should feature in a rounded 
education. Its wide-ranging influence and/or impact on almost every aspect of our 
lives, has been so tremendous and impressive, that many Governments have had to 
spend large sums of money on technology-related projects, with an implicit view to 
having or gaining a better insight into its dynamics, organisation and practices. 
As will become apparent later, the recognition and subsequent inclusion of technology 
as a curriculum subject has been rather slow, partly because philosophers in the 
rationalist tradition, (e.g. Plato) did not consider it as an acceptable and respectable 
form of human knowledge relative to other forms of human knowledge, for example, 
Science and Mathematics. Another reason is that there has been less emphasis on 
'practical' or (practical) education. However, it will be apparent in this thesis that 
philosophers concerned with the study of technology have demonstrated or re-
emphasised the view that technology viewed from epistemological, anthropological 
and sociological standpoints, should be regarded as a form of human knowledge, a 
knowledge that can range from practical skills derived from concrete experience to a 
more general knowledge of how to cope with our environment. Metaphysical studies, 
notably by Dessauer (1956, p.234) and Heidegger and Jonas, (see Rapp, 1974», have 
also concurred with this view. In these studies, knowledge has been involved 
centrally either as precondition or as product. 
This view of technology, and the recent emphasis on practical education, can be seen 
to be implicit in a number of papers outlining National Educational thinking. This has 
made technology an important, interesting and exciting area for investigation. For 
instance, in the recent National Curriculum document for schools in England and 
Wales in design technology subjects, (DFEE 1995), the emphasis on 'practical' 
through problem-solving activity, is a deliberate attempt to develop technological 
competence in secondary school pupils. 
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As mentioned earlier, there have been difficulties in this attempt, and in the teaching 
of other areas of the curriculum such as Mathematics, History and Science subjects 
where pupils had similar difficulty. Attempts have been made to reduce it by 
matching the learning demands of the curriculum to the cognitive development of the 
leamer, using Piaget's cognitive psychological model, (Fusco, 1983; Shayer and 
Adey, 1981). In the teaching of design technology subjects, the use of any 
psychological model in a similar manner is grossly lacking. Clearly, it would seem 
that what is needed is a model of cognition which will allow some predictions to be 
made about which technological activities are likely to be within the grasp of each 
pupil or a group of pupils. 
However, theoretically, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the teaching of 
technology subjects can possibly be looked at very much in a similar way in a 
Piagetian sense, as in the teaching of Mathematics, Science, History and English 
reading. In other words, that same Piagetian type of logical analysis could be applied, 
to some extent, to the teaching of technology. The obvious question that springs to 
mind is, is it a possibility in the first place? However, in addition to Siraj-
Blatchford's argument (1993, p.19-20) that a pedagogic model grounded in a 
'moderated' version of Piaget (Constructivist, Vygoaskyian, Ausubelian) can be 
consistently applied throughout design and technology, if one looks at other areas of 
the curriculum where Piaget has been reasonably applied, then, one could admit the 
possibility in the teaching of technology subjects. 
In these other areas of the curriculum, eg., English; History; Mathematics, there is a 
common belief, that if a teacher, who is reasonably knowledgeable in a particular 
area, can succeed in fmding say, five, six, or even more process areas, that he and his 
colleagues think or value to be important or significant for the understanding (or 
development), in his/her subject area; in other words, if he can actually define five or 
more separable sets of basic skills, then, it is always possible, both theoretically and 
empirically, to define different levels of attainments within each of those. 
Furthermore, it is possible both theoretically and empirically to assess those levels of 
attainment in Piagetian terms. 
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Note that process areas or basic skills, in Piagetian terms, will be the operations that 
pupils carry out; i.e. schema and mental activity in transforming input into output. In 
analysing the ways in which knowledge of background information about a task could 
influence pupils' comprehension of that task. Strander (1979) stressed the following: 
(1) the importance of schema as a general framework during encoding to facilitate 
the comprehension process; 
(2) the responsibility of the teacher to determine what piece of knowledge or 
schema pupils must have in order to successfully comprehend tasks 
requirements; 
(3) the need for the teacher to determine whether pupils have the background 
knowledge to understand and organise the task material. 
The fact that schema guide comprehension has not been doubted. The schema theory 
acknowledges the interaction between the textual information and the pupils' schema. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1984), have identified and describe in detail the development of 
the schemata which evolve in each pupil. Learning to use this model is subordinate to 
development and a description of the schemata attained by the pupils can be revealed. 
The attainment of the schemata can be ordered hierarchically and generalizations made 
from the pupils studied to others. 
Shayer and Adey (1981, p.4) developed a descriptive taxonomical model using 
Piaget's Schema which underlie pupils' thinking. This was organised by classifying 
objectives into groups according to schema and the characteristics of the stages of 
cognitive development. Although the taxonomy was constructed to analyse the 
science curriculum, it serves as a model for design technology and other disciplines. 
Pupils' performance can be anticipated when schemata comparing the curriculum and 
the characteristics of the cognitive levels of development of the students are 
considered and appropriately matched. 
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In English language and Literature where some of the things, (such as the notion of 
time, relative space etc.) overlap with things in science, some investigators have, with 
reasonable success, written out at least four or five lists of abstract processes, which 
every English teacher can recognise as being important for understanding concepts. 
Then, they have managed to define these abstract processes(schema), and the different 
levels in them. To illustrate the point, below is an example of English language 
process areas or skills (schema) and, in Piagetian terms, of the things considered to be 
involved in comprehending various texts of many kinds: 
(a) Classification ability; 
(b) Class inclusion ability; 
(c) Seriation ability; 
(d) Probabilistic notions; 
(e) Relating cause and effect; 
(t) Correctional reasoning; 
(g) Combinatorial reasoning; 
(h) Propositional arguments; 
(i) Proportionality notions; 
(j) Co-ordination of frames of reference: 
Each of the above process areas or schema, can be described in Piagetian terms. 
Taking (a) above i.e .. , - classification ability - for example, what is meant by late 
formal classification ability can be described, and specific examples, in terms of the 
texts to be given to pupils to work on, can also be given. 
This is essentially what will be attempted in this exploratory investigation, with 
respect to 'design and technology', as described in the National Curriculum, (DFEE 
1995). It will be noted from the new National Curriculum on technology that the new 
subject incorporates well-established yet different subjects ranging from metal work 
and motor vehicle studies to home economics and needlework (Sweetman. 1995, 
p.lOl). 
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For this investigation, however, technology courses would be so called where they 
meet all or some of the criteria listed below: 
(1) be concerned with controlling the environment to meet human needs; 
(2) allow pupils to be actively involved in the designing and making of 
artefacts, or devising working systems; 
(3) deal with or consider problems which require the use of scientific 
knowledge, where necessary; 
(4) help to build up in pupils a general understanding of technological 
concepts, particularly those which are related to energy, control, 
materials and communication. 
It would appear that many people involved with technology seem not to know much 
about the process areas or skills in technology subjects. Although, as Siraj-Blatchford 
acknowledges (1993, p. 20), we have little knowledge about the design and 
technology process of cognitive development; the need to identify the very basis of 
"good practice" in design and technology is now urgent, especially with the 
introduction of British National Curriculum. At first sight, the dearth of information 
about the process skills in technology subject teaching has given rise to uncertainty 
about the usefulness of Piagetian stage theory. For instance, by looking at, say, a 
woodwork perfonnance, one cannot be sure about the extent to which the process 
skills involved can be translated into Piagetian stages. This is probably because, in 
these subjects, reasoning of the sort involved in science is lacking. However, when it 
is remembered that beyond the realm of mere practical skill of which technology is 
normally conceived, intuition would suggest that before an intended useful 
technological product or result is achieved, there must be some form of reasoning, the 
possibility of such an application becomes apparent. The indication is that the process 
skills in technology subjects appear to be something that could be determined or 
worked out after, not before, the investigation. 
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Attempting a theoretical reflection only, in order to determine the process skills, can 
be an insurmountable task. Although theoretical reflection can be helpful in 
structuring where necessary, it shows the limitations of what can be gained through 
reflection. 
The significance of identifying the process areas (or skill), is apparent particularly 
when it is acknowledged, as Polanyi (1958) did, that some of the pupils seem to have 
more knowledge than anybody has succeeded yet in describing: most technology 
subject teachers, who can teach technology subjects very well, may not have a good 
description of what it is that they are doing; they just do it. 
Thus, from what has been said so far, the major task here, will be to produce these 
descriptions, for technology subjects, in the hope that at the end of this exercise, a 
glimpse of the theory and practice of technology, will be exposed more than as we 
know it at the moment. Furthermore, a description of the process skills in sufficient 
detail can be used both as an instrument for curriculum design and planning and also 
for assessing when pupils are making progress. In schools, teachers know how to 
give pupils feedback about their development of knowledge/learning, which is related 
for example, to subsequent performance in an examination. They know also how to 
tell a pupil whether he has done well. Undoubtedly, there is technological skill, just 
like academic knowledge skill, but they are not the same thing; and our (or any) 
system needs to be able to tell students when they are making progress, and when they 
have made progress. Unless, to reiterate, we have a good description of the process 
skills that we can rely on and can tum this into some form of assessment of pupils, 
they can be doing very good work, which they may not realise, and the teacher will 
not know that they have made progress. 
Thus far, it has been intimated that Piaget has been tried in a number of subjects, and 
it is a very useful view. We do not know how to apply it in the teaching of 
technology subjects. It is my intention to do that; but to do it, I cannot theorise about 
it, I have to do the investigation first and then try to work out the Piagetian framework 
from there. 
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To set the stage, it is necessary to address the question: how useful is a general 
Piagetian type of analysis for specific subjects, such as English, Science or 
Mathematics? 
1.4 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
An understanding of the literature review which occurs in Chapter 2 will be facilitated 
by comprehending the following terms: 
1. Cognitive Development - movement to, from and within the various levels of 
thought and reasoning described by Piaget. 
2. Cognitive Stages - (as defined by Piaget) - Ages indicated are the ages at 
which the child normally functions within that stage. 
a) Sensorimotor Stage (birth to about age 2) 
Child learns through manipulating the environment at the perceptual 
level. 
b) Preoperational Stage (2 years to about 6 years) 
Child acquires symbolic thought. 
c) Concrete Operational Stage (6 years to about 11) 
Child develops logical structures to deal with changing objects in the 
physical world. 
d) Formal Operational Stage (11 years to adulthood) 
Child is capable of hypothetical and deductive reasoning of 
hypotheses and ideas. 
3. Concept - In a logical sense, a mental construct of the generalizable aspect of a 
known thing. 
4. Concrete Operations - a period characterised by the ability to deal with 
concrete objects in a logical manner. The major achievements of the concrete 
operational period are seriation, conservation and classification. 
12 
5. Equilibrium - Development is composed of conflicts and incompatibilities 
which must be overcome to reach a higher level, and thus equilibrium. 
(Piaget. 1964). It is the state of balance in which the organism's 
coherent/stable structures effectively interact with reality . 
6. Formal Operational - A period characterised by the ability to deal with 
hypothetical reasoning. Formal operations are characteristic of the second and 
final stage of operational intelligence which reflects on concrete operations 
through the elaboration of formal group structures. The formal group 
structures include multiplicative compensation, probability, correlational 
reasoning, combinatorial reasoning, logic, proportional reasoning, the co-
ordination of two or more systems of reference, mechanical equilibrium and 
forms of conservation beyond direct verification. 
7. Intelligence - Problem-solving capacity based on a hierarchical organisation of 
symbolical representation derived from experience. 
8. Learning - In the strict sense, acquisition of knowledge due to some particular 
information provided by the environment. Learning is inconceivable without a 
prior structure of equilibration which provides the capacity to learn. 
9. Schema - (schemata) - A system or plan in which the connecting parts or 
thoughts are organised so that knowledge is realised. 
10. Social Cognition - Characterised by experiences that are dependent on 
interpersonal relations in a social or cultural setting. 
11. Stages - Successive developmental periods of intelligence, each one 
characterised by a relatively stable general structure that incorporates 
developmentally earlier structures in a higher synthesis. The regular sequence 
of stage specification activities is decisive for intellectual rather than 
chronological age. 
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12. Vectors - A line, such as an arrow, representing both the direction and 
magnitude of a force (e.g. water). 
13. Simple Classification - The ability to group objects spontaneously by one 
attribute and to be able to shift to another attribute and re-group the same 
objects. 
14. Two-way Classification - The ability simultaneously to co-ordinate two 
attributes of objects and to group objects by that co-ordination. 
15. Three-Way Classification - the ability simultaneously to co-ordinate three 
attributes of objects and to group objects together which share three attributes 
in common. 
16. Class Inclusion - The ability to understand and to co-ordinate in a hierarchical 
sense part/whole relationships. 
17. Simple Seriation - The ability to order a set of objects along some relevant 
dimension such as size. 
18. Double Seriation - The ability to order one set of objects according to some 
relevant dimension and to order a second set of objects along a relevant 
dimension in relation to that set of objects. 
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19. Probability - The ability to develop a relationship between the confirming and 
the possible causes with both beginning to be calculated as a function of the 
combinations, permutations, or arrangements compatible with the given 
elements. 
20. Correlational Reasoning - The ability to conclude that there is or is not a 
causal relationship, whether negative or positive, and to explain the minority 
cases by inference of chance variables. The task for the subject is to find out 
whether there is a relationship between the facts described by two or more 
variables when the empirical distribution is irregular. 
21. Combinatorial Reasoning - The ability systematically to generate all possible 
combinations of the givens when a problem's solution demands that all 
possibilities be accounted for. 
22. Logic - The ability to reason using propositions based on a formal system. 
23. Proportional Reasoning - The ability to discover the equality of two ratios 
which form a proportion. 
24. The Co-ordination of Two or More Systems (Frames) of Reference - The 
ability to co-ordinate two systems, each involving a direct and inverse 
operation, but with one of the systems in a relation of compensation or 
symmetry with respect to the other. This represents a type of relativity of 
thought. 
25. Mechanical Equilibrium - The ability simultaneously to make the distinction 
and the intimate co-ordination of two complementary forms of reversibility -
inversion and reciprocity . 
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26. Forms of Conversions beyond Direct Verification - The ability to deduce and 
verify certain conservation from its implied consequences. Developing a chain 
of inferences by which the conservation can be verified by observing its effects 
only. 
27. Prestructural - Student avoids the question (denial), repeats the question 
(tautology), a firm closure based on transduction. Transitional - student 
attempts to answer the question but only partially grasps a significant point. 
28. Unstructural - An answer is based on only one relevant aspect of the 
presented evidence so that the conclusion is limited and likely to be dogmatic. 
Transitional - an attempt to handle two aspects of the evidence is made, but 
they may be inconsistent and hence no firm conclusion is reached. 
29. Multistructural - Several consistent aspects of the data are selected, but any 
inconsistencies or conflicts are ignored or discounted so that a firm conclusion 
is reached. Transitional - any inconsistencies are noted: several aspects are 
recognisable but the student is unable to reconcile them. 
30. Relational - Most or all of the evidence is accepted, and attempts are made to 
reconcile. Conflicting data are placed into a system that accounts for the given 
context. 
31. Extended Abstracts - There is recognition that the given example is an 
instance of a more general case. Hypotheses about not given examples are 
entertained, and the conclusions are held open. 
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SECTION - TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 1 
CHAPTER-2 
SYSTEMS FOR DESCRIBING PUPILS' TIDNKING 
WITHIN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since research work which directly and/or specifically examines the relationship 
between the psychological characteristics of the pupils and the demands of a 
technological curriculum is virtually non-existent, the best that can be done in this 
circumstance, is cautiously to extrapolate some pertinent aspects from studies of a 
similar nature in other areas of the curriculum such as Science, Mathematics, English 
Language, etc. 
In these other areas of the curriculum, such a relationship has given rise to the idea of 
'matching' the curriculum to the pupil's cognitive level, i.e .. , adapting the instruction 
to the learner's current level of operation or thinking. This constitutes the main aim 
of this thesis. However, this idea of matching seems to have been given a new 
impetus following the work of Jean Piaget on cognitive development. Indeed, this is 
one of the practical issues raised by this work. The usefulness of Piaget's 
developmental model, as will be shown later, is in providing us with (1) a framework 
for understanding curricular design; (2) a system for understanding curricular design; 
(3) a basis for the schema theory's descriptive perspective for understanding the 
development of children's capabilities in design technology. Shayer and Adey (1981) 
have demonstrated the applicability of this model to the science curriculum. 
In section 1, it has been pointed out that a good description of the 'process skills' in 
technology is the key to knowing which technological thinking the pupils use in 
solving problems in technology subjects. 
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It has also been pointed out, that by determining these process skills, it will be 
possible, both theoretically and empirically, to define levels of attainment. Studies 
which have concerned themselves with the relationship between the pupils' 
psychological characteristics and the demands of the curriculum, have adopted either 
the Piagetian approach or its alternative. However, in both of these 'basic' 
approaches, the necessity for producing a detailed description of the pupils' thinking 
has been uppermost. In summary, the literature review will focus on three areas: 
(1) Cognitive development - this was an important component of the 
investigation, since a Piagetian perspective was used as a framework. 
(2) Survey of design and technology and response studies - to provide 
insight into the pupils' involvement and understanding of the tasks 
requirements. 
(3) Survey of studies related to contextual analysis - to provide insight 
into the knowledge structures present in design and technology. 
It is worth noting, that with respect to technology subjects, the 'process skills' are not 
something which can be entirely determined or worked out before the investigation. 
But instead, they can partly be determined after the investigation and partly by 
reflection. Before examining the method to be used in eliciting these process skills, it 
is appropriate to dwell a little on the various methods or systems for describing pupils' 
thinking, which exist within cognitive psychology, as well as the curriculum areas in 
which they have been successfully applied. It must be borne in mind, that within 
these various systems, a procedure for eliciting the process skills is suggested and the 
importance of the relationship between children's responses and their cognitive level 
(thinking) underlined. Thereafter, school subjects and responses studies will be 
looked at. Then, in Section 3, an examination of the nature of technology as a subject 
in secondary school will be undertaken, so as to have an insight into the knowledge 
structure present in it, as well as the pupils' involvement and understanding. 
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The relevance of the theories of cognitive and conceptual development to design and 
technology is found in the idea expressed by Kimbell et.al.(1991) in their research on 
modelling as part of the essence of design and technology. Pupils need to have a 
model in their minds before it can be expressed or developed further on paper or other 
media. Without this they cannot be clear about what their ideas are. This implies 
some sort of mental construction. 
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2.2 COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
STRUCTURALIST AND MECHANISTIC-FUNCTIONAL 
(NON-STRUCTURALIST) SYSTEMS. 
It can be said, that within what is referred to as the 'structuralist' framework, two 
principal systems for describing pupils' thinking exist, and can be identified by their 
root metaphors. 
In one, (referred to as the classical structuralist scheme), the root metaphor is the 
growing biological organism. This is the organismic structural approach (and its 
universal stages). Piaget, Kohlberg, Kaplan, etc., are the proponents of this system. 
In the other, (the alternative scheme), the root metaphor is the machine. These 
alternative schemes are based on cybernetic principles and are referred to as 
"mechanistic-functional" (non-structuralist) approaches (and their individual 
differences). Biggs and Collis, Case, Pascual-Leone, McLoughlin, etc., are 
proponents of this scheme. 
2.3 THE CLASSICAL STRUCTURALIST SCHEME 
2.3.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION (REVISITING PIAGET) 
However, with respect to the classical structuralist scheme, the most and widely 
known within education is Piaget's psychological mode. Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development became widely known and useful, because it constituted: 
"an alternative to the numerous and the unlearn postulates 
and corollaries associated with Hullian learning theory. " 
(Bolton, 1986, p.235) 
His main interest has been to try and elucidate the nature of knowledge: (particularly 
the development of scientific knowledge); how it is that knowledge is structured; and 
whether or not all concepts can be reduced to simple bits of information. As an 
epistemologist, he puts forward the view, that the development of concepts is as a 
consequence of the development of logico-mathematical structures. But there was a 
shift in his relatively late works from this position to one that asserts that human 
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knowledge and the person who knows are intimately related, and so he proceeds to 
study the former by looking at the way in which it is assimilated by the latter. 
He and his associates then gather information on the performance of children and 
adolescents in many tasks, most of which involve the manipulation of physical 
materials. This information is to give the researchers insight into how children 
develop their understanding of aspects of the physical world such as time, space, 
motion and matter. They also conduct interviews and observe pupils. His intention in 
gathering this information is not to develop a theory of the structure of the mind, but a 
theory of the structure of knowledge by gathering such information from a child's 
birth to the age of sixteen. Logically, this will lead to the development of a theory 
about the development of cognition in the child, rather than a theory about the 
development of the child. In effect, the suggestion here is that there is a "strong" 
relationship between the structure of knowledge and the mental structure of the person 
who knows. 
However, by establishing a growth in the child's ability to perceive, process, and use 
data, Piaget is implying that there is a hierarchy of complexity in the possible ways in 
which data may be processed. This may well mean a hierarchy amongst level or 
comprehension demanded by a set of learning material. At this point, it is appropriate 
to examine very briefly some basic concepts in Piaget's systems, if insight is to be 
gained about the characteristics of this approach. Then, some of the curriculum areas 
where it has been used to facilitate teaching and learning will be reviewed. 
2.4 SOME OF PIAGET'S BASIC CONCEPTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The difficulties in understanding Piaget's own writing are obvious to any first-time 
reader. One difficulty arises partly because his theory has been evolved largely in 
isolation from the main Western tradition of psychological research. As a 
consequence, most of his terms cannot be translated easily, but he uses them in a 
manner which leaves to the reader the task of teasing out their full meaning for his 
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own purposes. Another difficulty in understanding Piaget has to do with the fact that 
his concepts are very abstract, to the extent that they are at some 'distance' from the 
factual observation, and this renders the specification of the operational link difficult. 
However, in spite of these difficulties, the importance of his concepts (which are 
distinctively biological in flavour), lies in the potential which they have in conveying a 
whole perspective on behaviour which is unique in contemporary psychology, relative 
to the prevailing psychological orthodoxy. 
2.4.1 ACTION 
Before Piaget, underpinning the bulk of psychological research, has been a conceptual 
analysis of behaviour in terms of stimulus and response. Therein, the stimulus (which 
may be external or internal) has a function, which is to evoke a behavioural response. 
When the interest is in investigating the causes or determinants of behaviour, such 
conceptual analysis is inevitable. However, it carries the implication of relative 
passivity of the organism, until stimulated into behaviour, and downplays the self-
directing and self-regulating aspects of human functioning. In contrast, Piaget takes 
the view that the organism is living and active, and that every event that occurs 
between it and the environment is conceived as being, at one and the same time, the 
action of the organism upon the environment, and the action of the environment upon 
the organism. His viewpoint implies an epistemology - a way of interpreting the 
child's knowledge of his world. 
By rejecting two extreme alternatives, namely, (1) that the child is somewhat like a 
tabula rasa, who passively receives and retains information coming to him, and (2) 
that the child inherits a kind of performed knowledge of the world which matures with 
age, and which filters and organises incoming information in its own terms (Le., 
inherited and fixed reflex-responses in the child), Piaget takes a middle position. 
This pOSition allows him to assert, that in simultaneously acting upon the environment 
and being acted upon by it, the child actively CONSTRUCTS his knowledge of the 
world. 
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Thus, acting upon the world is knowing it; and knowing the world is acting upon it. 
In two main ways, Piaget's use of the term "action", far extends beyond its usual 
meaning. Firstly, ALL FORMS OF PERCEPTION are seen as actions upon the 
world, as a way of assimilating it. Secondly, activities such as thinking, 
remembering, and dreaming, are construed also as actions upon the environment, 
although, in symbolic and internalised forms. So that by subsuming overt behaviour 
and thinking under the category of action, Piaget is declaring a functional continuity 
between them. This is vital for his theory . 
2.4.2 COGNITIVE STRUCTURE 
According to Piaget, all action (overt or internal) has form, and this is, to a large 
extent, a function of the structure of the organism in action. Although the action 
cannot be repeated in exactly identical form, there is sufficient approximate repetition 
to justify the inference that the underlying structure is relatively stable and lasting. 
Piaget regards these structures as cognitive because of his interest in the knowledge 
and intelligence implied in action. A baby who grasps a ball held in front of him is 
KNOWING the ball in a very primitive sense, as something which has to be grasped, 
because he cannot possibly know it any other way. Far from expounding a cause and 
effect approach to behaviour, Piaget follows the structural-functional type of 
explanation: explaining the way structures change in terms of their functioning. 
2.4.3 SCHEMA AND OPERATION 
With reference to cognitive structure, Piaget makes use of two terms, SCHEMA and 
OPERATION. He regards SCHEMA as the basic unit of structure. Because he uses 
the terms loosely, and freely, he does not relate it in any precise way to behaviour. 
Nevertheless, he appears to mean the structure underlying a simple unitary act, for 
example, picking something up, looking at something or remembering something. 
OPERATIONS are regarded as SCHEMATA which have become organised into 
highly stable systems displaying distinctive logical properties. For example, the 
possession of operational structure enables the older child to have insight into a 
number or to classify objects and people in a hierarchical fashion. 
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Consideration of these two terms discloses one of the major weaknesses of Piagets 
theory, because they are concepts which relate Piaget's abstract theorising to 
behaviour in an impressive manner. 
2.4.4 ASSIMILATION, ACCOMMODATION AND EQUILIBRIUM 
Whereas action is regarded by Piaget as the functioning of cognitive structure, the 
form which it takes is also a function of the environment acted upon (directly or 
symbolically). Thus, cognitive structures are being modified in some ways by the 
environment in the very process of functioning. 
In accordance with this thinking, the action of a child can only be in terms of his 
existing cognitive structures, their level of complexity and organisation. In other 
words, the universe only exists for him insofar as he has cognitively structured it, but 
of course, the world is always more complex and problematic than the child's existing 
structure or knowledge of it can cope with or allow. Thus, in acting upon the 
environment, the child's structures are constantly developing in complexity. The 
limits on the rate of this development are set by the nature of human system, and its 
capacity to mature and change. Furthermore, the starting point of this change must 
always be the point which the child has currently reached. 
What follows from the above, is that the condition which facilitates cognitive growth 
is the presence of the unfamiliar and puzzling in the context of what is familiar and 
known. Piaget's accounts of the dual influence of structure and environment upon 
action, and the simultaneous development of structures are explained, in terms of 
ASSIMILATION AND ACCOMMODATION. 
Assimilation refers to the use which cognitive structures make of aspects of the 
environment in their own terms and for their own purpose, during action. For 
example, a baby grasping a ball. In becoming something to be grasped, the ball is 
assimilated to, or becomes, "food" for the grasping schema. Accommodation, on the 
other hand, refers to the adjustment to the thing being assimilated which the cognitive 
structures are forced to make, during the process of assimilation. So that the baby's 
grasping schema has to adjust to the size, weight and texture of the ball. 
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All actions, whatever their level of complexity, involve both assimilation and 
accommodation. Whereas assimilation is the conservative element, accommodation, 
is the element of change. The extent to which the environment can be assimilated sets 
limits to the extent to which accommodation can occur. The predominance of one 
aspect over the other is possible. Play, fantasy and dreaming represent primary 
assimilatory activities, although they also impose some measure of accommodation. 
Conversely, imitation and mental imagery are primarily accommodatory activities. 
Piaget maintains that the most intelligent adaptation to the environment occurs, at 
whatever level of development the child has reached, when those aspects of action are 
in balance or EQUILIBRIUM. 
Although the concept of EQUILIBRIUM is difficult to grasp, it appears to imply a 
condition of stable balance. The origin of Piaget's notion of equilibration is in his 
biological ideas of man as an adaptive organism . 
. . . . . , this adaptation is a state of balance ...... between two 
inseparable mechanisms: assimilation and accommodation. 
We say, for example, that an organism is well-adapted when 
it can simultaneously preserve its structure by assimilating 
into it nourishment drawn from the external environment 
and also accommodate that structure to the various 
particularities of that environment: biological adaptation is 
thus a state of balance between an assimilation of the 
environment to the organism and an accommodation of the 
organism to the environment. Similarly, it is possible to 
say that thought is well adapted to a particular reality when 
it has been successful in assimilating that reality into its own 
framework while also accommodating that framework to the 
new circumstances presented by the reality. Intellectual 
adaptation is thus a process of achieving a state of balance 
between the assimilation of experience into the deductive 
structures and the accommodation of those structures to the 
data of experience. 
(Piaget 1970, but see Driver 1981. p3.) 
The learner as an active "creator" of his or her own knowledge is implied in the 
quotation above. This is a notion which was embraced and nourished in this country's 
and elsewhere (Australia Primary Science). This view of the child learning naturally 
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through his/her interaction with the environment, has in fact been expressed by earlier 
educators, notably Rousseau, Froebel and Dewey. But by going beyond mere 
statement of principles to outlining in some detail the nature of the development which 
a child undergoes, Piaget set a precedent. 
However, Piaget uses the concept EQUILIBRIUM in at least four distinct but related 
ways. 
Firstly, he uses it to characterise cognitive structures within the individual when these 
form a tightly knit and stable organisation, as in operations. According to this use of 
the concept EQUILIBRIUM, the characteristics of adult world such as time, 
causation, and space, as well as the existence of objects and people etc., are self-
evidently so to use because we possess cognitive structures in a state of equilibrium. 
Secondly, he uses the concept to describe the relationship between the organism and 
the environment, when the former has achieved a stable adaptation to the 
environment. 
Thirdly, he uses the concept to describe the stability between accommodation and 
assimilation, which is evident when actions upon the environment are realistic and 
effective. 
Fourthly, besides states of eqUilibrium, Piaget also refers to the PROCESS OF 
EQUILIBRIUM. By this, he appears to mean, that total process whereby the 
organism-environment relationship moves forward throughout development, towards 
that most comprehensive and far-reaching level of adaptation that the organism's 
genetic endowment permits. However, the mechanism by which equilibration occurs 
is not specified by Piaget. Nevertheless, from his seemingly inadequate description of 
the process of equilibration, it can be concluded that the process of development must 
of necessity be a rather slow one. Just as one will not expect a child to develop an 
adult identity in a few months if he is simply given hormone treatments to induce 
maturation or exposed to a massive variety of new physical and social experience to 
induce learning, so one cannot expect a child to develop an entire system of formal 
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thought in a few months simply by the action of maturation of learning. Because the 
'equilibration process is an internal one that involves reflection, co-ordination, and 
construction.' (Case, 1985 p.170). 
Equilibrium, according to Piaget, occurs through the assimilation and accommodation 
of structures. It permits us: 
to reunite into one and the same totality those two aspects of behaviour 
which always have a functional solidarity because there exists no 
structure (cognition) without an energiser (motivation) and vice versa. 
(Piaget, 1974 p.301). 
Piaget, it will be recalled, is not interested in the kind of equilibrium where the child 
withdraws from the problem, but instead, in the kind of equilibrium that results when 
the child has acquired a new way of thinking to deal with the problem. This way of 
thinking or operation should be an operation which we rather hope is going to be an 
operational structure: i.e. is going to be some organised logical skills, such that he/she 
knows not only how to solve that problem, but also similar problems. (We look for a 
transfer of learning). 
Though it is not clear whether or not Piaget uses the term "transfer of learning", it 
appears that he hopes to find it, just as anyone finds intelligence when one finds 
transfer of learning. Thus, the basic thrust behind equilibration is the maturation of 
the organism, but the process of equilibration mentioned above, is an interactive one 
between the organism and the environment. 
2.4.5 PIAGET'S METHODOLOGY 
Having briefly looked at Piaget's general purposes and conceptual approach, it is 
logical therefore that his general methods of investigation be also briefly examined. 
His aim (as it is all too familiar) has been to map out the development of cognitive 
structures from childhood to adolescence. Standardised tests have been instruments 
which he did not consider useful at the initial stage, because they do not tap the riches 
of the child's thinking process. He instead opts for the method of clinical 
interrogation, which he has used not with young infants, but with older ones. As he 
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cannot interrogate a young infant verbally, he acts towards him in certain ways, or 
presents him with simple problems and observes how he behaves. For instance, he 
may make certain gestures and see whether the child tries spontaneously to imitate 
them, or he may place a toy which the child wants out of his reach, but on a cushion 
which is within his reach and see what the child will do about it. These sorts of tasks 
are given to an infant at a time when he has to stretch his skills and capacities to the 
limit, for only then can Piaget see what resources the child has available. Older 
children are presented with problems, but these are augmented by fairly intensive 
verbal questioning. 
Indeed, vital to Piaget's purpose, is that his methodology will reveal the basic 
reasoning and thinking processes of the child. It is a fact that, as a child grows older, 
his own natural thinking processes are likely to be masked by the knowledge, ideas 
and verbal formulae which he picks up from others, and especially adults. This 
presents a problem for Piaget, but he manages to offset it by presenting the child with 
problems, in material and verbal forms, which are new to him, and which, in many 
cases, he cannot be expected to solve adequately. This will inevitably force the child 
to fall back on his resources and his thinking process will then surface. Thus, the 
child's wrong answers are more informative about his thought processes, than his 
correct ones. 
Piaget (1929), classifies the verbal responses which young children give as: 
(1) Random: where the child is not interested in the question, and says the 
first thing, more or less, which comes into his head; 
(2) Romancing: (which develops from the above) where the child 
impulsively gives an answer to a question, which he apparently believes 
more and more as he gives it, but which he rapidly forgets afterwards, 
by giving a different answer to the same question; 
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(3) Suggested Conviction: where the child, anxious as he is to answer the 
question, picks up some cues therefrom, and bases his answers upon 
them; 
(4) Liberated Conviction: where the child grapples with the question in 
terms of his existing capacities and thinks his way through to his 
"real" answer; 
(5) Spontaneous Conviction: based upon liberated conviction, the child 
gives an answer confidently and readily. 
He proposes several criteria for sifting out the last two kinds of responses. According 
to Piaget, the occasions when we are confident that we are tapping the child's own 
cognitive structures are when: 
(1) he resists counter-suggestion and sticks to his answer; 
(2) the logical form of the child's answer remains consistent, if the same 
problem is approached in several different ways; 
(3) the logical form of his answers remains the same for other allied 
problems; 
(4) the same logical form can be discerned in the responses of many 
children of about the same age and this form differs from that of 
children of other widely different ages. 
Piaget presents his findings in such a way as to allow him to state, in general terms, 
the features of cognitive structures which he thinks he has elicited, and then goes on to 
illustrate these statements with samples of extracts from interview protocols. Very 
rarely does Piaget present any statistical evidence of the frequency of particular 
responses at a particular age. He neither makes clear the line of inference from 
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observed responses to the implied nature of cognitive structure, nor does he often 
consider alternative constructions that could be put upon the child's responses. 
There are indications from the interview protocol that Piaget frequently broke his own 
rules for interviewing children. He will give the same problem to different children 
but the interviews which follow will vary quite widely from one child to another. In 
spite of these and other criticisms of Piaget's reported work, as discussed later, it is 
clear that his own empirical investigations can be regarded as pilot studies used to 
support his theoretical standpoint, rather than as controlled and systematic attempts to 
test its weaknesses. 
It is clear from the above that responses as vehicles for knowing something about 
pupils' thinking are extremely important. 
2.4.6 THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
From what has been said so far, it is true up to a point that the development of 
cognitive structures consists of the steady and progressive elaboration and organisation 
of schemata. Nevertheless, Piaget insists that his empirical findings demonstrate that 
this progressively increasing complexity of structural organisation is marked by a 
sequence of "break-throughs" into a qualitatively new form which functions in ways 
that are not predictable from earlier forms. The child's world, as it is directly and 
self-evidently perceived in his consciousness of it, passes through a sequence of 
transformations as he grows up. Indeed, his adaptations to the world develop through 
a series of evermore comprehensive and stable eqUilibria. This stepwise aspect of 
cognitive development engendered Piaget's use of the concept of STAGE. 
The use of the term STAGE, must not be confused with age, because the age at which 
children move from one stage to another may vary stage in such a way that it is 
grossly inaccurate to speak of a child as being at a particular STAGE. 
This is so because the implication is that he exhibits a characteristic in all aspects of 
his living and the evidence shows clearly that this may not be the case. For a child 
may reach a given stage in his mathematical thinking, or in his conception of the 
object, but he may not have reached the same stage in his social thinking or in his 
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concept of volume. Piaget has built into his theory the idea that once a child breaks 
through into a qualitatively new level of thinking in one area, his acquisition of this 
level in other areas is much easier. This phenomenon he calls HORIZONTAL 
DECALAGE. 
In any event, it is both empirically and logically necessary for Piaget that the 
sequential ordering is held to be INV ARIANT. For some people, due to their cultural 
or inherited factors, develop more slowly and less far than others. Nevertheless, the 
order of the stages through which they go remains the same for all people. According 
to Piaget, the characteristics of one stage are not left behind, but are taken up into the 
next stage, transformed and made more complex. 
Thus, broadly speaking, cognitive development can be seen as a movement from 
egocentricity to decentration. This occurs at three successive levels, as discussed 
below. For Piaget, egocentricity means, a state whereby there is no clear distinction 
between self and other, or between subjective and the objective. The child is unable 
to conceive yet a perspective other than his own. The movement out of egocentricity 
consists of the acquisition of a sense of an objective universe in which the child can 
locate himself as one particular among many. 
2.4.7 SENSORIMOTOR STAGE (0 to 2 years approximately) 
From Piaget (1951, 1954) we learn that a child is born already equipped with a 
number of basic action patterns (schemes) such as grasping, sucking and visual 
tracking. Accordingly, the child acquires his first knowledge of the world, by 
exercising these schemes (skills). And immediately after he/she acquires his/her first 
knowledge, two basic changes take place in the schemes themselves, namely, 
differentiation and co-ordination. In other words, these schemes themselves become 
more differentiated (i.e. become capable of being applied differentially, to a wider 
variety of objects), and co-ordinated (Le. being initially relatively isolated and 
reflexive, they gradually become co-ordinated with a large number of schemes such as 
manual seriation etc.). By applying and co-ordinating these sensorimotor schemes, 
the child not only acquires a multifaceted and stable understanding of the objects in 
the immediate environment, he/she also acquires a flexible system of sensorimotor 
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operations, through which he/she can acquire further knowledge of new objects in 
new environments. In other words, the infant develops a conception of the 
environment as existing independent of itself. 
This is a limited sort of practical intelligence. The characteristics of the system of 
sensorimotor operations, are such that any effect produced by one scheme (say 
grasping), can be reversed by another scheme (for example, replacement). Note, that 
"scheme" is a Piagetian term; it does not mean a conscious plan, it is more like a 
skill, for example, the scheme of grasping, the scheme of following a moving object 
with one's eyes. These "schemes" (skills) develop in the Sensorimotor period. In 
summary, Piaget has postulated that during the stage of Sensorimotor intelligence, the 
child learns to: 
(1) co-ordinate perceptual and motor functions; 
(2) utilise certain simple schemata with external objects; 
(3) use simple forms of symbolic behaviour. 
However, the major conquest at this stage, is that of objects. 
2.4.8 PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR AND ORGANISATION OF 
CONCRETE OPERATIONS (2 to 11 years approximately) 
2.4.8(a) Sub-Period or Pre-operational Representation (2 to 4 years 
approximately) 
The next six years of life (Le. between the age of two and 
eight), sees a parallel trend to the Sensorimotor stage (Le. first 2 or 3 
years of life) appearing, but this time at a higher level. (Piaget, 1952, 
1960, Inhelder and Piaget, 1964). The child having mastered the basic 
Sensorimotor operations which are pertinent to his/her immediate 
environment, begins to represent these operations symbolically 
(through language, mental imagery, and the ability to draw) and to 
manipulate objects both mentally and physically. The similarity of the 
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new schemes which a child develops during this period ( pre-
operational) with those which were developed during the Sensorimotor 
intelligence stage, is in the fact that they (the new schemes developed) 
can still be applied only in the presence of, or on, concrete objects. 
But the difference lies in the fact that these new schemes now involve 
actions that can be described as more internal (mental) in character, for 
instance, procedures for combining and manipulating words, 
procedures for classifying objects, and procedures for quantifying. At 
first, the symbolic schemes that emerge are (like the Sensorimotor 
stage) rather global and isolated. For example, 
the mental activity of finding the larger of the two 
objects would be based on global appearances and 
would not yet be co-ordinated with the reciprocal 
activity of finding the smaller of the two objects. 
(Case 1978, p.169) 
In a typical Piagetian experiment (Piaget, 1952), the child in this 
stage will be shown a box containing a large number of brown and a 
small number of white wooden beads. When asked if there are more 
wooden beads, helshe will reply that there are more brown beads. This 
behaviour is typical of a child who is unable to perform the operations 
of abstraction and inclusion, which are required in the formation of a 
logical system of classes. (This stage is called the pre-conceptual 
substage of the pre-operational stage). 
2.4.8(b) Period of Intuitive Intelligence (4 to 7 years 
approx.) 
However, later, these symbolic schemes, once again (as in the 
Sensorimotor stage) become more differentiated and co-ordinated, so 
that by the age of approximately six to eight, the child has begun to 
form a new system, exemplified by the intuitive intelligence. During 
this stage, the child acquires the concept of permanence of quantity. In 
a typical Piagetian experiment to demonstrate this, two glasses are 
filled to the same level with a coloured liquid. The liquid from one 
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glass is poured into a tall narrow cylinder, and the child is asked if the 
amounts are still the same. The five year old will likely state that the 
amount is unchanged. In order to reach this conclusion, the child must 
perform two basic operations. Firstly, he/she has to decentre his 
attention from one aspect of the situation so that he understands that a 
process of compensation has taken place. Secondly, he/she must have 
developed the intellectual structure which allows reversibility to take 
place, i.e. the water can be returned into the glass without any change 
in volume. 
2.4.8(c) Sub-Period of Concrete Operations (7 to 11 years 
approx.) 
Thus, during the years from two to eight, as well as acquiring 
the knowledge of basic categories and relations of relevance in their 
environments, children also acquire a system of concrete operations 
through which they can acquire further knowledge of this sort in new 
environments. The basic characteristic of the concrete operation is that 
the effect of anyone mental action (e.g. width increase) can be reversed 
or compensated for by some other mental action (e.g. width decrease, 
or height increase). 
However, approximately between the ages of seven and eleven 
years, the child's system of concrete operations become increasingly 
stable and generalised. Simultaneously, the foundation for the 
emergence of a higher order mental operation is laid. (Inhelder and 
Piaget, 1958). These higher order mental operations take the products 
of the second state (i.e .. the mental operations of the preceding stage) 
as building blocks and operate on objects. The mental functioning of 
the child during the concrete operational state, is such that when he/she 
witnesses and increase of weight on one arm of a balance, a simple 
negation of this effect by the subtraction of the same amount of weight, 
can be imagined by him/her. There will also be an understanding of 
the reciprocal effect produced by an addition of weight to the other 
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side. In effect the child is actively able to operate on external objects. 
The major conquests during this stage are those of conservation, 
seriation, and classification. By using these systems, the child is 
liberated from the strictures and limitations of pre-operational stage; he 
can now disassociate his actions from their effects. This liberation 
however, is only of a partial nature, because, although he now has 
available to him a series of logical operations, he can only use these 
operations in isolation from each other. When faced with problems 
which require the simultaneous use of two or more operations he is 
unable to reach a solution. This is attributable to his inability to 
combine these systems into a single integrated system. As a 
forerunner for formal operation, the child in the concrete operation is 
supposed to be capable of sorting out objects in a fashion which has 
been described in symbolic terms by Inhelder and Piaget; namely, 
given two classes Al and A2, with either complementaries (things that 
do not belong in Al and A2), AI" and A2", concrete class logic 
furnishes only four elementary products. (AI *A2, Al *A2", 
Al "*A2"). 
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2.4.8(d) The Period of Formal Operation (from 11 years 
approx.) 
This is the period of acquisition of formal operations, that is, 
reversible mental operations upon propositions, hypothetico-deductive 
thinking, formal reasoning. Reality becomes subordinate to possibility. 
Propositional logic according to Piaget, depends upon a 'combinatorial 
system', and this is associated with the group of operations called the 
INRC group. 
Children at this stage of development (Le .. formal operation) 
are thought to be capable of taking either the operation of negation or 
reciprocity as a starting point for the generation of the others mentally 
in the absence of any concrete instance. Furthermore, they are thought 
to be capable of taking relation between these two relations as a given, 
and imagine an inverse relation between relations in some other 
variables such as the distance from the fulcrum of the beam balance. 
By applying and comparing operations, children become capable of 
generating possible combinations in a given situation and with this a 
procedure for experimentally eliminating all combinations except one, 
in order to isolate the effect of one particular variable. 
In other words, besides acquiring an understanding of the world 
that is more abstract and complex, the adolescent also acquires a co-
ordinated system of formal operations, through which he/she can 
acquire similar abstract knowledge in new content areas. However, 
during this formal operational stage, the adolescent learns to use 
hypothetical reasoning based on the logic of all possible combinations. 
Clearly, in this stage, there is a shift of emphasis from the real to the 
possible suggesting that the individual has developed a cognitive 
strategy which can be brought into use to enable him/her to determine 
reality within the complex organisation of the possible. It is this 
strategy which allows him/her to use a mode of reasoning which is 
hypothetico-deductive in nature. He/she is now able to reason by the 
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separation of the real from the hypothetical. He/she constructs 
hypotheses which incorporate all the data available; these he/she 
examines, rejecting those which do not fit into the context of the 
problem, whilst moving those which do conform to the domain of 
reality. And as will become apparent later on, the problem-solving 
nature of design and technology subjects requires the pupils to 
determine the problem, generate possible solutions, and then choose 
the most suitable one. The reasoning mode employed is similar to the 
one mentioned above. 
Thus, the thinking of the individual is now characterised by its 
propositional quality; he is no longer limited to concrete operations. 
He/She is able to use those operations to manipulate the raw data, and 
then to form the results of these operations into propositions, upon 
which he/she carries out a further set of operations. These features of 
Formal Operations, are accounted for in terms of symbolic logic, in his 
Meta-theory. According to Piaget's Meta-theory, in formal operations, 
we are concerned typically with propositions; (statements) and 
relationships between statements. Such that by taking the two 
propositions (not classes or objects as in concrete operations) (p = it is 
red) and (q = it is square), with their negations (P" = it is not red) and 
q" = it is not square), formal logic furnishes sixteen (16) possible 
combinations, derived from four (4) elementary propositional 
conjunctions (possibilities). (see the illustration on page 38) 
It must however be stressed, that Piaget's use of logic here, is different 
from anybody else's. He writes in such a way as to make one think 
that is using conventional logic. However, Piaget's idea concerning 
formal logic furnishing sixteen possible combinations, allows us to 
penetrate, as it were, into the structure of formal operations. And by 
way of expounding this idea, an interesting arrangement of it (Le. the 
sixteen possible combinations), has been presented by (Richmond 
1971). 
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.L)I j~GET' 3 SYSTEl'l OF SIXTEEN BIHARY OPERJ\TIONS - A nIitGRAH. 
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Truth tables fer the sixte e n binary operations 
of propositional logi~. 
'l' be dia[~rara abov e is derived from A. L. Baldwin's exposi tion of J·' iaget, 
b ut. h:"'G b u on arrall~od in £.. u .'.y suggesteJ by P.G. Richmond. 
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From this arrangement, suppose one wishes to find the evidence 
against the idea, If p, then q. (i.e. possibility fourteen), one would be 
looking for something that was red and not square. This would be the 
evidence against the idea If p, then q. Richmond's diagram shows, that 
the evidence against the idea in question, is possibily no.3 in the 
diagram. One can get from no. 14 to no. 3 by swinging a supposed or 
imaginary pointer in the middle around 180 degrees. This no. 3 is 
called the negation of no. 14, and the process is the finding of negation. 
In Piagetian thinking, as no. 3 is the negation of no .14, so also is no. 14 
a negation of no. 3. And similarly, no.4 is the negation of no .13. 
However, possibilities no. 13 (if q, then not p) and no. 14 (if p, then not 
1), respectively, are referred to by Piaget as reciprocal. He says that 
no.13 is the reciprocal of no. 14; no.4 is the reciprocal of no.3; no.ll 
is the reciprocal of no.6. 
Note that it is not important to know why Piaget uses the terms 
reciprocal, and rather than trying to justify him we should expound 
him. So, in Piaget, we find these two relationships, negation and 
reciprocal. They are relationships between relationships. There is yet 
another relationship called correlative. Piaget says, that no.14 is the 
correlative of no.4. 
The final relationship is identity. This means leaving things 
where they are. For example, if p, then q, is identical to if p, then q. 
(Le. red is red: a chair is a chair). These relationships namely, 
identity, negation, reciprocal, correlative, are related in some way, and 
collectively called the INRC or INCR group. 
Furthermore, a simple electrical apparatus can be used to 
describe the logical structure of formal operation. This description 
resembles the coloured liquids experiment used by Piaget. Consider 
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the possibility of a board onto which has been mounted a bulb Z and a 
switch A, (see fig. a). 
The logical possibilities under which the bulb will light are as 
follows: (a) the bulb Z lights when switch A is up (b) the bulb Z lights 
when switch A is down. This can be represented symbolically, viz., 
(a) Z = A (b) Z = A" Imagine that there is a further board onto 
which has been added a second switch, (see fig. b). The possibilities 
raised by this extra switch are as follows: 
(a) Z = A*B (i.e. switch A up, B up) 
(b) Z = A,,*B ( " " A down, B up) 
(c) Z = A*B" ( " " A up, B down) 
(d) Z - A"*B" ( " " A down, B down) 
These possibilities can be represented by the expression 
Z = (A*B) + (A"*B) + (A*B") + (A"*B") 
The possible associations symbolised by the above expression 
are the product of a one-to-one class multiplicative system, which 
represents the attainment of concrete operations stage. The inverse of 
the system, i.e.. the conditions which will cause the bulb not to light, 
are beyond the child's at this level. Only at the level of formal 
operations will the child be able to invert reality. Increase in the 
number of switches as in fig (c), results in an increase of the variables 
inherent in the problem. At the concrete level, the subject can handle 
these variables by the above process, but each variable must be 
considered in isolation from the others: he cannot as yet, consider their 
combined effects. The individual operating at the formal operations 
level, approaches the problem differently. The associations (A *B) and 
(A" *B) are regarded by him as propositional and, consequently, do not 
have class significance. They are representations of hypothetical 
statements which he can experimentally verify. The products of the 
concrete multiplicative operations are now hypotheses, upon which he 
can carry out 'second order' operations. 
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This change from intrapropositional to interpropositional 
operations has been represented in the language of symbolic logic. 
Accordingly, the symbols A and A", become p and q is true, and q" is 
not true). The class multiplication signs (*), are replaced by the 
conjunction sign (.), and the addition signs by the disjunction sign (V). 
The reversed notation for the four possibilities is as follows: 
(a) (A*B) becomes, p. q 
(b) (A"*B) " p" .q 
(c) (A*B") " p.q" 
(d) A"*B") " p".q" 
The statement p.q means that both are true. Similarly, p V q, 
means that either p or q is true, or that both are true. Its meaning can 
also be expressed by (p.q") V (p" .q). The only possibility which p V q 
denies is p" .q" (the possibility that neither is true). It is clear that the 
four base associations used above are conceived as possibilities, and 
have been represented as letters a.b.c.d. From these four associations 
there are sixteen distinct possible combinations (See fig. d). The 
sixteen combinations come about by taking the four base associations, 
and combining them one by one, two by two, three by three, four by 
four. This set of sixteen combinations provides the description of the 
'lattice' type of structure common to formal operation thinking. 
However, the alternative explanation to Piaget' s Meta-theory, 
seems to suggest that, actual human thinking is richer and more varied 
than any logical calculus can [possibly] model. (Shayer and Adey, 1981 , 
p.26) This alternative explanation to Piaget's Meta-theory, based on the 
principles of cybernetics, has been put forward by McLaughlin (1963), 
Case (1974) and Pascual-Leone and Goodman (1979). There is no 
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attempt to question the operations which Piaget has identified. Instead, 
they are offering a different interpretation of them. 
As will be made apparent later, both systems accept the 
existence of operational structures. They conceptualize them in terms 
of sets of schemes, which reflect previous knowledge and govern the 
acquisition of new knowledge via their control of the equilibration 
process. Whereas Piaget thinks that these structures can be modelled as 
logical competence, and subsequently expressed in symbolic logic, the 
alternative position is that these structures can be modelled as: 
sets of executive schemes whose releasing cues and 
sequences of effecting acts can be inferred directly 
from children's performance .... (Case, 1978, p.192). 
However, despite some compatibility between the notion of 
logical structure and executive schemes, the content of the latter can 
possibly be specified more easily and concretely than logical structure, 
according to (Case, 1978). By this conceptual shift, it is believed that 
children's thought can be modelled in a more detailed and precise 
manner; it is more closely tied up with observed behaviour. This line 
of thought will be taken up later. 
2.5 STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT: A SUMMARY OF 
CHARACTERISTICS 
All in all, four major Piagetian stages (with substages) of the development of thought 
(or how an individual comes to understand increasing by complex structures), can be 
delineated from the above examination. They are, as will be seen in a number of texts 
on this subject, and subsequently mentioned here, namely: sensorimotor stage; 
preoperational stage; concrete operational stage; and the formal operational stage. 
As already been mentioned, the sensorimotor stage, is the period from birth to about 
two or three years of age. In this stage, the infant (1) learns to co-ordinate perceptual 
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and motor functions; (2) utilise certain simple forms of symbolic behaviour. During 
this stage, the major conquest by the child is the conquest of objects. The period that 
extends immediately from sensorimotor stage until about six or seven years of age, is 
generally referred to as sub-period preoperational representations. This is a period 
during which the child beings symbolically to represent the external world through 
language. The child demonstrates this mainly by generalising, and the major conquest 
during this stage is that of language, mental imagery, ability to draw etc. Then comes 
the sub-period of concrete operation, which manifests itself between the ages of seven 
and eleven years. During this stage, the child is actively able to operate on external 
objects. The major conquest here is that of conservation, seriation, and classification. 
Finally, the formal operation represents the third major stage, and manifests itself 
from the age of eleven years approximately. This is the stage at which the adolescent 
acquires formal operations, i.e.. reversible mental operations upon operations, 
hypothetico-deductive thinking, formal reasoning. Here, reality, is subordinated to 
possibility . And according to Piaget, propositional logic depends upon a 
"combinatorial system", and this he says is associated with a group of operations 
known as the INRC group. In other words, formal operations are characteristic of the 
previous stages of operational intelligence, which reflects on the concrete operations 
through the elaboration of formal group structures (i.e. INRC). The formal group 
structure includes multiplicative compensation, probability, correlational reasoning, 
logic, propositional reasoning, the coordination of two or more frames (or systems) of 
reference and mechanical eqUilibrium. 
Thus, the adolescent develops formal operations, which are organised internal mental 
activities performed upon statements (or propositions). He/she becomes able to 
propose hypotheses and to test them systematically. He/she becomes aware of a set of 
possible states of affairs within which exists the one actual state of affair. In other 
words, the use of hypothetical reasoning based on the logic of all possible combination 
is what the adolescent learns during this stage. 
Thus, it can be seen that, apart from the sensorimotor period, the rest of the periods 
are operational, because they involve a type of action to be carried out directly or 
internally by the individual. Inhelder and Piaget (1958), accordingly assert that: 
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an operation differs from simple action or goal directed behaviour in 
that it is internalised and reversible (eg. adding or subtracting, joining 
or separating). It is an action which is bound up with others in an inte-
grated structure. (p. xiv) 
The integrated structures are presumed to depend upon the stages of development, 
and can be related to a special group of logical forms of structures. Thus, whereas the 
concrete operations stage depends upon the logic of classification (class inclusion), 
seriation, one to one correspondence, and conservation, the formal operational stage 
depends upon the logic of combinatorial operations, proportions, co-ordination of two 
systems of reference, and the relativity of motion or acceleration, the concept of 
mechanical equilibrium, the notion of probability, the notion of correlation, the forms 
of conservation which go beyond direct empirical verification and multiplicative 
compensation. (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958 p.310-329). The operations that are of real 
interest in school years are those characterised by concrete and formal thought. 
47 
2.6 VARIABLES WHICH ACCOUNT FOR PROGRESS FROM 
ONE STAGE TO ANOTHER 
Piaget claims that there are four factors or causes, which affect the child's progress 
through the developmental stages. These are (a) maturation, (b) experience, (c) social 
experience of socialisation and (d) equilibration. (Piaget, 1964). 
(a) Maturation: This is very open, and not unambiguously defmed by anyone. What 
is usually referred to as maturation includes some process or processes that go on 
independently of the outside world; i.e .. something that goes on in the individual, 
according to his biological nature. Note, that environment also affects maturation; ego 
the child would need food (nutrition), for maturation (and survival). 
(b) Experience (Activity): This is subdivided into three namely, (i) simple exercise; 
for example like practising sucking or reflex, activity is improved (ii) physical 
experience: which consists of extracting information from objects themselves. 
(knowledge) (iii) Logico-mathematical experience: for example, counting forward 
and backward. (Action plus knowledge). 
(c) Influence of social environment: for example, education. 
(d) Equilibration: this is an organising factor which co-ordinates other facts. (self-
regulation) . 
N one of these factors is considered sufficient for the development of thought; all of 
them play an important part in the process. Having said this, Piaget seems to regard 
equilibration as the most important of these four factors. Because, despite the fact that 
he concedes the necessity of the other three factors, the exact mechanism by which 
they exert their influence or effect, is not properly treated or defmed, and their 
importance is consistently downgraded. (Piaget, 1964, 1970). As was mentioned 
earlier, Piaget is also vague in his explanation of the process of equilibration. (Piaget 
1964, 1970, 1971). 
2.7 USEFULNESS OF PIAGETIAN STAGE THEORY 
The implications of Piaget' s work for curriculum materials and the teaching of 
particular school subjects, have been enormous. For example, practising teachers 
readily invoke the "readiness" concept; that it is not worthwhile to instruct children in 
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material which requires thinking at a higher stage than that at which they are currently 
capable of thinking (algebra, for example, may not be attempted until a certain age 13 
years). Furthermore, inductive teaching with much use of concrete material is to be 
used for children, and there should be less talk and chalk. 
In the early and middle 1970s, authors including, in History, de Silva (1972) and 
Hallam (1967, 1969, 1970); in Geography, Rhys (1972), in English Literature, 
Mason (1974); in Mathematics, Collis (1975, and Lovell (1971); in Science, Shayer 
et. a1. (1976), have all held onto the fact that internal logical structures guide 
behaviour. To the extent that any error in the responses of children at different 
stages, is indicative of natural developmental phenomena, rather than the result of 
"carelessness", inadequate learning, or poor teaching. All these researchers must be 
greatly indebted to the notion of the coherence of the stages. 
They maintain, that taking account of what the learner already knows [what Ausubel 
(1968) refers to as prior knowledge], in terms of the cognitive operations available to 
him, can ensure some permanent learning. And if a mismatch between the logical 
demands of what is to be taught and the operations available to the learner exists, then 
permanent learning will hardly take place. Anderson (1968) (see Driver, 1982, 
p.357), has shown this to be plausible. 
2.7.1 HOMOGENEITY OF THE STAGES 
The idea of "Matching" arises from the implications of Piaget's stages thus, 
that 
the operation characteristic of each stage becomes integrated and 
consolidated. (Driver 1982, p.356) 
so much so that they have internal coherence before significant development in 
operation, typical of the next stage, takes place. However, there have been 
confirmations about the internal coherence of the stages. Lunzere (1965) 
reviewed the homogeneity of the stages and confirmed the unitary nature of 
concrete operation. Lovell (1961), using about ten Piagetian tasks as 
described in the Growth of logical thinking, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) was in 
sympathy with this idea of internal coherence of the stages. The research by 
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Lawson and Renner (1974), Lawson and Norland (1976), and Shayer (1979), 
supports this notion. The factor analytic study carried out by Lawson, et. al. 
(1978), which involved the use of tasks involving propositional logic, 
propositions, probability, and correlations, is supportive of the notion of 
homogeneity of the stages and also worthy of mention. However, for 
Berzonsky (1968), Hughes (1980), and Brown and Desforges (1977), the 
notion of internal coherence of the stages is unfounded. 
Although the notion of internal coherence of the stages has received 
considerable attention by researchers, because of its potential, and practical 
values in education, the Meta-theory used by Piaget to explain the homogeneity 
of the stages has been queried by Parsons (1960), Bynum, et. al. (1972), and 
an alternative explanation offered by McLaughlin (1963), Pascual-Leone et. 
al., and Case (1978). Yet, efforts to exploiting its potential have continued. 
For example, attempts have been made to match the logical demands of a 
curriculum to the operational capabilities of the pupils. Such attempts, as in 
Shayer and Adey (1981, p.26), have acknowledged the difficulties, 
uncertainties, etc. , involved in Piaget' s Meta-theory. Instead, they have 
concentrated on that dimension of Piaget's Protocol (2nd tier) which allows for 
the observation of children: for example, watching their performance and 
monitoring their responses at times in natural settings, but often in problem-
solving situations. This involves the actual description of the pupils' 
responses, (which are accounted for by the cognitive structures or operations 
available to the learner). Then these descriptions are appropriately 
categorised. 
This appears to be a fair alternative in response to the difficulties shown to be 
associated with the Meta-theory. These difficulties arise because the Meta-
theory is thought to have the power to predict human behaviour. Lawson and 
Karplus (1978) stated that Meta-theory was evolved by Piaget, as a means of 
explaining the logic involved in the ten schemas which he described as 
underlying the performance of children in different tasks. These schemas are 
as follows:-
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• control of variables, 
• exclusion of irrelevant variables 
• combinatorial thinking 
• notion of probability 
• notion of correlations 
• co-ordination of frame of reference 
• multiplicative compensation 
• eqUilibrium of physical system 
• proportional thinking 
• physical conservation involving 'model'. 
Thus, the inability for the Meta-theory to produce falsifiable predications 
cannot justify the rejection of the whole gamut of psychological description 
produced by Piaget and his associates. By way of suggesting a fair quantitative 
test for Piaget's Meta-theory, Shayer and Adey (1981), lay their emphasis not 
on the predictivity of behaviour, but on the consistency of the schema. In this 
respect, they introduced three levels of explanation or description, for the unity 
of formal operation. Whereas one level is extremely qualitative, another is 
extremely quantitative. Between these extremes, is a level (2nd tier mentioned 
above) which allows for the observation of children. 
2.7.2 MATCHING MODEL 
2.7.2(a) Science Subjects 
Science is considered here because of its strong relationship with 
technology, as will be demonstrated in that section of this work which 
deals with technology and its meaning for education. 
The evidence of the coherence of the stages has led to the concept of 
matching. Science 5 to 13 (in England) and (ASEP) in Australia, are 
the two curriculum projects which have been designed such that 
materials are presented to the pupils according to the cognitive demands 
which they make. Teachers who use these curriculum materials are 
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given instructions on how to diagnose the level of thinking a pupil is 
capable of, and thus how to select material which matches in order that 
development may be stimulated. Implicit in this programme, is the 
notion that pupils' learning depends on developmental level, and there 
are other studies within the area of science, to demonstrate this too. 
They include the study by Lawson and Renner (1975), wherein a 
mismatch has been identified between the logical demands of secondary 
science courses and the developmental level of the pupils. Sayre and 
Ball (1975), with a combination of interviews and Piagetian tasks, 
assessed the level of thinking of the Junior and Senior grade (14 to 18 
year oIds) , and demonstrated that the scores obtained on the tasks 
correlated with the grades obtained in science courses. Shayer and his 
associates have done a considerable amount of work using the matching 
model. Shayer and Adey (1981) have attempted to relate the 
psychological characteristics of the pupils to the demands of science 
curriculum. They were hoping to establish an "appropriate" match, 
after previous research (Shayer et. al., 1976) had indicated that there 
was a considerable mismatch between the logical demands of the 
curriculum and the cognitive capabilities of the pupils. Shayer and 
Adey (1981, p.72-79), identified about nine process areas in science 
subjects by (reflection) using Piaget's protocol, and proceed to defme 
different levels of attainment within each of these areas. 
They end up with a method for estimating the level of 
thinking demanded by science curriculum activities. Based 
upon their report about an empirical study in which pupils' 
performance on tasks assessed to be at a late concrete level can 
be predicted from their performance on group- administered 
Piagetian tasks, they recommend this test instrument for use by 
teachers for assessing the cognitive level of their pupils. 
Furthermore, they report a correlation of 0.77, which suggests 
that about 60 % of the variance in the score can be predicted on 
the basis of these Piagetian tests. (Shayer, 1978). 
However, (Driver 1982, p.359), has reasons to be cautious 
about Shayer's report. After expressing her worries about 
the .... 'reliability of the analysis of the cognitive demand of 
the curriculum materials themselves" , 
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she seems to think that it is not inconceivable, that the level ascribed to 
any lesson topic may depend on the teacher's interpretation of the 
material and the approach used. In other words, the issue involved is 
pedagogical rather than curricular. A particular topic may be treated 
in such a way as to demand formal operational thinking. Generally, in 
practice, we are most likely to find that most teachers would treat a 
particular topic in a manner that requires concrete operational thinking. 
53 
2.7.2(b) English Language/Literature Subjects 
In English language, where some aspects such as the notion of relative 
space, etc., overlap with those in science subjects, some investigators 
have, with reasonable success, written out at least four or five lists of 
abstract processes, which every English teacher recognises as being 
important for understanding. Then, they managed to define these 
abstract processes, and the different levels in them. In English 
Literature, Fusco (1983) identified eight process skills required for the 
understanding of various tests. They are (1) Classification ability; (2) 
Class inclusion ability; (3) Seriation ability; (4) Probabilistic notion; (5) 
Relating cause to effect; (6) Correlational reasoning; (7) Combinatorial 
reasoning; (8) Propositional arguments; (9) Proportionality notions; 
(10) Co-ordination of frames of reference. 
Each of the above process areas is then described in Piagetian terms. 
Taking Classification ability as an example, what is meant by late 
formal classification ability is described and a specific example, in 
terms of the texts to be given to pupils to work on, is also given. 
She used this information to analyse (1) the cognitive level of the 
students in secondary school, and (2) the cognitive demands of the 
literature text books. Her reports tend to suggest that children are more 
likely to perform better where there is a match between their cognitive 
level and the cognitive level of the literature text books. 
Adey (1979), minimised the difficulty which pupils had with the 
learning of some aspects of science subjects (physics), by first 
determining the cognitive levels of both the pupils and the curriculum 
and appropriately matching them, using Piagetian protocol. However, 
the (potential) advantages of matching the operational capabilities of the 
learner to the logical demands of the curriculum material have been 
expressed by many. In English Literature, Hunt (1961), like Shayer 
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and Adey (1981), stressed the importance of "matching" the learner to 
the material, and accordingly asserts that 
the environmental circumstances force accommodative 
modification in schemata only when there is an appropriate 
match between the circumstances that a child encounters and 
the schemata that he has already assimilated into his repertoire. 
(p.268.) 
He points out that critical periods occur when this appropriate match is 
achieved to promote optimal growth. According to Hunt, during this 
period, 
accommodative modifications in central structures take 
place when the child encounters circumstances which 
so match his already assimilated schemata that he is 
motivated by them and can cope with them. (p.280) 
Matching process, according to Hunt (1961) is vital in teaching because 
through it the necessity arises for the analyses of the already assimilated 
schemata of the pupil and the newly presented task or circumstance. But he 
recognises the problem involved since such assessment could only be obtained 
through observing behaviour, listening while the pupil expressed himlherself 
on a particular matter, and from knowing the individual's past experiences. 
There is a further need to analyse the pupil's potential intellectual ability. The 
description of successive stages of intellectual development by Piaget removes 
the necessity for some trial and error in determining the appropriate match. ( 
p.287) 
Elkind (1974) (see Fusco 1983, p.30) has been concerned with the 
problems that occur when education is inappropriately matched with the 
child's intellectual and emotional development. He reviews the work of 
Piaget and reports that the child's thinking grows both by substitution 
(Le., by replacing a less mature idea with a more mature one), and by 
integration (Le .. , less mature ideas are brought together to arrive at 
more complex and abstract conceptions). This growth was always in 
the same direction - toward ever greater objectivity, reciprocity and 
relativity . 
55 
Case (1985, p.27) acknowledges the 'goodness' 
in the matching concept, yet he insists, that because of 
the rational and empirical problems engendered by the 
notion of logical structure, attempts at matching learners' 
ability to the curriculum are problematic. They are 
problematic because, one will need to specify what 
logical structure is of relevance to the subject area in 
question. 
Furthermore, 'successful' matching would necessitate the assessment of 
the presence or absence of this structure in the pupils. Neither of these, 
according to Case (1985) is easily achieved because of the abstractness 
of Piaget's theory and the presence of decalage. Nor is Stewart (1979) 
satisfied with Preece (1976), Shaeffer (1980), and Shavetson (1974) 
who used concept mapping and word association, to ascertain what the 
learner already knows (semantic words). He seems to think that these 
authors in fact assessed semantic proximity, Le .. , words which tend to 
be associated in semantic memory. 
In spite of the advantages offered by the matching model, Piaget's stage 
theory is limited and has come under attack. 
2.8 CRITICISMS OF THE STAGE THEORY 
Piaget's stage theory has come under severe attack by his critics. The main 
difficulties with Piaget's theory, which his critics always point to, are those associated 
with the assertion that development of children is controlled by the emergence of 
general logical structures, (Le .. the notion of a logical structure), and that transition 
from one stage of development to another is as a result of the process of equilibration. 
With respect to the notion of a logical structure, two major attacks are made purely 
from the rational viewpoint. One the one hand, the abstractness and the difficulties 
operationalizing the concept is much in evidence (Brainerd, 1973, Flavell, 1963). On 
the other hand, the logical model proposed by Piaget contains mathematical or logical 
errors (Ennis, 1975). 
Empirically, the problem of horizontal decalages showed quite clearly. 
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In any case, in criticising the "structure d'ensemble" (i.e .. the structured whole of 
each stage), what his critics have done is to decompose his hypothesis of structured 
whole into its principal empirical criteria, namely, universality and synchrony. 
Such decomposition opens Piaget's hypothesis to attack (Fisher and Silvern, 1985, 
p.632). In questioning whether the implied need for the synchronous appearance of a 
set of behaviour as evidence of a stage made any meaningful sense, Modgil and 
Modgil (1976) quote Brainerd (1973) as having expressed the opinion that 
. . . .. if we take the constant operation of the groupments as the deflning 
attributes of a particular stage of mental development (as Piaget does) the 
predictions of the synchronous emergence of operations within groupments 
are psychometrically inescapable. 
However, it is worth remembering that Piaget hypothesised that all children will show 
high synchrony in the sequence across domains, at least at each age when a new 
structured whole shows. Synchrony requires a child who has developed concrete 
operations in one type of conservation (say, of amount of water) simultaneously to 
develop concrete operations in others (say, of length of string). Indeed, the structured 
whole should induce concrete operational structures simultaneously in tasks involving 
schemes other than conservation: eg., classiflcation, seriation, and number (Inhelder 
and Piaget, 1964). The strictest interpretation of the structured whole hypothesis 
requires that the child develops concrete operations in all domains at virtually the 
same point in time, thus demonstrating what can be regarded as "point synchrony". 
However, this has not been found to be the case. Biggs and Collis( 1982) and Flavell 
(1982), have shown that children manifest high unevenness or decalages. This has 
even been acknowledged by Piaget (1971) who asserts that this unevenness cannot be 
explained. And as Broughton (1981) concurs, within the structuralist scheme, this 
variation is difflcult if not impossible to explain. 
Amongst the studies which have reported asynchronism in the appearance of 
responses characteristic of the same stage, is Lovell and Ogilvie (1960), who report 
that a signiflcant number of children who conserve rubber band substance, cannot 
conserve plasticine. This is not in tune with Piaget's hypothesis of synchrony. Even 
in their later studies about conservation of weight, Lovell and Ogilvie (1961) report 
that, although most children manifest the logical operations of transitivity of weight 
relations and reversibility over shapes, they still have problems with conserving 
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weight, particularly due to the fact that they have interfering beliefs about the effects 
of other variables like hardness, warmth, dryness, etc., on weight. The authors 
conclude by asserting that conservation difficulties cannot be explained in terms of 
logical mental structures. 
Smedslund (1961), in a similar work in which the relationship between logical 
operations and conservation is implied, reports that transitivity of weight (as an 
example of a logical operation) failed to occur simultaneously with conservation of 
weight, (as an example of infra-logical operation) amongst a group of 4085 to 7 year 
olds. 
Uzgiris (1964), reports that although children conserve substance, weight, and volume 
etc., there are individual differences between the children regarding the order in 
which the different materials are conserved, a variability which she thinks is 
accounted for by their individual past experiences. 
Lunzer (1960) is suspicious of Piaget's attempt to associate observed behaviour with 
underlying psychological processes, and demonstrates that the pupils' ability to 
calculate volume from dimensions is perhaps more associated with their ability to 
understand proverbs than to concepts of infinity and continuity. The appearance of 
somewhat similar skills in pupils of the same age range is not evidence for causal 
connections between skills: 
Complexity of logical structure demands a parallel complexity in the 
corresponding psychological process. But the two structures are not 
necessarily identical, and it is the second which is fundamental to the 
cognitive development of children. (Lunzer, 1960, p.198). 
Furthermore, two hundred and forty 5 to 10 year olds have been studied by Dodwell 
(1960) for acquisition of number concepts. The results show many examples of 
asequential development of responses reminiscent of three stages:-
• A (global comparison) 
• B (intuitive stage) 
• C (operational stage) 
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Besides, the chances of a child who is at stage C for cardination and ordination being 
found to be in stage C for seriation were slim: only 0.56. Furthermore, the 
probability of the same child being in stage B for seriation is 0.45. 
By citing a number of studies, the majority of which concern either the acquisition of 
formal operations in different task situations, or show evidence of "precocity" (the 
production of what is considered an advanced level of behaviour by a child thought to 
be at an early state), Brown and Desforges (1977) launch a ferocious attack on the 
concept of stage. 
For instance, they cite Neimark's results (1975) which show a correlation of about 
0.4 between measures of formal operations based on tasks involving permutations and 
combinations. But they seem to have ignored the conclusion drawn by Neimark, 
namely, 
This evidence provides extremely strong support for Piaget's stage 
theory of cognitive growth.. . . . There is evidence for concrete and 
formal stages of task strategy with transition from concrete to formal 
through temporary intermediate levels. 
Brown and Desforges (1977), also cite Schwebel's studies of (1975) in which three 
formal operational tasks have been performed independently of one another. The 
conclusion from the results indicate that formal operational stage presents a particular 
kind of problem, regarding the equivalents of the ability of individuals at different 
tasks. 
The evidence of precocity used by Brown and Desforges for attacking the stage 
concept has been provided by Gelman and Tucker (1975), whose report shows that 
children estimate the number of a few objects shown for a short while by counting, 
while Piaget (1952 ) suggests that the process is more perceptual. 
Piaget's concept of equilibration has formed another line of attack by his critics on the 
concept of stage theory. For Piaget, the individual stage represents a stage of 
equilibrium, with the transitional stage between the main stages representing the states 
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of disequilibrium. This state of disequilibrium is thought to be engendered by 
cognitive conflict. And cognitive conflict in tum is vital for the process of 
development. It is in the area of training that cognitive conflict has been most useful. 
So much so that some research has reported that a cognitive conflict training 
(Piagetian training) can be more effective than other types of training. It is interesting 
to note that Piaget shows interest in teaching by saying something about it. But he has 
not done much research into teaching or training. It is not out of place to say that it is 
part of the tradition of child development theorists not to be interested in research into 
teaching and training. Developmental psychology has grown up with people studying 
the children as if there is no training involved. Although Piaget himself has not 
published any study about training, some people who have worked with him like 
Inhelder et.al. (1974) have published a book reporting experiments in which children 
have been supposedly trained. 
But Brainerd (1973), in his review about the question of training or acceleration 
studies, has cited instances of training techniques which have not involved cognitive 
conflict. Yet they are as effective as cognitive conflict in inducing 
temporarily durable, generalisable, conservation in the quantity area plus 
considerable for transfer to other concept area. (p.360) 
Generally speaking, those who have used standardised techniques in 'conflict' 
situations, get 
"poorer results than direct training techniques." (Vuyk 1981, p.376) 
These results, however, are not without problems. 
Novak (1978) reviews data from a number of studies about the development of 
concepts in cross-sectional samples of six to fifteen year olds and has been led to 
report the absence of obvious evidence of stepwise development because the data show 
a more or less smooth increase with age in the proportions of pupils achieving each 
concept, with no apparent evidence for stepwise development. 
These criticisms have paved the way for other conceptions of the 'stages', to which 
attention will be turned shortly. 
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2.S.1 STAGE AS A FUNCTION OF WORKING MEMORY AND 
GENERAL ABILITIES 
It has already been mentioned that levels of development depend to a great 
extent on the particular task presented to the pupils. However, this does not 
mean that there are no endogenous limitations to what they can do. In Piaget's 
theory, general abilities are in some way related to developmental stages. 
Working memory is one other (non structuralist) variable, which is related to 
developmental stages. According to McLaughlin (1963), Pascual-Leone 
(1972), Case (1980 a) and Halford (1980) what limits pupils on the level of 
structure they can obtain in solving a problem is the amount of working 
memory available or the M-space. This is interpreted to mean that 
preoperational thinking would involve a constant (K) + 1 item; early concrete, 
(K)+2, middle concrete, (K)+3; etc. A pupil with M-space of only (K)+2, 
would not be expected to solve problems demanding the simultaneous 
processing of (K) + 3 items, unless the problem is presented in such a way that 
would legitimately be solved in a (K)+2 space. When this happens, as Case 
(1980 b) has demonstrated, the pupil at the 'early concrete' will have solved a 
middle concrete problem. 
The educational implications of this concept of 'stage', is not that of 'wait-
until-ready' strategy associated with Piaget. And so, 'stage' is not explained in 
tenns of overall logical structures that exist in the mind of the pupil, but in 
terms of the amount of information that the individual can retain 
simultaneously, vis-a-vis the amount of information that the particular task 
requires for its solution. Decalages rather than present themselves as 
problems, merely show that some tasks present different infonnation 
requirements to different pupils, depending on how much they already know 
about the task to be solved. An unfamiliar task will require more M-space 
than familiar ones. Given the fact that a pupil is required to handle different 
kinds of tasks at various development periods, development is conceptualised 
in this tradition, as an interaction between two processes, namely: (1) the 
increase in sophistication with which a child handles particular kinds of tasks 
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within developmental stages which is indicative of a progressive increase in 
the amount of task relevant information that can be handled; (2) different 
developmental stages, which in themselves typify the nature of the task being 
attempted. In other words, by looking at the content of the task that is 
typically required by each Piagetian stage, as the pupil becomes increasingly 
familiar with each mode, the likelihood of handling complex problems within 
each mode increases. 
Here, there is some similarity with Piaget's broad stage concept, but the 
mechanism within each stage is given a different interpretation. 
2.8.2 STAGE AS UNIMPORTANT 
This conception of stage-related phenomenon argues strongly, that 
development is essentially based on (or determined by) familiarity with the task 
in question (or task requirements). Stages, according to this tradition, do not 
explain development, but simply describe a state of organisation achieved so 
far Brainerd (1978). Stages as 'artefacts of measurement' imply that if (A) 
includes (B), then by successfully accomplishing (A), (B) will necessarily be 
accomplished. This view of stages suggests that the most important thing is to 
study the nature of the task, the strategies and skills involved and the prior 
knowledge required to solve it (Brainerd, 1978, Brown & Desforges, 1977, 
Smedslund,1977) 
Perhaps a conception of stage which takes account of all the other conceptions, 
in view of the bulk of research evidence in support of 'stage-like' 
development, and the effect of environment and individual differences, would 
be more appropriate and comprehensive. (Fischer & Silvern, 1985) 
2.9 FURTHER PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH PIAGET'S 
THEORY 
Apart from the problems associated with Piaget's "stages", further limitations of his 
stage theory become apparent when one tries to answer two important questions raised 
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by any developmentally based theory of instruction. These questions, as put forward 
by (Case (1978) are (1) how should we structure an educational environment so that 
the acquisition of the major system of intellectual operations can be optimised? The 
assumption here, is that the acquisition of these systems can be influenced by the sorts 
of environmental factors that are potentially under human control. A further 
assumption, is that the environment in which the child is currently being raised is not 
optimal from a developmental view point. (2) how should we design the instruction of 
valued facts and skills, such that they are geared to the system of knowledge-gathering 
operations that the learner has available? Once again, the assumption here being that 
instructions which are not geared to a pupils available system of operations will not be 
optimal. It is not uncommon that pupils distort the information which they reproduce 
moments after instruction, demonstration, and explanation, which is thought to utilise 
a more advanced level of thinking than they themselves employ. (Blatt and Kohlberg, 
1971, Turiel, 1972) 
The strategy which can be deployed to deal with these questions at the strategic level 
is obvious from Piaget's protocol. Firstly, one simply provides a detailed account of 
the way in which the major operational structures manifest themselves in the content 
areas which are important, eg., mathematics, science, and history. In other words, 
one undertakes a structural analysis of the content area. Secondly, one then 
determines the stage or level at which the students to be taught are presently 
functioning, i.e. determine the current operational thinking or functioning of the 
pupils. Thirdly, the curriculum is structured in such a way as to improve or promote 
the transition from one stage to another higher one. 
This general procedure or steps for fostering operational development, and adapting 
instructional material to the current level of functioning of the pupils, is lucid. In 
order to transform these general steps into practice, Case (1978) suggests that a 
functional rather than a structural theory is required, due to the difficulties associated 
with each step. In fact, researchers, for example Biggs and Collis (1982) and Fusco 
(1983) who have worked within this area, have modified this general procedure 
because of the problems highlighted below. 
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Beginning with Step-l which is concerned with structural analysis, Case (1978), 
illustrates the problems inherent in this step using conventional academic tasks. The 
best known Piagetian analysis of an operational structure which underlies the 
conservation of substance is taken as an example. In this instance, the specific 
concept to be learnt is that the amount of matter, water, plasticine, etc., in a container 
remains constant or unchanged (invariant) regardless of perceptual deformations. Only 
children who have acquired the concept will realise the invariability of the amount of 
matter. According to Piaget, they are able to do this because they have acquired the 
understanding that the increase in the salient dimension that occurs during the 
transformation is compensated for by a decrease in the less salient dimension. 
Symbolically, Piaget expresses this knowledge as al * bl = a2 * b2 = a3 * b3 = ----
--- where a and b are dimensions such as height and cross-sectional area, and where 
the subscript represent the different values which these dimensions may take. The 
pupil who can do this, according to Piaget, is capable of imagining increase in one 
dimension, and then reversing the result of this operation by imagining a decrease in 
the other. As reversibility is the characteristic of concrete operation, Piaget concludes 
that the knowledge underlying the concept conservation cannot be acquired, unless the 
child has acquired the system of concrete operations. 
This analysis is quite appropriate for Piaget's purposes. However, in extending it to 
classroom task, it becomes problematic. Case (1978, p.172) seems to think that the 
groupings of logical operations described above may not have any role in other areas 
of academic study, except in science and mathematics. Furthermore, Piaget did not 
disclose the procedure which he used to uncover the role of the above logical 
grouping; for instance, watching the pupils' actual performance during conservation 
task does not give any indication that they are making mental compensation of the 
difference in height and in the cross-sectional area. One possible conclusion which 
can be drawn from this is that the procedure for determining the underlying 
operational structure is not simply to analyse pupils' responses to the task. Perhaps, it 
must be to analyse, instead, the knowledge that this performance was presumed to 
imply. Case (1978) maintains that it is still not quite clear how the operational 
structures that underlie specific tasks should be identified, even in well-defmed areas 
requiring logical reasoning, such as mathematics and science. 
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Nevertheless, if in analysing pupils' responses in order to determine the underlying 
operational structures, the knowledge implied by their performance is what is being 
analysed, then, it may be that identifying and analysing this knowledge in terms of 
Bloom's protocols can be helpful. And it is quite possible to relate such analysis to 
Piagetian protocol and the structure of observed learning outcome, identified by Biggs 
and Collis (1982). Fusco (1983), tried this idea in literature as a subject for secondary 
school pupils. 
Indeed Biggs and Collis (1982) and Shayer and Adey (1981) think that the operational 
structure underlying a particular curriculum subject can be identified. Biggs and 
Collis (1982) argue that such determination would involve a number of experts in the 
subject area in question, psychologist and educators, sitting together to discuss these 
underlying operational constructs. They would have to look at the aims of the 
subjects, etc., and the sort of activity which the pupils are required to carry out. They 
also give instances of this procedure in other areas of the curriculum. Shayer and 
Adey (1981) suggest that by reading the objectives of a course it is quite easy to elicit 
the underlying operational structures - what they have described as abstract descriptors 
- of the course. These appear to be the things that one expert in the subject area in 
question values, which another would readily agree as being important for 
understanding or operating effectively within the course or subject. 
In Step-2, which is concerned with the assessment of pupils' current level of thinking, 
Piagetian protocol suggests batteries of Piagetian tests, which can simply be 
administered, and pupils' level of operation (thinking) determined using appropriate 
scales. This looks simple, but it is not as simple as it looks, according to Case 
(1978). Because when the items on Piagetian tests which presumably tap very similar 
structure, are correlated, the coefficients are usually low and sometimes insignificant. 
However, it is quite common for two tests of the same mental battery to show low 
correlation coefficients. What this suggests from the point of view of instruction is 
that pupils', level of functioning must be assessed with regard to the specific structure 
that is required for a given task. (Case, 1978, p.173) Granted that the low 
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correlation of these tests items (of related structures) results, because of uncontrolled 
test factors, according to (Case 1978), 
it would not be possible to know whether a given child's performance 
resulted from the presence or absence of a particular operational structure 
of interest or from a response to one of the uncontrolled task factors. 
(p.173) 
More serious problems arise when Piagetian tests are used for ascertaining the level of 
pupils' thinking. This problem, is that of 'decalage' among tasks of supposed 
identically underlying structure. The absolute level of success varies widely, 
depending on the particular test item employed. For example, number conservation 
test is taken at age six years, whilst weight and displaced volume conservation tests 
are not taken until about the age of nine or ten years and eleven years respectively. 
This represents a serious problem from an educational viewpoint. If we are led to 
assume that a given structure is present at the kindergarten age, but may not be used 
or applied to a certain task until high school age, then the chances of knowing whether 
or not a pupil has acquired the structure are very small. Except through applying the 
structure to tasks that is of instructional relevance. But Piaget has not specified in his 
theory the factors that affect the application of intellectual structure to specific tasks. 
Step-3, having got the structural analysis of the subject and the operational level of 
functioning, the teaching of curriculum materials has to be adapted so that the pupils 
may work within their current level of functioning throughout each curriculum unit. 
However, in planning instruction so that it matches with pupils' existing structures, 
there are problems in optimising pupils' application of existing structures to new 
content areas. This is so, particularly as Piaget's theory concerns only the process of 
structural knowledge acquisition, and ignores the process of structural application. 
And very little guidance is obtained therefrom. It may be that the task factors 
responsible for affecting structural application may tum out to be identical to those 
responsible for structural knowledge acquisition. 
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CHAPTER-3 
3.1 FUNCTIONAL THEORY (An Alternative/Complement to 
Piaget) 
A case for functional theory has been put forward by Case (1978). Although it is still 
in its infancy, it is worthy of consideration because of its potential. Acknowledging 
that the problems highlighted above do not disqualify Piaget's theory completely, Case 
(1978) intimates, that they are (serious as they are) traceable to a common source: 
namely, that Piaget's theory is predominantly structural rather than functional. As 
mentioned earlier, Piaget's concern has been to provide a logical description of the 
systems of intellectual operations which children possess at various levels in their 
development, rather than provide a psychological description of the processes by 
which these operations are acquired and utilised. (Flavell and Wohlwill, 1969) 
The desirability of a functional rather than structural theory of development has been 
stressed by Case (1978), if we are to describe the processes by which these operations 
are acquired and utilised, thus reducing some of the problems or difficulties associated 
with Piaget's theory mentioned above. As a "supplement" or alternative to Piaget's 
theory, such functional theory of intellectual development promises to facilitate the 
development of operative structure, by identifying the intellectual operations relevant 
to various academic disciplines more easily. This is so, according to Case (1975) 
because these intellectual operations will be induced more directly from children's 
actual performance, thus reducing the dependence on abstract logical analysis. 
Furthermore, with functional theory, the pupil's current level of functioning can be 
easily assessed, because the factors which constrain performance are better 
understood, and the assessment is one which is more closely related to observed 
performance. Also, adapting materials or methods of instructions to the operational 
level of the pupils will be facilitated by a functional theory, because the materials or 
methods will be easily analysed in terms of their developmental appropriateness. So, 
too, will the assessment of student characteristics which will determine their ability to 
benefit from one method or another, be made easier, because there will be a better 
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understanding of the internal variables that determine pupil's reaction to task factors. 
Furthermore, with a functional theory, it would be easier to arrange the sequence of 
activities which would optimise the application of already existing structures to new 
conceptual domains; because the theory would specify the performance factors which 
are of great relevance not only to the process of acquisition, but also to the process of 
structural application (if indeed they are different) (Case 1978, p.178) 
The functional theory suggested above by Case takes into account Piaget's 
developmental theory. This theory is rooted in Pascual Leone's idea (1969). It is 
attractive as a theory, because it attempts to provide a more detailed account of the 
functional factors which influenced the acquisition and application of specific 
Piagetian structures. 
3.2 SOME ASSUMPfIONS MADE BY FUNCTION THEORY 
This theory assumes that all human knowledge, be it factual or procedural, is stored in 
the psychological system, via entities called schemes. Just like units of knowledge, 
schemes are thought to consist of two components: namely, (1) an initial set of 
conditions under which they apply (releasing component); (2) a subsequent set of 
conditions they generate, (their effecting component). For instance, a five year old's 
capacity to solve a conservation task, i.e .. , comparing two beakers and judging that 
they contain an equal amount of water, interpreted in these terms: it is assumed that he 
has this capacity because he already possesses a scheme for equality in his cognitive 
repertoire. The particular meaning which he attaches to equality at his particular stage 
of development constitutes the effecting component of this scheme. The releasing 
component, is the set of possible conditions under which he may legitimately assign 
this meaning. Schemes perform a number of functions such as representational 
function i.e .. , representing facts, states, or meanings, (figurative), transformational 
function, i.e .. , operating on one set of figurative schemes to generate as products a 
new figurative scheme or set of schemes (operative schemes), control function, i.e .. , 
monitoring the series of operations a subject intends to execute in order to get from 
one figurative state to another, (executive). 
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The general idea of the functional theory is reflected through a detail and functional 
analysis of conservation of liquid substance task. In solving such tasks, pupils appear 
to go through certain stages, namely, 
(1) Uni-dimensional Scanning 
(2) Bi-dimensional Scanning 
(3) Reasoning in terms of initial state 
The sequence of structure which Piaget has described is regarded as a series of 
executive schemes in Pascual-Leone's functional theory. In the case of the 
conservation task example, the executive schemes which are of relevance to this task 
have to do with the evaluation of quantity. The pupils begin by evaluating quantity 
unidimensionally, i.e. by relying on, say, height alone. When they perceive that this 
does not work, they look for a basis for improving their evaluations. They may use 
width and height alternatively, then both jointly. This bi-dimensional executive basis 
of evaluation becomes inadequate for situations where compensation, comparison of 
height and width are apparent. Again, when pupils find difficulties or perceive 
contradictions, in the comparison, they search for a better basis for quantification. 
However, details about this model which can be seen in Case (1978) are speculative 
and as yet untested widely. From the examples which he presents, the important thing 
is not just the specific set of mental steps or schemes which have been postulated but 
the set of performance factors which emerge when this sort of approach to modelling 
children's development is adopted. These factors include: 
(1) the rate at which a pupil is capable of attending to several schemes at 
once (M-power); 
(2) the pupil's attraction or resistance to the influence of perceptual set; 
(3) past or previous experience; 
(4) the pupil's affective disposition. 
These four factors frequently appear as underlying successful or unsuccessful 
acquisition, and form the basis of a general theory of the process by which children 
acquire and apply the cognitive structures which Pascual-Leone has constructed. For 
a complete presentation of the theory, see Pascual-Leone (1970, 1972, 1976). 
3.3 HOW THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY DEALS WITH SOME 
OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY PIAGET'S THEORY 
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3.3.1 ENSURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURE: 
Where the question is one of ensuring the development of operational 
structure, under Piagetian protocol, it is difficult to undertake a structural 
analysis for reasons already given. Namely, (1) The logical nature of the 
structure to be analysed and its irrelevance in some conventional academic 
areas. (2) The nature of the analysis to be carried out on the structures is 
competence analysis, instead of performance analysis (Le. ability and 
attainment). In any event, students' performance is an unreliable and uncertain 
guide to their competence. Piaget, however, did not suggest any general 
method for proceeding from one to the other. Nevertheless, in the context of 
functional theory, the structure to be analysed, is an executive not a logical 
one. The significance of the executive structure is obvious in most academic 
disciplines. Indeed, 
since the function of an executive structure is precisely to control 
subject's performance in a given task domain, the nature of the 
structure that is required to execute a given task may be inferred 
directly from the performance of skilled subjects on that task. 
(Case, 1978, p.205). 
The steps which may be followed in order to carry out executive analysis of a 
task are as follows:-
3.3.2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
(1) Identify the goal of the task (sample of technological task) to be 
performed. (This can be done looking at the questions pupils are asked 
to answer.) 
(2) Map out a series of steps by which successful subjects might reach this 
goal. {One way of doing this is to execute the criterion task yourself, 
and list the sequence of operations which you underwent in order to 
reach the goal. This might involve mapping out your general sequence 
of steps; then perhaps the sequence of suboperations you executed 
within each of these general steps.} 
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(3) Then compare these hypothetical steps in (2) with the actual 
performance exhibited by the subjects. For example, you can note the 
sequence of motor movements that experienced subjects exhibit as they 
evaluate the task. (O'Bryan and Boersma, 1971). Alternatively, you 
could interview a skilled performer. Ask him or her to describe how 
he or she actually proceeded through the task and what he/she was 
thinking as he/she did so. 
(4) Make changes if necessary, otherwise make sure that the hypothesised 
steps correspond to those used by skilled performers. 
In some important respects, the procedure for analysing (or determining) the 
underlying structure of a task as outlined by Case is similar to that outlined by 
Shayer and Adey (1981), and Biggs and Collis (1982). The latter's represents 
a conceptual shift in their position regarding the notion of logical structure 
which underlie pupils' performance. In order to carry out an adequate analysis 
of a task, so as to determine the process skills or 
"abstract descriptors" (Shayer and Adey, 1981), or "genetic code" 
(Bruner, 1960), (Biggs and Collis, 1982), 
ideally a team of specialists in the area, curriculum experts, and psychologists, 
will be required. The first stage in this comprehensive assault on the 
curriculum would necessitate searching among the curriculum objectives for 
certain underlying principles of analysis. This invariably involves a 
consideration of the nature and purpose of studying the technology curriculum. 
3.3.3 ASSESSMENT OF PUPILS' CURRENT LEVEL OF 
FUNCTIONING 
The difficulty in assessing pupils' current level of functioning is accounted for 
partly by the presence of uncontrolled performance factors. The reported low 
intercorrelations among tasks which are supposed to tap closely related 
underlying structures, and the presence of decalages between tasks, point to the 
existence of these uncontrolled factors. Due to these two phenomena, it is 
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difficult to say whether a given test result is a function of the presence or 
absence of an underlying logical structure or from the individual's success or 
failure in coping with one of the unidentified performance factors involved in 
the task. (Case, 1978) 
The factors inherent in most Piagetian tasks have been identified with sufficient 
accuracy by this alternative system. It suggests that pupils' failure to utilise a 
given executive structure (Logical Structures in Piagetian protocol), would be 
due to any of the following factors:-
(I) Insufficient M-space (memory space) 
(2) Sensitivity to the perceptual cues involved (field independence) 
(3) Lack of task relevant experience (the average of (1) and (2) 
above. 
In Case's theory, the nature of relevant operational structure is redefined. And 
the reason for using inadequate executive structure in a particular context is not 
important. Of importance, is what executive structure the pupil actually uses. 
The method of assessing the pupil's current level of functioning is the same as 
in structural analysis. But the strategy that leads to an incorrect rather than a 
correct answer is what has to be assessed, especially as the entity to be 
assessed is executive strategy in the task. In practice, however, this is much 
more difficult, because we use correct strategy and we may find it difficult to 
imagine ourselves in the pupils' positions and mentally come up with a strategy 
which lead to their answer. Furthermore, because of the inarticulateness of 
students who failed compared with those who passed, information about their 
thought processes may be more difficult to get. Due to the problems involved 
in analysing incorrect strategy vis-a-vis the correct one, it is helpful to convert 
an incorrect strategy into a correct one. This can be carried out in two 
possible ways:-
(1) by determining the question for which the response would have been 
correct. Make this question a goal, then go through steps (2) to (4) of 
the structural analysis. 
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(2) assume that the pupils' have no access to some crucial piece of 
information which they appear to ignore to do a task. Present this task 
to mature students without this information. Hypothesise the procedure 
for solving the task. Compare this with the actual procedure used. 
3.3.4 ADAPTING THE CONTENT OF INSTRUCTION TO THE 
OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF THE LEARNER (MATCIDNG) 
Where the question is about adapting the content of instruction to the 
operational level of the leamer, (matching), the steps already mentioned apply. 
Initially, adopting the content of instruction to the operational level of the 
learner means: 
(1) modifying the tasks presented to the pupils so that they do not 
have to use a higher level of operative functioning than that 
which they have already developed;. 
(2) giving pupils tasks which would normally require a higher level 
of operative functioning, but teaching them some trick or special 
procedures for solving it. In this respect, certain formal tasks 
can be solved using concrete operation. {Teaching simple 
strategies to solve complex tasks.} 
However, the same phrase has three meanings within the alternative 
framework, due to the fact that the operative level of the child may be defmed 
either in terms of the strategies he currently deploys, or the M-Ievel he has 
reached. In addition to the two Piagetian meanings, it can have the third 
meaning which is teaching complex strategies for solving complex problems, 
but doing this in such a way that the subjective complexity of the learning 
sequence never exceeds the subjects' available M-space. (Case, 1978, p.212). 
No matter which of these meanings is used, the procedure for adapting the 
content to the operational level of the learner is similar. These defmitions are 
merely underlining the important point, that teaching and pupils' conceptual 
level have to be integrated, if a "reasonable" demand is to be made on the 
pupils. In other words, the issue here is pedagogical not curricular. The 
teacher may pitch the instruction material to be learnt at a level higher (or 
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lower) than the students' thinking. It is not that the material has thinking 
higher than that of the students. 
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3.4 TIDS THESIS' APPROACH TO DESCRIBING PUPILS' 
TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING 
Piaget was the first to undertake a relatively detailed description of pupils' thinking. 
Yet, as is apparent from the exposition of his work (theory etc. ,) fundamental 
difficulties have been detected, particularly with regards to his concepts of "stage", 
"equilibration", etc. Consequently, it has been questionable to organise educational 
programmes, for instance, developmentally based instructions, around Piaget's ideas. 
However, the existence of two "systems", is implied in the assertion by Case (1985) 
that when the characteristics of a task have been specified, the observed thinking of 
the pupils cannot be described in logico-mathematical terminology of Piaget, but in 
terms of Executive Control Structures (ECS). Piaget himself appears to have 
recognised that there are two "systems" as he makes the distinction between logical 
structure and performance (Vuyk, 1981), but accordingly ignores what may be termed 
the strategies of the thinker. There is some truth in this statement. 
Undoubtedly, every system for describing something that exists is limited, and so 
Piaget's scheme is limited. However, the real question in this regard is: does each 
system actually provide any insight into pupils' thinking? It seems to me that it is a 
question of how close one wants to get into a phenomenon. For instance, if I take 
myself as thinking at this moment, then one way of describing me can be a Piagetian 
way. I am presumably obeying certain rules of logic, because I am not contradicting 
or trying to contradict myself. I am thinking in a formal operational way. 
Certainly, that may be telling part of the story, because another way of looking at, or 
describing my thinking, can be perhaps the sort of description put forward by Case, 
and the others which has to do with matters of production, execution etc., more 
directly than Piaget's scheme. Piaget's scheme refers to the kind of general 
framework that I might use. Although he describes this general framework quite well, 
he has not, or may not have, described the actual production or execution of thoughts 
to a fInished conclusion, because there are other kinds of descriptions. In view of the 
limitations associated with Piaget as outlined above, and of the fact that he is not 
specific enough about technological skills, it may be concluded that his approach 
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based on meta-theoretical explanation is not appropriate for this thesis, and will not 
be used. An approach which involves looking not at pupils and the curriculum 
separately, but looking at pupils as they solve technology problems.(Le .. Piaget's 2-
tier) is my favourite. 
In other words, instead of just getting a group of pupils and giving them Piagetian 
tests, and then having the syllabus analysed using the same framework, we need to 
observe pupils actually thinking about technological problems, if a description 
of the way in which they are thinking is to be undertaken. This can be a difficult task, 
but it has been forced upon me by the logic of my argument. However, this makes 
sense, because if the pupils class test scores are taken, then the process skills which 
they have used in solving the problem, (which is what this investigation is all about) 
will be difficult to describe or determine. 
This will allow me to approach the problem of how to elicit or describe pupils' 
technological thinking confidently and/or differently, because it will enable me to look 
at the pupils' actual technological work to see the kind of steps they seem to be going 
through. This approach cannot be limited, because one cannot see, literally, what is 
going on in the pupils' minds. It is likely to provide an insight into the way pupils are 
actually thinking in technology. As a first step forward using this approach, it is 
necessary to have a thorough understanding about the concept of technology, and how 
it is being taught in schools. 
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SECTION - THREE - LITERATURE REVIEW 
(PART 2) 
RELATED LITERATURE REVIEW PART-2 
CHAPTER-4 
DESIGN & TECHNOLOGY - ITS MEANING FOR 
EDUCATION TODAY 
4.1 THE NATURE OF DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY 
Having identified and examined the psychological principles/protocols which exist 
within Cognitive Psychology for tackling the problem under investigation, attention 
will now be focused on the subject of design and technology itself. In early 1980, it 
became apparent that the traditional technology was to be relaunched anew as Design 
& Technology. As from mid-1985, when the new subject of Design & Technology 
became one of the National Curriculum subjects, the bulk of the research/investigation 
work concentrated on the nature of, justification for, and general curriculum 
development etc. within the subject. Research work that examines the relationship 
between the cognitive development of the pupils and the sort of demands being made 
upon them by design and technology subject, has been sparse in a neglected area. 
It is generally felt that it is not a good idea to design a Design & Technology 
curriculum without first acquiring a deep understanding of the ways in which children 
and young people think about design and technology. Here lies a real potential for all 
sorts of problems with learning and teaching design and technology, as indicated by 
McCormick (1995). In spite of these potential problems, the most important skill for 
the future, according to Johnson (1992), is the ability to think. 
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These few research papers will be looked at first, then attention will be turned to other 
related areas of design and technology where there has been a great deal of research 
work. 
The first known published research which attempted to relate the psychological 
characteristics of the pupils to the demands of a technological curriculum was Oboho 
& Bolton (1989) at the International Conference for DATA at Loughborough 
University of Technology. 
In a revised edition of their work, Oboho & Bolton (1992) using a typical Piagetian 
protocol, analysed the ability to think in the design and technology subject area from a 
sample of 50 pupils aged 11-16 years in a comprehensive school. Although attempts 
were made to defme technological thinking and outline insight gained about how it 
developed, no detailed description of a taxonomy of the different schemata required 
for understanding design and technology was produced. 
In a longitudinal study of key stage (KS) 1 & 2 pupils, Roden (1997), attempted to 
identify and classify consequently developing, and changing problem-solving 
strategies in design and technology. Children were closely observed from reception to 
Yr. 2 as they were engaged in six different design and technology tasks which were 
analysed using systemic network (Bliss et.at., 1983) and open coding technique 
(Strauss, 1987). This was in an attempt to develop a taxonomy of young children's 
problem-solving strategies within the psychological development framework which 
particularly acknowledges the notion of co-operation in problem-solving, which is 
essential in design and technology enterprise. This psychological framework is 
'situated cognition', which according to Lave (1992) offers a view of cognitive 
process that differed according to the domain of thinking and the specifics of the task 
and context. This valued the ultimate connection between knowing and doing and 
viewed learning as a process of enculturation through shared activities into a 
community of practice. 
The following categories, not in any order of importance, were identified, namely: 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
task 
(d) 
(e) 
to 
(0 
Personalization 
Practice 
Identification of needs 
Negotiation and reposing the task 
Focusing down 
Identifying difficulties 
problem 
(g) Talking themselves through sub-tasks 
(h) Tackling obstacles 
(i) Sharing and co-operating 
(j) Praise, encouragement and seeking 
reassurance 
pupils relate tasks to their 
experience 
pupils manipulate test 
pupils relate resources to 
pupils able to explore task 
boundary 
pupils interpret and explain tasks 
themselves. 
pupils able to pinpoint 
egocentric speech 
pupils seek help 
pupils give advice and assistance 
with or without being asked. They 
ask detailed questions concerning 
procedures. 
pupils support each other and gain 
confidence. 
Certainly, these categories need to be processed properly so that they can become part 
of the wider categories which have been or are yet to be identified. 
In his description of a model for problem-solving involving electronics, Martin 
(1990), in somewhat general terms, outlined the stages in systems thinking used by 
pupils aged 5 - 16. This albeit ad hoc model, involved thinking in terms of (or 
progression from) systems, through subsystems to components. No attempt was made 
to identify and describe the 'generic code' / 'abstract descriptors' involved in such 
'system thinking'. For each stage in Martin's (1990) system thinking, the activities 
expected of pupils are suggested, as follows: 
(1) System Stage, the activities involve exploring, specifying system, 
selecting sub-system, testing system and appraising system. 
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(2) Sub-system Stage, the activities involve selecting subsystem, 
integrating, testing sub-systems. 
(3) Components Stage, the activities involve selecting components, 
building sub-systems and designing PCBs. 
In considering the cognitive style related to design process, Pearson (1991) went 
further by examining the thinking process underlying one major feature of a design 
process i.e. the generation of ideas, and the development of one of them, (or 
integration of several ideas). Using a revised version of Witkin's Group Embedded 
Figure Test (GEFT) and two further tests of a similar type, he reported that the field 
dependence/independence measured by these tests may be an important factor in 
relation to the ability to design. It is worth remembering that the idea of cognitive 
style of field dependence/independence takes into account the surrounding influences 
or stimulus field, which form an integral part of the problem given. If one controls 
these surrounding influences to a given problem, then one can apply this in turn to 
help others solve problems more efficiently in design and technology as well as other 
subjects. The degree of help required by an individual would depend on his position 
on a field dependent/independent continuum measured by his ability to manipulate 
shapes in an embedded test. 
By advocating the ability to think as the most important skill for the future, Johnson 
(1992) proposed five dimensions of thinking which could be used as the focus for an 
intellectual process curriculum within the framework of design and technology 
education. These were, viz: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
thinking processes 
core thinking skills 
critical and creative thinking 
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4. 
5. 
meta-cognition; and 
the relationship of content 
to thinking. 
Within the framework for developing intellectual process curriculum, the correlation 
of each of the dimensions was for 
(i) identifying goals; 
(ii) developing an instructional model; 
(iii) building a five instructional principles for 
developing intellectual process. 
a) helping students organise their knowledge; 
b) building on what they already know; 
c) facilitating information processing; 
d) facilitating deep thinking 
e) making thinking processes explicit 
iv) enhancing the role of the teacher as a facilitator 
v) developing an evaluation process. 
Although narrowing the curriculum was a weakness in Johnson's idea (1992), it is not 
clear how educationally or scientifically important it is. There was also an apparent 
neglect of context knowledge. In his in-depth treatment of the cognitive context of 
technology, Vincent (1990) identified the highly systematic, analytical process 
involved in the development of flush riveting systems in the aircraft industry. If 
anything, Vincent (1990) has pointed out that a vast body of cognitive content exists 
and must be appropriately identified as technological knowledge. 
Custer (1994) asserted that because technological activity is, by definition, a human 
activity, the dimensions of human cognitive style characteristics must be incorporated 
into the problem-solving structure. Thus the inventive process was described as a 
function of divergent thinking and creativity. The trouble-shooting process generally 
required convergent thinking and an application of established procedures. 
It is clear from the few research contributions reviewed that no serious attempts have 
been made to develop a taxonomy of schema in design and technology which could 
help to organise the teaching of concepts, theories, procedures and tasks. In order to 
develop such taxonomy, the requirements would include: 
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(1) an understanding of- and reflection on- the work of Piaget in science and 
other areas of the curriculum, as in previous sections; 
(2) a very delicate deployment of Bloom and Solo's taxonomies; 
(3) analysis of design and technology curriculum at KS 3 &4; and 
(4) analysis of pupils responses from design and technology tasks. 
Before proceeding further on this we need to review the work in the other areas of 
design and technology curriculum, concerned with the nature, justification, 
development and organisation of design and technology within the school system. The 
significance of this part of the review was conjoined with the psychological review 
section to produce a design and technology taxonomy shown in the taxonomy section. 
Section two on psychology has portrayed Piaget as a rationalist but it has been shown 
that there is more empiricism to Piaget's work than rationalism. However, modem 
views about technology are empirical in character, as will be demonstrated here, in 
the course of historical development. 
In this section an attempt will be made to examine the nature of technology and how it 
has been conceptualised in the National Curriculum and in schools. From such 
examinations, it is also hoped that a guide to designing or choosing appropriate 
technology tests will emerge. 
It must be said, however, that a clear and unequivocal definition of the concept of 
design and technology is problematic. Problematic, because historical and systematic 
analyses carried out so far shows that the concept is of a highly generalised character 
and/or has a lot of forms, and that it interact with our lives in a number of ways 
(Laudan, 1984, p.l; DeBono, 1971). The result, has been differing versions of the 
concept and disagreements on a precise definition (Skolimowski, 1968); (Tondl, 
1974); (Rapp, 1981). Given that the concept of technology has manifold 
determinants, it is quite unreasonable to expect a universally agreed definition of 
technology. But to do without one at all, is a mistake. The definition of technology , 
which is intended to be adopted here, will be one that reflects the present-day usage of 
the concept because during the course of historical development, different forms of 
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technology have occurred (Rapp, 1981, p.31). Accordingly, design and technology 
has been defmed in the National Curriculum document as a capability (to or for) 
combining design and making skills with knowledge and understanding, in order to 
design and make products. (DFEE 1995). 
This definition must, of necessity, have some foundation. What is the basis for this 
definition? It is important to understand this, if there is to be an appreciation of how 
it operates the way it does, in schools. 
In this attempt, the term design and technology, although used as one in the singular 
in the National Curriculum document, has been separated, for good reasons of 
understanding and clarity, by (Eggleston, 1996) into two, namely: design as one 
element and technology as the other. Acknowledging a close relationship between 
them, Eggleston states that design 
consists of using technology to achieve solutions that satisfy design criteria. 
Technology by the same token, consists of using design to achieve solutions 
that satisfy technological criteria. (p.24) 
This relationship is not well brought out by Eggleston. For there to be a relationship, 
there must be a third or mediating factor or variable. The conceptual framework for 
establishing this will be explored later. The technology component would be 
examined in detail, followed by the design component. 
If pupils' technological thinking is to be matched with a technological curriculum, 
then technology has to be seen in its original form and in its consequential 
ramifications: i.e., in its abstract and material forms. In other words, a general 
analysis of technology will be attempted which will provide guidelines for determining 
the sorts of thinking, structure, concepts and skills involved. The basis of such 
analysis has to be a frame of mind that permits us to go beyond the normally 
conceived instrumental function of technology subjects. This is an indication that 
technology can be understood in two essential ways. 
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4.2 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
TECHNOLOGY 
According to Rapp (1974), it is common for people to conceive or understand the 
instrumental function of technology, like the technical operations used in modem 
engineering, in practical terms, designed to direct the natural forces according to 
human purposes. However, beyond the realm of mere practical skills of which 
technology is normally conceived, it is not difficult to realise that before an intended 
useful technological product or result or object is achieved, 
a planned and preconceived action processes, involving the deliberately 
considered application of well designed tools and devices must take place. 
(Rapp, 1974, p.vii). 
In other words, theoretical reasoning is a necessary condition for the accomplishment 
of pragmatic technological aims. 
Although, presently technology is indeed a very complex subject matter, because its 
product involves a process of social action, it can be analysed from different points of 
view, grouped roughly, into two approaches. The first group of approaches focuses 
attention on the logical and methodological structure of:-
(a) the action processes performed; 
(b) the knowledge applied within them; 
(c) the objects subsequently realised. 
This approach is appropriate for investigation in the field of engineering, systems 
analysis and management, because it is pragmatic in nature and designed to arrive at 
more efficient methods, in planning, design and implementation as well as research 
and development processes. It can also be clearly associated with the philosophy of 
technology. Although this approach is devoid of human elements, it is concerned with 
the general methodology, and theory of knowledge. 
The focus of the second group of approach, is on the people involved in the action 
process. This constitutes the social dimension of technology, which involves giving 
an adequate account of the sources of technological change and evaluating its impact 
on human society. This second group of approaches, falls in the broad area of 
technological philosophy, i.e. social and cultural philosophy. 
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However, with reference to the first approach above with which this thesis is in 
sympathy, it cannot be said that the above-mentioned categories are necessarily good 
or appropriate, because each can be treated under different headings. For example, 
(a) above i.e., the analysis of the action processes performed, can be regarded as 
belonging to the general methodology of social action. Whereas (b) above, i.e., the 
formation and structure of technological knowledge and its theoretical formulation 
may be treated as part of the established philosophy of science, (c), i.e., the 
investigation of the production process and the structure of technical objects, can be 
considered under the heading of systems engineering and cybernetics. 
The treatment of each under different headings is not without problems. And the fact 
that the various branches of technology exhibit differences in procedure and in the 
level of their theoretical elaboration, demands that the philosophy of technology 
unifies the conceptual structure of the common traits of the various issues. Hence, its 
attraction. N ow let us examine how technology is understood within the identified 
framework with which this thesis identifies. 
4.3 THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY - A NARROW VIEW 
4.3.1 TECHNOLOGY AS SKILLS 
Technology can be understood in a narrow sense as skills of technique (certain 
procedures, learnable skills such as the technique of driving a car, playing a 
piano etc.) This understanding of technology as skills, understandably, 
originates from the meaning which the Greeks attach to the word technology, 
namely, "techne" (art or skills, or method of making something). 
Thus, operating skills has been a central concept in people's idea of 
technology. Feibleman (1966) has taken on board this idea and begins his 
conception of technology by attempting an analysis of it and its related 
concepts. This he does by making a distinction between technology and pure 
science, as well as applied science. One probable reason and basis for such a 
distinction is the alleged relationship between both and the ends pursued by 
each, respectively. Pure science, he claims, aims at knowledge and consists of 
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theoretical constructs arranged toward knowing. Whereas, applied science 
aims at practice. Moreover, applied science is thought to have, in addition, the 
concrete application of such theory. In other words, there is a theory of 
operating (theory of practice) and an actual way of operating (concrete 
application of this theory). This actual way of operating is regarded as 
technology. Or more directly, technology is skills. Feibleman (1966), 
illustrates this using the example of a space programme (and indeed any similar 
programme for that matter), showing how this conception of technology may 
be incorporated into a common-sense view of modem technology. 
Accordingly, the normal steps will be: 
(1) acquiring strictly scientific knowledge about the general laws of nature: 
e.g., gravitation, etc., concrete formation about the world, e.g., moon 
orbits the earth (science); 
(2) with (1) as the basis, a practical theory on how to go to the moon is 
devised: e.g., involving ascertaining rocket size, trajectories or space 
ship etc. (applied science); 
(3) the actual construction of the hardware (technology); 
Thus, according to Feibleman (1966), 
"an activity which immediately produces artefacts", 
is technology. This obviously sets the scene for further probing because he is 
silent about the nature or structure of this activity. 
However, it is inadequate philosophically to regard technology as skills or 
techniques or even skills for making. This is not difficult to pinpoint. 
Mitcham and Mackay (1972) intimate that not only are there techniques for 
acting plus those for making; there are, as well, different making skills other 
than those associated with technology, for example, artistic skills. Specifically 
Mitcham and Mackay (1972) think that Feibleman (1966) has not clearly and 
conceptually distinguished between techniques of acting and skills of making. 
The description of technology as skills merely refers to the making of objects 
by crafts or art skills, devoid of any theoretical basis. Later, the philosophical 
foundation of this narrow view of technology will be examined. Now, 
attention will be focused on a "broader" view of technology. 
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4.4 CONCEPTION OF TECHNOLOGY - (BROADER VIEW) 
4.4.1 TECHNOLOGY AS KNOWLEDGE 
However, going beyond Fiebleman (1966), the search through the relevant 
literature reveals, that a philosophically adequate conception of technology, 
requires three complementary approaches, namely, epistemological, 
anthropological and sociological. 
Briefly, an epistemological approach attempts to put technology within the 
scope of human knowledge, and evaluates technology as a form of human 
knowledge. The contribution of the anthropological approach is in its attempt 
to relate technology to the nature of man. From this approach, all forms of 
knowledge take on a technological character. The sociological approach sees 
technology as the defining characteristic of thought and action. 
A detailed treatment of each approach will not be attempted here because, 
apart from the fact that each approach stresses points which the others ignore, 
thus helping us to comprehend technology fully, interestingly, they have one 
important theme in common; which is, their reference to, or treatment of, 
technology as knowledge. This definition, is further supported by 
metaphysical studies of technology by Heidegger, Dessauer, Jonas, wherein 
knowledge is seen either as precondition or as product. Lawton (1979, p.4) has 
concurred that technology can be regarded as 
,---- a kind of knowledge.' 
McGraw-Hill Encyclopaedia of Science and Technology, 5th edition, refers to 
technology, as "systematic knowledge and action". 
The suggestion here is that despite conceptual problems surrounding the 
definition of the concept of technology, and despite a lack of unanimity about 
the appropriate way to approach technology, it is proper to approach it, at least 
initially, from the epistemological point of view, although this can hardly be 
pursued independently of anthropological and sociological considerations. 
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These latter approaches will not be considered in this work, except perhaps 
those aspects that may be relevant to an epistemological approach. 
The advantage of the epistemological approach is associated with its capability 
to study the structure, conditions, and validity of human knowledge. It also 
has the capability of relating technology to other forms of human knowledge, 
especially science. These features of epistemology promise to facilitate the 
sort of analysis to which technology will be subjected later on in this work. 
4.5 WHAT KIND OF KNOWLEDGE IS TECHNOLOGY? 
4.5.1 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 
The elusiveness in the search for knowledge, is indicative of how uncertain we 
are about what knowledge is. The difficulty of defining what knowledge is has 
confronted the epistemologists for centuries, and the mystery surrounding 
knowledge has intrigued humanity. Although ancient Greek philosophers such 
as, and including the sophists, the Ionic school, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, 
struggled to arrive at a concise and universal definition of knowledge, 
knowledge continues to be a word commonly used nowadays, but probably not 
understood. 
In his attempt at defining knowledge, Hamlyn (1970), tells us what knowledge 
is not. For example, it is not faith, it is not belief and it is not reason. Yet it 
can be said that knowledge does something to us that brings about change, and 
we can use knowledge to accomplish a desired end. These words appear to 
have added to our confusion about the nature of knowledge because they 
sometimes suggest a kind of knowledge that transcends the normal mental 
processes: i.e., a knowledge that is 'supernatural' in its origin, and sometimes, 
the words suggest a kind of substitute for knowledge. And yet at another time, 
they suggest nothing more than a concatenation of thoughts, i.e., a chain of 
related ideas. They provide elements of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, faith, belief, and reason each make a fundamental contribution to 
that which is accepted as true knowledge. The contribution of FAITH is its 
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assumption of authority: That of BELIEF, is its substitution of plausibility in 
the absence of fact. And the contribution of REASON is a system for the 
systematic arrangement of ideas so as to give them a semblance of reality to 
the mind, and therefore an inclination to accept them as being true knowledge. 
It is worth examining each one of these elements, briefly, by drawing from and 
sharing the opinion expressed in (Rosicrucian Digest, 1987). 
4.5. 1 (a) Faith 
According to this digest, by keeping aside the conventional dictionary 
definition of the word faith, it will be possible to arrive at a better 
understanding of it from common usage. Most people talk about faith 
as if it is an immediate and direct experience, and therefore has the 
value of knowledge. However, faith and experience are not 
interchangeable in meaning. The latter comes through the medium of 
our five objective faculties or senses, and it is direct and immediate. 
There is no intermediary between us and the impressions from the 
object(s) which we perceive. It is not inconceivable, that the essence of 
knowledge must be the same. Thus, no matter what the ideas are 
which knowledge is composed of, its essence, Le., the quality which 
knowledge consists of, must always be the same. This quality of true 
knowledge is REALITY. This reality must and (should be) that 
which we or others can experience or perceive (Le., be seen, felt, 
heard, etc.) as reality. This is not to imply that what we learn by study 
is true knowledge, because we may never be able personally to perceive 
as reality what we read in a text book, or in history books. Yet the 
contents of such text books is regarded as KNOWLEDGE: (a socially 
accepted substitute for our own intimate acquired knowledge.) 
However, when one is described as an authority, what is normally 
implied, is that one has closely and objectively experienced what he 
relates, or has reason to believe, such reality as demonstrable. The 
difference between faith and socially acceptable knowledge, referred to 
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above becomes apparent, whereas, in faith we accept as an authoritative 
source, that which cannot be universally substantiated, in socially 
acceptable knowledge, the authority can and will substantiate what he 
has expounded. In faith, because the source of authority is thought to 
be infallible, 'supernatural', the belief sets in, and it becomes 
sacrilegious to question the substance of faith. Certainly, its content is 
now knowledge in the realistic objective sense. 
4.S.1(b) Belief 
Belief can be classified into universal belief and personal. Universal 
belief implies that an idea or concept which has widespread currency, 
and is thought to be irrefutable. Because a number of persons have a 
similar belief, it, psychologically speaking, becomes truth. That in 
which we believe may be false, and it has happened on several 
occasions. Refuting that which is universally accepted idea which 
proved to be wrong, takes courage and time. Personal belief is not 
influenced by the opinions of others. This belief may be arrived at by 
one's own mental processes, rather than by internal reasoning. A 
typical instance would be an occasion where one's attention is called to 
some event, a happening, or a phenomenon, which no conclusive 
explanation has been given. One then thinks about this, by associating 
ideas without using any method of formal reasoning, and arrives at a 
personal conviction as to the cause of the phenomenon. The individual 
in question here may have recalled from his memory various associated 
ideas, which have assisted in providing a plausible personal conviction 
for his belief. We cannot refer to such beliefs which have neither been 
proven or refuted, as knowledge. 'Intuitive' knowledge, is one type of 
personal conviction. Nevertheless, intuitive impressions, which flash 
into one's consciousness effortlessly, do have indubitable truthfulness 
(or veracity). These intuitive impressions derive the substance of true 
knowledge, because of the clarity of their illumination to the person 
receiving them. Most of the times, these intuitive impressions cannot 
be reduced to factual substance. The individual involved may be unable 
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to prove his beliefs to another person. And others may be unable to 
disprove it. Thus, intuitive impression, or this form of subjective 
knowledge, lacks the objectivity of reality, and thus, is only of 
immediate benefit to the one having the intuitive illumination. He is 
then obliged to give substance to his intuitive knowledge: i.e., to try to 
give it that reality which can be perceived by others, so that it can 
become universal knowledge. The method by which this is 
accomplished is reason. 
4.S.1(c) Reason 
Although reason is essential to any inquiry into the nature of 
knowledge, what is meant by reason has, again, confronted the minds 
of philosophers for centuries. However, the question, what is reason? 
can be approached by stating that thoughts are ideas, and ideas are 
engendered by our faculties of perception and conception. Whereas 
perception can be regarded as our awareness of the sensations derived 
from our receptor faculties, conception can be regarded as consisting of 
the recall of impressions which are regarded as consisting of the recall 
of impressions which are registered in memory, as well as the 
rearranging of such impressions into a new order and mental image; 
e.g., the faculty of imagination, is to conceptualise. Thus, reason can 
be referred to as the most precise and intentional integration and 
association of our ideas. During this process, the mind seeks a definite 
relationship between particular ideas, so as to attain a satisfactory 
conclusion. This conclusion depends wholly upon the arrangement of 
the ideas of which it consists. 
The two general methods of reasoning are deductive and inductive. In 
applying deductive reasoning, one works from the general idea or 
principles to particulars. Thus, the deductive process begins with a 
general idea which is not self-explanatory to the mind: which is not 
conclusive in itself. This reason seeks, via the use of progressive 
analysis, to see how this inconclusive idea can be realised as a 
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comprehensive whole, instead of an undefined thought. For example, 
is intelligent life a universal cosmic phenomenon, or is it limited to 
earth only? The answer could begin by a procedure of deductive 
reasoning: i.e., seeking those elements which have a relationship and 
which prove or disprove the concept. 
In the inductive process of reasoning, one takes an idea which is 
perceived to be complete in itself, and then determines by observation 
and analysis how it may be combined with other particulars to form a 
general idea. Thus, one works from particular (idea) to the general 
(idea). 
Reasoning becomes accepted as true knowledge only if its conclusions 
are eventually universally presented objectively. Otherwise, these 
conclusions are only beliefs, a substitute for knowledge. 
From the above, it does not seem that to gain knowledge, we place our 
greatest dependence upon our receptor faculties. Because these 
faculties have been known to be sometimes deceptive. On the other 
hand, it cannot be said that when a majority of persons perceptually 
experience an object in the same way, such is reality. Because the 
noumenal quality of the object, i.e., the thing in itself, may be quite 
different from what humans perceive. According to Aristotle, 
noumenal phenomena are opposed to the phenomena of the senses. 
Such phenomena are reality and therefore true knowledge. 
4.5.2 TECHNOLOGY KNOWLEDGE 
4.5.2(a) PersonallImpersonal Knowledge 
By now, it is apparent how difficult it can be to define knowledge, and 
technological knowledge is not an exception. Perhaps categorising 
knowledge into "impersonal" and "personal", may prove helpful. 
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The brief comments about faith, belief and reason, suggest that 
knowledge can be "impersonal", no matter what value we may place 
upon it. Knowledge is something that is external to us, until it is 
experienced through problem-solving. What this means, in a sense, is 
that knowledge stands passively by and must be understood and made 
into experience by some process (problem-solving). This view is 
associated with the traditional conception of knowledge:- knowledge as 
abstract and impersonal. But knowledge associated with technology 
appears to be personal and practical, and therefore not external to man. 
[Heidegger, Polanyi (1958), Schon (1967), Wesson (1980)]. Polanyi's 
"tacit" knowledge (much of which is inaccessible to formal academic 
study, but transmittable by personal contact) know-how, (Laudan, 
1984) and the aim and/or goal of technology (practicallproblem-
solving) are clearly underlined here. 
As will be implied later, when knowledge is personal and practical, 
rather than abstract and impersonal, our ideas become "tools" into 
which, as it were, we "pour" ourselves to use Bolton's phraseology 
(1985), in order to discover or know things. 
From the epistemological standpoint, the "knowledge" involved in 
technology makes itself clearer, only when technology (as a form of 
human knowledge) is related to other forms or human knowledge, 
particularly science. From this perspective, technology is perceived as 
"practical activity", or a way of acting or action, which (as distinct 
from mere behaviour) involves some beliefs. This practical activity or 
knowledge, ranges from skills derived from concrete experience 
(Feibleman, 1961), to a more general knowledge of how to cope with 
our environment. (Jarvie, 1967). 
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Skolimowski (1966), in sympathy with Kotarbinski' s praxiology, 
reveals the distinctive structure of technology, using the distinction 
between science and technology. 
In other words, put in a wider context, the practical knowledge or 
technique, involves "know-how" as well as "know-that". A way of 
acting or technique implies detailed procedure and skills, and their 
application. This complex procedure comes into being through 
knowledge. Skill is the ability to use one's knowledge effectively. The 
common synonym of technology, "know-how", presupposes "know-
that". For there cannot be "know-how" without "know-that" 
(knowledge). 
4.S.2(b) "Knowing That" and "Knowing How" 
This distinction of knowledge between "knowing that" and "knowing 
how", was the focus of Ryle's book entitled, Concept of Mind. 
Although "knowledge that" is regarded as theoretical, and "knowledge 
how", as practical, Ryle has forcibly argued that not all "knowledge 
how" presupposes "knowledge that". To argue otherwise will result in 
an infinite regression, because every item of theoretical knowledge 
requires formulation and application; this even applies to "knowledge 
how". Consequently, in some sense, "know how" is prior to "knowing 
that". In any case, such distinction need not be so sharp, because there 
can be forms of knowledge that are both theoretical and practical at the 
same time. 
In this respect, the distinction can be made between knowing how to do 
something and merely being able to do it. Due to the possibility that 
some animals are able to do things instinctively without really knowing 
how to do those things, "knowledge-how" normally implies some 
understanding and knowledge of principles involved in the activity in 
question. Moreover, it might be wrong to speak of "know-how" where 
there is no such understanding. If one can do something, it is because 
94 
one has learnt the procedure. Whether or not a person can say how he 
does such things, if he has learnt to do them, he in some respects 
knows the principle involved. Thus, "knowing-how" is knowledge of a 
technique, the principles of which can be formulated in theory, whether 
or not they can be put in practice. Tech 
niques are acquired through learning, and reveal themselves, in a 
certain flexibility in the circumstances in which they are manifested. It 
appears true to say, that a person does not know how to do something 
unless he can do it. The exception is where he knows in theory how to 
do it, although he cannot do it in practice. In other words, he knows 
the principles, but cannot apply them. Since we cannot speak of 
"knowing how" unless there is a good reason for the ability, "knowing 
how" and "knowing that", become parallel. And the locution, 
"knowing how", is intelligible to use. 
4.S.2(c) Science and Technology Distinction 
The character of technological knowledge can also be elicited and thus, 
the relationship between "knowing how" and "knowing that", made 
clearer, by examining the distinction between science and technology. 
Clearly, the aims pursued by technology must be different from those 
pursued by science. While technology aims at effectiveness, science 
aims at truth. (Skolimowski, 1966). Sharp differences are created by 
making the aim of an activity effectiveness rather than truth. For what 
is effective, may be true or it may be false. To illustrate this point, 
technology, as knowledge of sorts (know-how), tells us something 
about what works in this world. However, what is regarded as 
effective in one part of the world, may be a purely contingent matter in 
another and will depend also on the degree of effectiveness demanded 
in technology. For instance, it may be found, that a particular measure 
'(X)" deals with a problem '(Y)' 95% of the time; we may feel that 
'(X)' deals effectively with '(Y)' 95% of the time, but may not be too 
sure. We may also know, that 5 % of '(Y)' cannot be dealt with by 
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'(X)'; the cause of '(X)', and the reason '(Y)' deals effectively with it 
may be unknown to us. What we can safely say, is that '(X)' 
sometimes deals with '(V)' completely. Thus, in technology, truth is 
also valued, because attempts are made to find out why '(X)' works as 
it does, but meanwhile, it is seen as a good technology, with effective 
percentage of 95. 
It is obvious that truth is not the same thing as effectiveness. But when 
knowledge is mentioned, knowledge of truth springs to mind. What is 
being suggested here is that on a different logical level, knowledge of 
effectiveness is also knowledge of truth. In other words, knowledge of 
effectiveness is true knowledge of what is effective, rather than why it 
is effective, and thus, an aspect of the whole truth. (Jarvie, 1967). 
The idea of knowledge as proven truths was left behind for us by the 
ancients. Contemporary philosophers discarded this idea, and came out 
with one which decreed, that only tautologies of logic and mathematics 
can be proved. Nevertheless, the new view of the concept of 
knowledge also discards proved truths, and, in their places puts 
scientific reservations like this one: " This is only a hypothesis, the best 
that can be suggested at the moment. It will be revised, as soon as 
there is reason to doubt it." So that in recent times, knowledge, is 
generally regarded as putatively true statement: i.e. statements which 
are tentatively advanced in the belief that they might be true and should 
be tested. For instance, scientific knowledge is generally regarded as 
putatively true statements about the structure of the world. To say that 
water boils at the temperature of 1 ()() degrees C, is not a truth about the 
structure of the world, but a contingent fact about our environment. 
And technology seems to be closer to knowing a lot of things whose 
logical status is the same as the boiling temperature of water, instead of 
things like Newton's laws or Einstein's mass-energy equation. In other 
words, science aims at true laws which are universal, and explains the 
facts of the case about them. Technology (know-how), is knowing 
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what works, how to do things (design), with a precision as high as is 
demanded. 
Let it be taken for granted, that technology is an all-embracing word, 
encapsulating within itself in, 
applied science, invention, implementation of applied science 
and invention, maintenance of the existing apparatus, 
and that these last two concern planning and engineering (purely 
practical matters). Beyond these practical matters, invention takes 
over. As it is important to science and other fields, it consists in 
discovering a way of doing something which has already been known to 
be possible. For example, persistence of vision makes the motion 
picture possible; but a great deal of inventiveness was required, in 
order to make this possibility and actuality. Although the character of 
the inventor's (technologist's) knowledge, is not on a fundamental level 
in the sense that pure science is, nevertheless, it is a sort of 
ingenuity in bringing together separate pieces of mechanical and 
other information and applying them to a particular problem. 
The information sometimes concerns quite commonplace facts about 
our world. The inventor (technologist) therefore demonstrates how, 
when these are put together in a certain combination, they do a certain 
job. It is clear from what has been said so far that a special kind of 
ingenuity and mechanical intuition, constitute the character of the 
inventor's knowledge; a character which seems to be quite different 
from that of science. The implementation of what has been invented is 
purely a practical matter, which is also technology. A typical 
example, is the builder who carries out the architect's blueprint. The 
applied science component, is considered to be the application of 
abstract theories to the world. 'Applying', is regarded here as 
deducing from scientific theories with the help of some statements of 
fact, consequences that can be tested and applied. Scientific theories are 
abstract and fundamental; with the help of concepts, like space, mass, 
force, etc., the explanation of what the basic structure of the world is 
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composed of, is made possible. Applied science attempts to show how 
this can be done, by actually deducing those descriptions of the 
phenomena they do explain. 
In some ways, technology can be seen as a tool invented by the 
inventor (because he shows us how, when he puts mechanical and other 
information etc., together in a certain combination, they do a certain 
job), which is shown to be possible by pure scientists and actually 
explained by deductions and calculations by the applied scientists. 
Well, technology as "know-how", as a tool, cannot be knowledge. A 
tool is not knowledge. A screwdriver, or a hammer, or a chisel, or for 
that matter a lathe machine is not knowledge. They are things. 
However, knowing that a real screwdriver, or a hammer exist, knowing 
how they can be used and constructed, may be regarded as knowledge. 
If technology is regarded as a tool, or what the inventor invents, or 
what the applied scientists do to show a theory explains, then it has no 
place in the structure of knowledge. 
Yet according to the pragmatic philosophy, 
the only way which you can know that you know-that 
something, is by trying it out, by making it work. 
But is it really true that the argument that a screw driver or a lathe 
machine etc., cannot be knowledge? Are we being misled or 
misguided by a word. Granted that a tool like a hammer, is not, and in 
addition to being a thing, a piece of knowledge: what about a piece of 
knowledge? Is it not a thing and can it also not be a tool? E=mc2, is a 
piece of knowledge, a theory or an equation. Is it not also a tool? Has 
this piece of knowledge not been used to plan, build and calculate the 
effect of the atom bomb? Is a tool not simply something which a man 
uses to increase his power over (or control) the environment? Is it not 
in this sense that the whole scientific and even intellectual endeavour is 
considered an outgrowth of our attempts to cope with our environment 
by learning about it? 
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4.6 TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
4.6.1 AS KNOWLEDGE OF PRACTICE 
To distinguish knowledge as distinctly technological, it has to meet certain 
criteria. The criterion of utility alone is insufficient, because technological 
activity does not necessarily require technological knowledge; e.g. by using 
the knowledge of thermodynamics to improve the full efficiency of an internal 
combustion engine does not make that knowledge inherently 'technological'. 
Thermodynamics is scientific knowledge. Thus, technological knowledge 
cannot be so called on the basis of a criterion of technological activity, 
processes or goals, otherwise the argument would be logically circular. Just as 
it would be incorrect to say that knowledge is technological simply because it 
is used for a technological end, it would also be incorrect to assert that 
technological activity only involves technological knowledge. 
According to Frey (1991), what makes technological knowledge distinct from 
other forms of knowledge, seems to be its dimension/range from tacit to 
analytical/symbolic knowledge. Tacit knowledge operates at both intuitive and 
sUbjective levels. This knowledge cannot be verbalised, and is exemplified in 
the hands of highly skilled crafispersons. At the tacit level, knowledge 
requires little or no conscious effort or reflection. It is highly practical and 
efficient. Analytical/symbolic technological knowledge (which is at the 
opposite extreme), is frequently expressed in mathematical formulations which, 
in tum, look very much like scientific laws, e.g. in many engineering models. 
It appears that there is a continuum of knowledge that draws from practical 
experience of designing, developing, trouble-shooting, and repairing 
technological artefacts. Whereas one end of the continuum has the highly 
systematised and formalised knowledge of the engineering profession, the 
other end has the tacit knowledge of the skilled tradespeople and artisans. 
Between these two extremes, there is a huge range and degree of experiences, 
which are directly related to technological activity. This cumulative 
experience after a period, achieves some degree of formality. The result of the 
convergence of this range of activity, experience and practice, is technological 
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knowledge. Thus, making technological knowledge, 'knowledge of 
accumulated practice', which is directed toward the activity surrounding the 
development, maintenance of technological artefacts. The 'artefactual thrust' 
of the activity distinguishes technological knowledge from the other forms of 
praxeological knowledge (knowledge of practice), such as those used by 
dentists, medical doctors, educators, journalists, etc. According to Frey 
(1991), maintaining the sense of 'range' is vital if an understanding of 
technological knowledge is not to slip out of our minds. This is probably 
because this accumulated knowledge of practice covers a broad spectrum of 
technological experiences. Otherwise, incorrect and inappropriate restrictions 
in what constitutes the knowledge base could occur. For instance, it is 
inappropriate to identify engineering knowledge as 'the' source of 
technological knowledge. Because a large segment of the 'accumulated 
knowledge of practice' spectrum would be eliminated, and thus be incorrect. 
Rather, technological knowledge should be seen as a function of a range of 
activities that can be classified as technological. 
By establishing that certain activities are inherently technological (generally 
focused around the trouble-shooting, design, development etc. of technological 
artefacts), and that technological knowledge as an accumulation of practice 
exists, the way becomes clear to assert that technological activity requires at 
least minimal levels of technological knowledge (that is uniquely, technological 
in nature). This usefulness or applicability of un-technological knowledge for 
engaging in technological activity is being played down. Neither is it 
suggested that technological knowledge is the only applicable knowledge, or 
that that knowledge becomes technological when driven by technological 
purposes. The argument, simply and pragmatically, is that technological 
knowledge is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for technological 
activity. What Frey (1991) is implying is that some element of a formalise or a 
systematic knowledge is required. The idea of 'artifactual' thrust emphasised 
by Frey (1991) has guided and informed this investigation by stipulating the 
criteria necessary for a task to be technological. 
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4.6.2 TECHNOLOGY AS PROCESS 
To establish the vital link between technology and design, technology as 
process must be closely examined. The term "technological problem-solving» 
provides a useful mechanism for discussing technology as process. This is so, 
not only because technological problem-solving is distinct from other forms of 
problem-solving, but also sufficiently robust and inclusive of the full range of 
technological process. 
It is important to clarify what technological problem-solving is and how it can 
be distinguished from other forms of problem-solving. A conceptual criterion 
would be required to clarify and structure technological problem-solving. 
Problem-solving is a critical process skill that involves virtually all aspects of 
existence. Clearly, all problems are not technological. Problem-solving is a 
process which has been identified and promoted by diverse academic 
disciplines such as mathematics, psychology, the physical sciences, the arts. 
In different contexts and in unique ways, problem-solving processes have been 
used by all. It is hard to imagine any field of endeavour or type of activity that 
does not engage the problem-solving faculties of people; e.g. an engineer 
calculates the material and dimensional requirements for a load-bearing 
structural member. Since it is difficult to imagine an aspect of life that does 
not require problem-solving, the term problem-solving itself has evolved into a 
generic construction which covers a wide range of different types of activity. 
The 'problems' of an alcoholic, besieged with numerous fmancial, marital and 
personal difficulties, appear to have little in common with the 'problems' that a 
design engineer faces in attempting to develop ways to dispose of hazardous 
waste safely. Given this and numerous other examples, how can technological 
problems be distinguished from other types of problems? A conceptual 
framework for problem-solving that was inclusive of all form of problems and 
able to distinguish technological problems as unique from other forms, was 
needed. A classification structure based on Newell & Simons' notion (1972) 
of 'problem space' was developed. According to this notion, problems exist 
within a context that is defined by the resources, solutions, and processes used 
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to address them. This notion was used as a launching pad for the more 
detailed analysis of technological problem-solving. Problem-solving space 
includes three primary dimensions, namely resources, primary process and 
goal 'thrust'. 
Resources: concerns all that is brought to bear on the solution of a 
particular problem, be they physical, material, psychological and knowledge. 
There are no restrictions on the amount or type of resources that could be used 
to address a given problem. 
Primary Process: included in this area is a vast range of terms such as 
designing, repairing, negotiating, counselling, testing, investigating, 
hypothesis, etc. These processes include a range of activities or techniques 
that are employed by problem-solvers, using available resources to solve 
problems. 
Goal Thrust: concerned with the motivation or directionality of the problem-
solving activity. Problem-solving activity is intrinsically purposeful and 
directional. For problem-solving to exist, a problem must first be identified 
that is capable of eliciting action. This sense of action, motivation and 
directionality constitutes goal thrust. 
These three primary dimensions interact, and their relative values help in 
distinguishing between the various types of problem-solving space. 
Individually, each, except goal thrust, cannot be used for classification of 
problem space. However, whilst resources brought to bear on a particular 
problem are valuable in almost any type of problem situation/problem space, 
they cannot serve as a basis for classification of problems. Primary processes 
include tasks such as designing, developing, making, repairing, planning, etc. 
It can be argued, that primary processes are basically linguistic constructions 
that have emerged out of the cultures of various fields of endeavour. For 
instance, engineers would use terms such as design and development, while 
counsellors refer to active literacy, planning and directing. A closer look, 
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however, would indicate that these various terms actually share much in 
common in terms of cognitive and practical processes. Their distinctiveness 
has evolved as various communities of practice come to attach common sets of 
terminology and language to their practices and procedures. As with 
resources, primary processes are insufficient for use as a basis for 
classification. The goal thrust component was the primary distinguishing 
characteristic that was sufficient for developing inclusive classification for 
problem-solving. Custer (1994) identified three types of goal thrust namely: 
(a) those concerned with the creation of primary physical artefacts; 
(b) those concerned with the development and maintenance of healthy, 
efficient and meaningful relationships; and 
(c) those concerned with the need to understand the workings of the natural 
world. 
It was these three primary types of goal thrust (motivational) which provided a 
useful mechanism for structuring three primary problem spaces: 
technological, social and natural/ecological. Here then was the model that 
provided a useful conceptual framework for distinguishing among the various 
forms of problems and for conceptualising technological problem-solving as 
distinct from other forms. To say that technological problem-solving process 
occurs within a unique domain (e.g. technological problem space), raises the 
question; 'Are there processes that can be said to be uniquely technological?' 
Conceptualising technological processes in terms of (a) problem-solving; and 
(b) technological problems as occupying a distinct problem space, seemed to 
point to the answer. 
Having established the uniqueness of technological problem-solving (based on 
a problem space that is uniquely technological), Custer (1994) developed a 
two- dimensional technological process matrix, which he used to distinguish 
various forms of technological problem-solving one from another. These two 
dimensions are defined in terms of (a) goal clarity and (b) problem complexity. 
(see appendix -12 ) The goal clarity continuum ranges from problems that are 
posed in terms of a single, clearly delineated goals at one extreme to those that 
are multiple, ill-defined, complex and perhaps even obscure at the other. 
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The second dimension focuses on problem complexity. It covers a broad 
knowledge requirement (both in terms of type, level and knowledge transfer 
demands), linearity and degree to which solution paths can be formalised into 
structured rule systems. Thus, by so doing, Custer (1994) analysed technology 
as process and revealed the conceptually distinct nature of terms traditionally 
used, such as inventing, development, repairing, design/innovation, trouble-
shooting. The matrix also provided a conceptual framework within which 
technological problem-solving processes could be structured. Each quadrant in 
the matrix included three dimensions (procedures, personality characteristics 
and knowledge) that are unique to that type of technological process. 
Procedures: referred to the various approaches used to progress through a 
technological problem-solving activity. They included a set of procedures that 
generally represented a range of systematisation. The possibilities extended 
from haphazard to the rigorous application of routine and algorithmic 
procedures. Referring to the technological process matrix, experimental 
procedures could be most closely associated with the highly complex, multiple 
solution problems that were more typical of problems associated with the 
Invention Quadrant (e.g. designing a computer software routine capable of 
processing fuzzy logic). The Design/Innovation and Development Quadrants 
were typified by processes that were more heuristic in nature. A coalescing of 
techniques based on experience, informal trial and error, and feedback were 
presented in processes of this type .. Algorithmic procedures were most typical 
of processes associated with singular goals and relatively low problem 
complexity (e.g. trouble-shooting faults in electronic circuits, or following an 
established plan of procedure to assemble a product). Processes of this type 
were located in the trouble-shooting Quadrant. It was important to note that a 
range of expertise might be represented within each of the quadrants, and that 
this expertise, was not necessarily transferable across quadrants. Neither did 
the expertise required to solve a specific type of problem within one quadrant 
transfer to a problem within that same quadrant (within quadrant transfer). 
For instance, expertise in trouble-shooting a faulty electronic circuit in a logic 
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board does not transfer directly to expertise in trouble-shooting a hydraulic or 
pneumatic circuit, because a different knowledge base for each problem is 
required to use the procedure. This is explained later. 
Personality Characteristics: Since technological problems and activity were 
meaningless in the abstract, technological activity would, by deftnition, be 
human activity. Given this and the diversity of human abilities and styles, it 
was important that the dimension of human cognitive style characteristics be 
incorporated into the problem-solving structure. For instance, the inventive 
process could be described, partly, as a function of divergent thinking and 
creativity. Whereas, the trouble-shooting process generally required 
convergent thinking and an application of established procedures. However, it 
was important that personality and cognitive style dimensions be integrated 
into the technological problem-solving framework, for both conceptual and 
practical reasons. Conceptually, problem-solving could not be abstracted from 
the realm of human of activity and ability. Any attempt to do this, would 
typically foster reductionistic conceptions of the problem-solving where all 
people, irrespective of their individual characteristics and abilities, 
theoretically approach all problems armed with a generic set of steps or 
procedures. In practical terms, certain personality characteristics corresponded 
with the degree to which individuals were successful in thinking out solutions 
to speciftc types of problems. For instance the tenacity, systematic thinking 
and strict attention to detail which would be necessary to debug a complex 
computer program, could well prove to be restrictive in a creative and open-
ended problem situation. Clearly, from the above, the human dimension 
(cognitive style, personality characteristics, type of knowledge, etc.) would be 
an important and necessary variable that must be incorporated into a 
conceptual framework for technological problem-solving. In other words, 
individuals do not simply bring themselves to problems that have been 
conceived in the abstract, rather, problems must be conceptualised, at least to 
some degree, as a function of the people (their expertise, personality, cognitive 
style, etc.) who attempt to solve them. 
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Knowledge Requirements: In examining the nature of technological 
knowledge, the conclusion was that it was a distinctive form of 'knowledge of 
accumulated practice'. It was clear that while the idea of the 'knowledge 
practice' was useful in the abstract, it became quite specific when transformed 
into process. For example, for a technician to be able to trouble-shoot a faulty 
electronic circuit, it would be useful, if not essential, for the individual to 
possess specific 'knowledge of practice' in electronics. That same type of 
knowledge, even though at a high levels of expertise, would be of little value 
to the same individual when faced with the challenge of specifying the 
structural requirements of a load-bearing beam for a large building. It 
therefore seemed logical and appropriate to defme, partly, specific types of 
technological processes (development, design, invention, etc.) in terms of the 
kinds of knowledge required to address them. 
In sum, it was possible to define technology as process. These processes 
represented arenas of activity generally focused around the performance of 
technological activities. Technology as process was defined generally as 
problem-solving, and this was a function of goal clarity and problem 
complexity. This established the link between technology and design. 
Furthermore, certain personality types, cognitive styles, learning styles, 
psychological variables, etc., would have effect on how well different 
individuals were likely to be able to solve types and configurations of 
problems. 
As maintained earlier, the process in Technology with Design provides the 
vital link. Process, according to Johnsey (1995, p.195) is the way we go about 
achieving an end. The separate part of the process can be referred to as 
process skills. When the end sought is the solution to a practical open-ended 
problem then, in a very broad sense, it can be referred to as problem-solving. 
Moreover, where the end is the fulfilment of a need, or a designed product 
then, design process has been used. 
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Design and problem-solving are the same thing. Implied in the above 
definition is a methodological characteristic. Technology process linked to 
design can take different forms, such as algorithmic, heuristic and 
experimental. Design is about preparing to make a product and this is often 
followed by making and testing. By design only, production of such things as 
drawing in preparation for making, is implied. 
Various modes of design have been put forward (see appendix 12). However, 
Eggleston (1996, p.30-31), has illustrated the similarity in the analytical 
process of enquiry between the two processes (technological and design). 
Without being critical of each model, they have been presented in appendix-12 for 
the purposes of showing how technology through design has manifested itself in 
schools over the past years. Some of these models are linear and others are 
cyclical. They have all been presented linearly for the sake of clarity . 
Most of the models have the essence of the outline put forward by Assessment 
Performance Unit (APU) , namely, Investigation, Invention, Implementation 
and Evaluation. In the mid-eighties, linear or cyclic process describing 
. . . . . .. . a procedural path which can be broken down into a 
developmental sequence consisting of a number of related 
areas of activity (Johnsey 1995, p.201), 
was a typical approach to design and technology in Britain. To a large extent, 
it has influenced the developments in this area at both primary and secondary 
school levels . 
4.7 MODERN DAY CONCEPTION 
From what has gone so far, two complementary frameworks of clear, conceptual 
definitions of technology have emerged. Whereas some authors see the essence of 
technology in the fact of human activity (action processes involved), others see it in 
the methodological character of the procedures employed (purposeful activity leading 
to object making - material substratum). 
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It is appropriate at this point to say that these two frameworks are not fundamentally 
different, but complementary. Both of them are looking at the same thing from 
different points of view which are not necessarily incompatible. After all, the 
systematic procedure of the methodology employed in technology, which one of the 
frameworks emphasises, is more or less a natural systematisation of human activity, 
which the other framework stresses. In other words, to say, on the one hand, that 
technology is a means to an end, and on the other hand, that it is human activity, is to 
imply that the two definitions belong together. For to posit ends and procure and 
utilise the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilisation of 
equipment, tools and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves and the 
needs and ends they serve, all belong to what technology is. 
This definition of technology, according to which it is means and a human activity 
corresponds to the current conception of technology. 
This "broad" conception of technology considered thus far, has largely influenced 
schools' definition of technology. This is taken up later, but for now, attention will be 
directed to the philosophical foundation of the two principal views of technology 
presented above. 
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CHAPTER-5 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE TWO 
PRINCIPAL VIEWS ON TECHNOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Each of the two principal views about technology identified, has a philosophical 
foundation which will be examined. The "narrow" view, in which technology is not 
regarded as "knowledge" but associated with skills, is rooted in Plato-Aristotelian 
philosophy. Therein, technology is not part of Plato's "mind" but "body". However, 
the "broader" view, in which technology is regarded as knowledge, purposeful 
activity, and process, is associated with the Pre-Socratic philosophy, as well as, or 
more recently, Heideggerian philosophy. Within this philosophy, the superiority of 
the "mind" over "body" suggested by Plato above is dismissed, in favour of the unity 
of both. Technology is regarded as the very foundation of all forms of knowledge. 
5.2 NARROW VIEW: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION 
S.2.1 THE CONCEPTION OF TECHNOLOGY WITmN PLATO· 
ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION 
Labelled as the traditional conception of technology, the Plato-Aristotelian 
conception of technology has dominated the scene for many centuries, and is 
still maintained by many philosophers today. Essentially, within this tradition, 
the description of the concept of technology as a form of human knowledge, is 
bitterly disputed (or rejected). Two 'powerful' arguments have been used, one 
by Plato and the other by Aristotle, to reject the idea of technology as a form 
of human knowledge. Whereas Plato used ontological judgement 
incorporating the distinction between mind and body to argue that technology 
cannot be knowledge, Aristotle deploys forcefully the notion of the 'neutrality' 
of technology to make the same point. This will be apparent as progress into 
the tradition is made. Plato's 'mind-body' distinction will be presented first, 
followed by the Aristotelian 'neutrality' of technology. 
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5.2.2 PLATO'S 'MIND-BODY' DISTINCTION 
As Ihde (1979), and Russel (1946, p.861) remind us, the bitter dispute about 
technology as a form of human knowledge, is probably linked to the 
association of technology with practical skills, or machine technology. This 
dispute and the subsequent downgrading of technology, is indeed religious in 
origin, but orchestrated and subsequently extended to cover other areas of 
knowledge by philosophy, particularly Platonistic philosophy. The early 
philosophic concern excluded technology as an unimportant theme and 
concentrated on issues related to ontology and epistemology, because it is not 
immediately clear whether technology has any philosophical parentage 
compared to other forms of knowledge e.g., science. And to regard 
technology as applied science will mean that it is a forebear of philosophy, 
which obviously seems unlikely. What is then likely is that technology is 
dumb and merely an instrument, tool or slave of science. Furthermore, 
legends such as that of Frankenstein, have strengthened this thinking by 
pointing out that technology is created from "matter which is both dead and 
dumb" and later brought to life through the application of theory. Hidden in 
this argument is the ontological judgement, reminiscent of Plato. 
Chronologically speaking, technology is older than science. The knowledge 
involved in techne was praised but downgraded by the Greeks, but later 
recognised at least, as extant and powerful for human beings. Some historians 
like Lynn White, have suggested, that 
if the root of modem science took life in the Renaissance, that of 
modem technology, goes back to the Medieval time. (Ihde, 1979, 
p. xviii). 
Yet still the philosophical roots of technology remain unclear, relative to 
science. Thus, the partial setback, or downgrading of technology, has been the 
responsibility of philosophy, which thinks of or considers itself more as 
conceptual engineering than material engineering. This thinking regarding 
technology, has dominated the scene for a long time. It turns out to be 
idealistic, and it is not unrelated to the long-standing distinction between 
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theory and practice. To take for granted the primacy of theory over practice 
(or mind over matter), is to suggest, or imply, that technology is dependent 
upon science or that technology is made possible by science. A deeper phase 
of this distinction may be associated with the mind-body distinction. 
Accordingly, theory, as a set of concepts in some system of relations, is 
usually thought of as the product of the mind, while practice is often associated 
with the product of the body. 
Thus, where there is a paradigm within the dominant tradition about the 
relationship between science and technology it is defmitely one which assumes 
the primacy of science. The consequence is that technology is given less 
attention relative to science, and confirms the realistic interpretation which 
sees technology as applied or as an instrument of science. Within the 
Platonistic tradition, mind takes precedence over the body. In this respect, the 
phenomena of perception and embodiment in the 'body', are negatively 
evaluated, as lower on the scale of human activity than what is presumed to be 
a pure conceptuality. However, it will be remembered that in Plato's Republic 
there is a clear evaluation of the types or stages of knowledge. Therein, and as 
the allegory (or myth) of the cave will indicate, certain human capacities are 
valued more than others. For example, the lowest form of knowledge, 
imaging or seeing reflected shadows in the cave, results in a kind of perceptual 
type of knowledge: then on to mathematics knowledge (although still 
perceptual in the Greek sense), gradually rising upward to pure intuitions of 
forms; i.e. true knowledge - knowledge of forms. Accordingly, this sketch 
downgrades both perception and embodiment. 
5.2.3 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GREEK RELIGIOUS IDEAS 
Cultural reasons such as the ancient Greek religious ideas about the dualism of 
the body and soul, in which the former (body) is regarded as "container" of 
the soul (inferior), and the latter (soul) superior, ethereal, have also 
contributed to the downgrading of technology. In Greek religion the soul is 
regarded as ethereal and the inner direction of humanity toward the Good, a 
direction which is actualised by transcending beyond the body. This 
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'transcendence beyond the body' underpins, within the Platonistic tradition or 
theory, the negative value which has been given to both perception and 
embodiment. (Ihde, 1979, p.xx) 
5.2.4 ARISTOTELIAN NEUTRALITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
Aristotle, like Plato, regards technology in a narrow sense as 
a human arrangements of technics - (tools, machines, instruments, 
sciences and personnel) - to make possible, and serve the attainment 
of human needs or goals. (Hood, 1968, p.347). 
According to this conception, technology is not an activity which in itself 
satisfies man's nature, rather it is something he does only in order to get 
through with it so that he can go on to something else. In other words, 
technology is not an end in itself but simply a means to some further end. It is 
something external to man's nature. Furthermore, the value or meaning of 
technology is determined by this 'ordering' towards something else; it is not 
thought to have any meaning in itself: it is NEUTRAL. 
The neutrality in question is based, first of all, on the Aristotelian distinction 
between NATURAL and ARTIFICIAL objects, and secondly, on what he 
thinks techne or productive cognition is. 
Techne within this tradition, is concerned with objects which are 
neither necessary nor according to nature. That is, with things 
which are not what they are necessarily, nor have any innate 
tendency to become what they might be, but with things which 
can be made into other things given the action of some human 
agent. (Hood, 1968, p.348). 
5.2.4(a) Distinction between Natural and Artificial Objects 
Aristotle starts his distinction between "natural" and "artificial" objects 
by contrasting forms given to matter by artisans with those given by 
Nature. Accordingly, artisans do not give form to matter in the same 
manner as Nature does. For the natural form of some thing, is intrinsic 
to that thing. For instance, an oak tree is an oak tree, because of some 
intrinsic principle which determines its growth and operations. The 
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natural form has some power to define and effect operation: it is not 
neutral. 
Thus, the form brought forth by technology in matter, such as technics 
and products, given extrinsically by the artisan, are artificial. 
Accordingly, when a new form is given to matter by the artisan, for 
example, the forming of a bed on some oak wood, the change which 
has been brought about is not a change in its natural form, but a change 
solely with respect to some externally imparted form. In other words, 
if one plants a bed and the rotting wood acquires the power of sending 
up a shoot, it will not be a bed that will come up, but wood. In this 
respect, because technical production has no intrinsic principles of 
definition or operation, they may be said to be neutral, and therefore, 
require humans for their operations. 
5.2.4(b) Non-Utilitarian (Use) Vs Utilitarian (lnstrumental/ 
Production) 
The neutrality of technology, given the Aristotelian analysis, is even 
stronger, in that therein technological forms are presumed to derive not 
only their actual operation, but their value and meaning from the use to 
which they are put. For example, according to Aristotle, many of the 
actions, arts and sciences that exist now, have many ends. For medical 
arts, the end is health, for shipbuilding, it is a vessel, for strategy, it is 
victory, for economics, it is wealth, etc., etc. Each of these techniques 
and the artificial forms which they engender and utilise, has its meaning 
in the human purposes which they serve. 
However, the unity which pervades this multiplicity of techniques and 
meanings, is rooted in the fact that technology is necessary to human 
life. Aristotle, was conscious of the importance and meaning of 
necessity, particularly as the basic necessity of living, e.g. the 
provision of food, shelter and clothing etc., call for the making and 
using of tools. 
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In what appears to be an endorsement of the superiority of non-
utilitarian production over the utilitarian ones, Aristotle asserts, that the 
ability to make or produce something stands beyond the 
mere satisfaction of needs, because productive knowledge, 
like any other form of knowledge, is knowledge of universals. 
And for this reason, it is admired by others. (Hood, 1968, 
p.348). 
Aristotle, however, insists that admiration is engendered not only 
because the product e.g. the chair, bed, etc., is useful, but also because 
its maker is believed to be wiser and superior to men of experience, 
who have knowledge only of individuals. Here the concept of human 
necessity seems to include more than the satisfaction of man's 
immediate biological needs: i.e., the end of technology is dimly 
perceived to be more than the fulfilment of the requirements of organic 
needs. 
He cites instances, where primitive techne devoted a considerable 
portion of its attention to non-utilitarian productions from music 
instruments to ornamentation. 
Technology 
include not only technics as means, but also the products it 
makes. Some of these products being directly used in the 
service of specific ends, such as items for consumption, eg., 
food to sustain life. (op.cit. p.348). 
But many of these products are means to other products. For instance, 
machine tools which are used to devise tools, which in tum are used to 
make products, and so on, until the ultimate end is achieved. Hence, 
the distinction between instruments of production and instruments of 
action, is made quite clear by Aristotle in these words 
as production and action are quite different in kind, both 
require instruments: But the instruments which they employ 
must likewise differ in kind. (op.cit. p348) 
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It is therefore not too difficult to see why Aristotle regards the 
instruments of action as more important than instruments of production. 
To him, the end of technology is something which we can use (things 
which we call consumer goods) and not something that creates items of 
use (which we now call technics). Clearly, within this tradition, 
technic is an instrument (for instance, a hammer, or lathe machine), 
which belongs to production, and the instrument of action or practice, 
is an item of immediate use, (for example, chair, clothing). So that, a 
technic produces some results, but a consumer item produces no result, 
apart from its use. 
Aristotle regards technology as the actualisation of certain entities (or 
conditions, if the effects that humans produce on animals, plants and 
the surface of the earth are included), and practice, as the manifestation 
of their function in living. Human life, according to Aristotle, is not 
production, but action. Instruments of action are for human existence, 
and they make its perfection possible by allowing men to go beyond 
production. In other words, it is not production, but certain activities, 
such as politics, philosophy, which in themselves perfect human nature 
and are pursued for their own sake. Aristotle asserts that it is such 
trans-technological activities and ends which determine the limits of the 
technical activity. Thus, to pursue techne, represents a finite task. It is 
after all the forms of technic have been established and some freedom 
from necessity has been secured that sciences (theory), become 
possible. Sciences are not for other purposes, but are ends in 
themselves. It is in the sciences (POlitical theory) that the limit of 
technics becomes conceptualised. 
Nevertheless, given that man, according to Cosmic Law and Order, has 
a nature or essence which is his proper function to realise, let us say 
that this nature or essence can be known, (if it is not ultimately 
knowing itself) by contemplating in the unchanging reality which 
encloses Cosmic change. The attempts by humans to deal with 
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to 
changing things are radically subordinate to theoretical or non-
utilitarian concerns. 
For contemplation according to Aristotle, is at once the 
highest form of actuality since the intellect is the highest 
thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals 
are the highest things that can be known. (op. cit. p.348) 
Clearly, Aristotelian is alluding to a hierarchy of activities in which 
technology represents the lowest kinds, and this is understood or 
implied. Accordingly, technology is regarded as 
a human arrangement of technics to serve the attainment 
of human ends; ends which are extrinsic to that arrangement 
and determined by the intelligible order of the Cosmos which 
in tum is reflected in the stable structure of the society. 
(op. cit. p.348) 
The goal of techne (its product) e.g., the article of clothing, the house, 
etc., which the activity of making sees as its object, is strictly 
instrumental to something else from which it receives its complete 
justification. This 'something else' is the use to which it is put (Le. 
wearing the article of clothing, living in the house) for the sake of 
activity that ultimately is its own end, viz. moral or intellectual activity. 
Technology is therefore subordinate to practical wisdom, to moral and 
intellectual activities which are their own justification (or can justify 
themselves.) 
S.2.4(c) A Reaction to Aristotelian Understanding of 
Technology 
As an immediate but quick reaction to the Aristotelian conception of 
technology, Hood (1968, p.349) thinks that such understanding of 
technology probably makes sense in pre-modem society. However, the 
difficulty with this understanding of technology is:-
(1) that the modem scientific view of nature does not lend support 
its metaphysical base; 
(2) that, practically speaking, the search for concrete limits to 
technology cannot be found in present-day culture. 
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This is particularly so because the development of technology since the 
19th century has been so great that nothing in our culture remains 
outside of it. Thus, the problem of deciding what is the total 
arrangement, to which technology is referred, becomes apparent. What 
is a means in one context, becomes an end in another. For instance, a 
hammer is used in the workshop, but it is made in the factory; what has 
been a product or end, becomes a means. This analogy applies to even 
more complex technic than a hammer, e.g. the production of 
automobile. 
The point being stressed here is that a hammer ( or technic), cannot and 
should not be approached as if it is simply a neutral instrument which 
attains its value (or otherwise) from some use (or misuse) which is, a 
priori, clear and settled. Thus, it is more appropriate or sensible to 
approach this important technic as a 
dynamic member of a means-end continuum in which 
it functions as an indefmite number of means (for 
transportation, recreation, profit, etc.) as well as con-
currently serving as an object of immediate possession 
and enjoyment. (op. cit. p. 350) 
As a consequence, we do not seem to be able to distinguish 
arrangements of technics from things which are not technics in any final 
way, because it is not possible to distinguish means from ends in our 
modem technological complex. With such complexity, we are forced 
to acknowledge that 
means and ends are relative and interchangeable, and 
neither has a clear moral superiority over the other. 
(op. cit. p. 350) 
Another analogy which seems to 'dismantle' the traditional means-end 
distinction, is that which has to do with occupation. It is often thought 
that occupation is a means for making a living. But it is not often 
117 
realised that equally important is the fact that occupation provides an 
opportunity for realising some of our unique capacities as individuals. 
It must be remembered that this means-end distinction, forms the basis 
upon which the neutrality of technology rests. The fact that the 
structure of technology appears to elude our grasp, disappearing in a 
confusion of interrelationships, and resulting in man himself being lost 
in technology, calls the Aristotelian assumption into question. In 
Theodore Roszak's words see (op. cit. p.350) 
Those of us who find ourselves distressed or even horrified 
at the shape that the technological society is forcing upon our 
lives find ourselves again and again brought up short by the 
familiar cliche that technology (in both its mechanical and its 
organisational aspects) is after all a neutral force that can be 
wielded for man's well being as well as for his harm. 
However, although the modem situation appears to contradict the 
Aristotelian understanding, there continue to be protagonists for the 
traditional conception, with the tacit understanding along the way that 
the structures of technology can possibly be fixed by relating it to 
something external. It is unclear under the present circumstances, what 
this something may be. 
5.3 DESCARTES: SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL SUBSTANCES 
It is perhaps relevant with respect to the notion of 'mind-body', to bring in Descartes, 
who, described as the "father of modem philosophy", has also endorsed Platonistic 
idea of mind-body distinction. His assertion that man has immediate knowledge of his 
mind by a kind of interior illumination, greatly superior to the kind of knowledge 
which he has of material things, is a testimony to his endorsement. According to his 
assertion, mind dwells in the bodies and share none of the characteristics of material 
things. 
However, his idea about spiritual and material substances left no doubt in his mind 
about the existence of spiritual reality in general and in particular, man's spiritual 
mind. This idea has been an integral part of Descartes' system, and not merely the 
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relic of an old tradition. This is an idea which is apparent in his book Discourse on 
Method, wherein he attempts to reconcile deductions from mathematics with concepts 
of universe created by God. 
In one of Descartes' numerous assertions on mind-body, he describes the material 
world in terms of matter, identifiable with geometrical extension and motion. He 
seems to believe, that a fixed amount of matter and motion was put into the world 
when God created it. Having decided on the mechanical laws that will govern all 
nature, God did not want to interfere with the self-running machine which he had 
created. He ascribes to as machines, all bodies including living bodies, inorganic 
matter. They are ruled by the same inexorable laws and susceptible to analysis by 
quantitative methods of mathematics. According to Descartes, 
"man's body is nothing but a statue or machine made of earth". 
But man he says, 
as a whole, cannot be reduced to a member of this mechanical system. 
Because he possesses a spiritual mind which transcends the material 
world and the determining laws of efficient causality which governs this 
world. (Copleston, 1963, p.24) 
He then draws the distinction between those organised bodies which are and those 
which are not connected with self, so as to form a substantial unity. Whereas the 
latter bodies are explicable in behavioural concepts, in terms of mechanistic actions, 
stimulus-response model and conditioning processes, the former bodies, which exist in 
a real union with a relational, volitional self, require purposive models to explain their 
actions. 
Despite the problem in Descartes' interpretation of man as consisting of two 
distinguishable substances (mind and body), he still maintained that the mind can and 
does act on the body. If we assume that man consists of two clearly distinguishable 
substances, then we will expect his nature to tend to fall apart and no longer to possess 
a unity. It then becomes difficult to account for the evident facts of psycho-physical 
interaction. 
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5.3.1 SPIRITUAL vs CORPOREAL 
In another instance, Descartes talks about spiritual and corporeal substances, 
where Platonistic similarities are much in evidence. According to Descartes, 
thinking is the principal attribute of spiritual substance. He is more inclined to 
maintain that spiritual substance is in some respects always thinking. But he 
had no doubt that the mind begins to think at the same time that it is infused 
into the body of an infant, and that it is at the same time conscious of its 
thoughts, although it does not remember it afterwards. Why should the soul 
(mind) not always think when it is a thinking substance? And why is it strange 
that we do not remember the thoughts it has had when in the womb? If the 
essence of the soul (mind) is to think, then it must obviously either always 
think or cease to exist when not thinking. 
With respect to the corporeal substance, Descartes asserts that it has as its 
principal attribute, extension. Figures and actions cannot be conceived without 
extension. So that extension in length, and depth, constitutes the nature of 
corporeal substance. 
These attributes are inseparable from the substances of which 
they are attributes. But they are also modifications which are 
separable, not in the sense that they can exist apart the substances 
of which they are modifications, but in the sense that the substances 
can exist without these particular modifications. (Copleston, 1963 
p. 128) 
For instance, though thinking is essential to the mind, the mind has different 
thoughts successively. Furthermore, though a thought cannot exist apart from 
the mind, the mind can exist without this or that particular thought. Similarly, 
though extension is essential to corporeal substance, a particular quantity or 
shape is not; because they (e.g. size and figure) can vary. Descartes uses the 
term 'modes' to describe these variable modifications of attributes of thought. 
However, from the above, it is clear that human beings consists of two 
separate substances and the relation of mind to body is likened to that of a pilot 
in the ship. 
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For Descartes, there seems not to be any intrinsic relationship between the two 
factors. (i.e. mind and body). Because by his saying, that I am a substance, 
the whole of which is to think: and therefore not included in my clear and 
distinct idea of myself as a thinking thing, it would then seem to follow, that 
the body does not belong to my essence or nature. Consequently, I am a soul 
lodged in a body. 
Obviously, if I can move my body and direct some of its activities, then the 
relationship between the soul and the body at least is such that the soul stands 
to the body as mover to moved, and the body to the soul as instrument to 
agent. The mind-body relationship just described, is analogous to the pilot in 
the ship. Therefore, the theory of my clearly and distinctly perceiving myself 
to be merely a thinking being leads to the conclusion that nothing corporeal 
belongs to the essence to man, who is hence entirely spirit, while his body is 
merely the vehicle of the spirit. 
5.4 SUMMARY OF THE NARROW CONCEPTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
The conditions have been stated in which technology is not knowledge, because it is 
not part of Platonistic mind-body distinction. Aristotle equated the end of technology, 
exclusively with use. He says 
"artefacts do not exist for their own sake. " 
So that, if the roof of a house collapses after a carpenter builds it, carpentry would not 
have realised its purpose, even when the carpenter was satisfied with the exercise of 
his craft. Because use is not an end in itself, its final purpose is the same as that of all 
human action - namely, the maintenance of human life and its perfection in which man 
attains "eudaemonia", and his supreme happiness, which, according to Aristotle, 
consist of either a life of political activity or contemplation. Technology gives man 
the possibility of attaining perfection; of entering into the full realisation of his nature 
but, does not formally constitute that possibility. To achieve human perfection man 
needs to cultivate not just technology, the habits and know-how, which constitute 
productive cognition, but a life that transcends mere making. Descartes reinforced 
this view, himself being a follower of Plato. 
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CHAPTER-6 
"BROAD" VIEW: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Thus far, the philosophical conditions have been in which technology is somehow not 
knowledge, because it is not part of Platonistic idea of 'mind' but 'body'. The 
"broad" view, which is in direct contrast to the Platonistic one, does not make the 
distinction between "mind" and "body". Thus, it can be identified with pre-Socratic 
philosophy. In the pre-Socratic philosophical era, there is not the same distinction 
between mind and body, although Parmenides (fragments B5 and B6) indicate that the 
distinction in question has been built-in already, perhaps to serve a useful purpose of 
clarifying concepts. However, Plato is directly held responsible for starting it all. 
Pirsig (1974), has tried to link pre-Socratic philosophy to today's thinking about 
technology. In effect, he argues for the unity of mind and body, the priority of action 
over mind. There is also a mystical overtone, and a pre-Socratic philosophy, where 
there is a mystical element (in which there is the unity of thinking and doing, which 
has been destroyed by Plato). Greek philosophy, after all, is not just Plato but 
includes what happened before Plato as well. And as will be implied, what happened 
before Plato is in tune with what is happening nowadays. 
6.2 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY MIND-BODY UNITY 
The contemporary argument for technology as a form of human knowledge, is not 
based on the idea of the separation of mind from the body. Instead, it is based on the 
unity of these seemingly separate entities. The origin of this philosophic idea is 
undoubtedly pre-Socratic philosophy. The various texts on the pre-Socratic Greek 
(e.g. Kitto, 1950, p.173), relate that, during this philosophic era, the sharp distinction 
which the Christian and the Western world drew between the body and the soul, the 
physical and the spiritual, is foreign to the Greek at least until the time of Socrates and 
Plato. 
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Greek philosophical thinking during this time, was expressed in terms of 'oneness', 
'wholeness', unity of things. The poet Homer expresses this thinking, despite his love 
for particular detail and individual character. He fixes things firmly into a universal 
frame. Moreover, many Greeks such as Solon have aspired to and became several 
things: a political and economic reformer, man of business and a poet all at once. The 
"modem" man divides, specialises, thinks in categories. On the contrary, the pre-
Socratic Greek mind takes the widest view and sees things in an organic whole as the 
speeches of Cleon and Diodotus indicate. (Kitto, 1951). 
More illustrations of the 'oneness' or 'wholeness' in pre-Socratic Greek mind, can be 
found in the Greek language. Therein, there is an apparent refusal to specialise the 
meaning of words. According to Kitto( 1951, P .170), the pre-Socratic Greek did not 
divide (1) concept into different, though parallel categories; (2) the moral; (3) the 
intellectual; (4) the aesthetic; (5) the practical. Even the then philosophers are said to 
be reluctant to do it. Also, it is not difficult to find that some of Greek virtues seem 
to be as much intellectual as moral. Thus, it is found in Homer that the hero of the 
Odyssey in pre-Socratic Greek, is an excellent all-rounder, who has a surpassing 
'arete'. ('arete' implies respect for the wholeness or oneness of life, and a consequent 
dislike for specialisation; it implies a contempt for efficiency - or rather a much 
higher idea of efficiency, an efficiency which exists not in one department of life, but 
in life itself.) The Greek hero tried to combine in himself the virtues which "modem" 
heroic age divided, between the knight and churchmen. 
That the body is the tomb of the soul, is indeed an idea which is seen 
or met in certain Green mystery-religions, and Plato with his doctrine 
of Immortality, necessarily distinguished sharply between soul and body. 
(Kitto, 1951, p. 172) 
As already shown, this is not typical of pre-Socratic Greek ideas. Indeed, every 
aspect of the pre-Socratic Greek life is manifested in the expression of "oneness" or 
"wholeness". In their physical training, which is regarded as an important part of 
education, it did not occur to them to train anything, but the 'whole' body. The 
availability of gymnasia, as well as theatres, and warships, has made men of all ages, 
use them not only for physical but also for mental exercise. Even when they made 
games part of their religion, (Olympic Games), the contests were seen as means of 
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stimulating and displaying human 'arete' (quality of excellence). The poet Pindar, 
regards physical, moral, intellectual, as part of the one whole. In other words, there 
is a complete fusion of these parts which begins to disintegrate, following the writing 
of Euripides, twenty years after the death of Pindar, in which Olympic victors are 
seen as men of brawn and no mind. 
6.3 MIND-BODY DIVISION 
Up until the time when the early Greek philosophers emerged to wrestle with the 
problem of what is imperishable in the affairs of men, there seem not to be such things 
as mind and body, matter or object, form and substance. These divisions are just a 
dialectical invention that came afterwards. However, the modem mind still thinks that 
these divisions were there for the Greeks to discover. This is not quite correct, 
because they are just ghosts, immortal gods of modem mythos which appear to us to 
be real because we are part of that mythos. In reality, they are just as much an artistic 
creation as the anthropomorphic Gods they replaced. However, what is regarded as 
imperishable is within the domain of the Gods. With the growth of impartiality of the 
Greeks to the world around them, their power of abstraction which allows them to 
regard the old Greek mythos, not as revealed truth, but as imaginative creations of 
Arts strengthened. This consciousness had never existed anywhere in the world, and 
marked a step forward in the Greek civilisation. 
The mythos continued, and that which destroys the old mythos, becomes the new 
mythos. The new mythos under the first Ionian philosophers have been transmuted 
into a philosophy which enshrines permanence in a new way. Permanence, ceases to 
be the exclusive domain of the Immortal God, because it can also be found within 
Immortal Principles of which the law of gravity is one. Thales refers to this Immortal 
Principle as Water. Anaximenes calls it Air. For Pythagoras, it is number, (the first 
to see the Immortal Principle as something non-material), and for Heraclitus, Fire and 
Change, are seen as part of the Principles. Heraclitus maintains that the world exists 
as a conflict and tension of opposites. According to him, there is "One" and there is 
"a many", and the "One" is the universal law which is immanent in all things. 
Anaxogoras identified the One as "Nous", meaning the "Mind". Parmenides, in his 
fragments B5 and B6, makes it clear for the first time, that the "One", "Truth", God, 
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is separate from appearance and from opinion. The effect of this upon the subsequent 
history has already been stated. This is the point where the classic mind, for the first 
time, takes leave of its romantic origin and goes its separate way. Parmenides and 
Anaxogoras had Socrates as their listener, who later took their ideas and developed 
them to the full. 
It is this idea of "wholeness", or "Oneness", which Heidegger exploits to make the 
point that technology is something that is not separate from man, and is not a neutral 
instrument science. 
6.4 HEIDEGGER ON THE NEUTRALITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
Not all aspects of Heideggerian philosophy are easy to grasp. He should be examined 
through the 'eyes' of Hood (1968). 
By departing from the "narrow" traditional view of technology and claiming that 
technology is part of the existential structure of man and grounded in his being, 
Heidegger, needed to explain what he means by man and being. To achieve this, he 
introduces other concepts; some of these concepts include "Being" as fundamental, 
and belonging to the "ontological" dimension; "being" as phenomenal, and 
belonging to the "ontic" dimension. 
6.4.1 BEING AND MAN 
Man, in Heidegger's view, does not stand in some relation to technology. 
That is to say, technology is not something apart (external) from his being. It 
is grounded in man. Therefore, 
the relation between man and technology can be understood and 
the structure of technology fixed, only by coming to terms with 
the being of man. (Hood, 1968, p.352) 
Accordingly, technology becomes meaningful by exhibiting its grounding in 
man's being along with the characteristics it receives from such grounding. 
But what does man and being mean to Heidegger? Like all existential 
philosophers, he maintains that man is radically different from any object or 
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thing, because he has a unique nature which can be known and understood 
only in terms of the intentional or oriented character which his concrete being 
expresses. 
By denominating man Dasein, he draws attention to the basic link between 
man's existence and Being, and thereby indicates that man's very existence is 
what is proper to him and distinguishes him from other entities. But the noun 
Dasein, in German literally means, 'there-being'. Man in his being expresses 
the actuality or the presence of Being. Moreover, because man performs his 
actions (expressing the actuality or presence of Being), from out of his 
inseparable context or world surroundings, Heidegger calls man 'being-in-the-
world', to make the point that man's being or existence is the place where 
Being appears in the world. Since man is 'there' in the world and is the only 
being who is concerned with and actualises the presence of Being, Being can 
show itself only through man. Man is the only being to whom the world, 
including the things in it, e.g. nature, artefacts, and persons can reveal 
themselves in their own significance. 
Due to man's relationship with Being, existence denotes a standing out from, 
or a coming forth or emergence of entities in their being. In other words, man 
himself, is 'being-in-the-world'. The interpretation is that man's being is not 
that of substance, but rather a standing out from himself towards things, in 
such a way as to receive and express their significance. (Like abstracting 
one's self from something, or a situation.) By standing out from himself 
towards things, man becomes essentially a relating being. 
This is unrepresentative of Heidegger's thoughts, in which he identifies man 
with the relation or (bond) existing between himself and things, rather than 
characterising man merely as subject and things as objects. In other words, 
man as 'being-in-the-world' , represents the locus for subject-object 
relationships. The nisus or gap which separates, and at the same time unites, 
subject and object. That man is always in the world, is a basic fact. This 
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presupposes that the disclosure of things and the one to whom they are 
disclosed, are co-original. 
Plato and Neo-Platonistic philosophers, according to Heidegger, have 
systematically confused 'being', 'thing' or 'entity', with 'Being'. For 
Heidegger, 'being' is that which is 'ontic', or phenomenal - anything which 
manifests itself, on this plane of consciousness, e.g. a tree, a molecule, an 
ideology or a person. 'Being' on the other hand, is more fundamental than 
any particular 'being' or phenomenon. However, in an ontological system, 
'Being' is not a supreme category, because it is neither a given entity nor 
everything in general. Thus, it can be said, that 'Being' is the foundation for 
all entities and phenomenon. 'Being' and 'being' should not be confused or 
identified, because 'Being' is the foundation of all 'beings'. 
As Heidegger asserts, conceiving something ontically (Le. in its ontic 
dimension), allows one to grasp how it is related to other entities. But doing 
the same thing ontologically (Le. in its ontological dimension), allows one to 
appreciate how it is related to Being. (Le. to appreciate exactly how Being 
makes this entity possible.) Although both the ontic and the ontological 
dimensions are distinct, they are not separated. They represent the different 
dimensions of human existence as involved with entities. Man is thought to 
exist simultaneously in both dimensions. The ontological, though structurally 
prior to the ontic, 
it is not disclosed until after some entities have been encountered 
on the ontic level. (Hood, 1968, p.353) 
In other words, because man exists in the ontological dimension, he is inclined 
towards an ensemble of entities such as quality, quantity, relation, etc. in the 
ontic dimension. But his background of ontological dimension, as provided by 
his basic orientation to Being, and the horizon of his ontic dimension, (which 
emerges from his discovery of entities), are revealed together. But Heidegger 
is decisive in maintaining that the ontic structures which are technics (tools), 
products, nature (power, materials) theory (science), inter-subjectivity, are a 
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priori characteristics of man's encounter with things, and ontological structures 
are a priori characteristics of man. Dntic and the ontological are the two main 
characteristics of Being. 
The relevance of what has been said so far, with respect to technology, is that 
Heidegger's conception of technology is not just in its ontic dimension (which 
is the activity of producing definite things with technics in characterisable 
ways), he also conceptualises technology, in its ontological dimension, (which 
is more fundamental). And it is by going beyond the instrumental conception 
of technology, an it be well understood. In other words, to grasp technology 
(even instrumentally), it must be understood as a way in which man comports 
himself ontologically towards entities - that is to say, technology must not be 
conceived ontically, it must also be conceived ontologically. By so doing one 
can see how man grounds technology and how it takes on its determination in 
such grounding. 
6.4.2 FIXING THE STRUCTURE OF TECHNOLOGY (EXPERIENCE) 
Consideration will now be given to how the ontological dimension of man 
makes possible the ontic determination of technology. In essence, how does 
this take place on the ontic level? According to Heidegger, the determination 
of technology on the ontic level (or the fixing of its structure) originates in 
man's transaction of ordinary experience. This structuring of ordinary 
experience takes place in terms of five ontic characteristics, namely, 
TECHNICS: (tools, implements, apparatus, machines); PRODUCT: 
(consumer and non-consumer goods); NATURE: (material and power); 
THEORY: (the role of science); and INTER-SUBJECTMTY: (the social 
and organisation of labour). These five features represent the specific ways in 
which the ontological side of man's existence is realised through the creation 
of technology. By referring to technology as a total arrangement of technics, 
what is implied is that the five general characteristics of technology are made 
up of, or composed of, a complex structuring of ordinary experience, which is 
immanent to this experience. As the ontological dimension of man is 
actualised by the growing complexity of his transactions with technics, an 
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increasingly definite character is given to ordinary experience. Technology 
becomes a dynamic structuring which grows out of, complicates, and pervades 
ordinary experience. 
6.4.3 GROUNDING 
(CONCERN) 
TECHNOLOGY ONTOLOGICALLY? 
Man grounds technology ontologically through the concept of, concern which 
defines his active relation to the world. 'Concern' is man's relation to things 
insofar as this takes forms such as using, handling, production, etc. This 
concern for entities transcends man's specific nature and is directed toward all 
being. Inevitably, this widens the meaning of technology to include not only 
that it makes possible the execution and satisfaction of human needs, or that it 
is instrumental (both of which are correct), but also that which reflects the 
concern man has for the Being of entities. Technology then becomes 
onto logically possible because man's concern grounds it. In other words, man 
encounters entities by freeing them for their being. 
Man, in Heidegger's terminology, is the clearing of Being. By his being 
basically oriented to Being, he is open to the given in experience. But as a 
relational being, he is partially at one with the given in experience by opening 
himself to it, as in tum, the given opens to him, and entities emerge. Put in a 
different way, what man experiences in the world depends on how he creates 
his world, how he structures it ontically. 
And how he creates the world, depends upon what he encounters 
in the world in his basic orientation, how the world shapes him in 
his fundamental possibilities. (Hood, 1968 P.354) 
6.4.4 THE FIVE ONTIC STRUCTURES AND THEIR ROLE IN 
TECHNOLOGY 
6.4.4(a) Technics 
It must not be forgotten, that Heidegger is claiming that technology is 
part of the existential structure of man and grounding in his being. To 
support the claim, he describes the five ontic structures and their role in 
technology. And then demonstrates how man onto logically liberates or 
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frees these five structures. However, it must be conceded technology 
begins with ordinary experience; in other words, ordinary experience is 
the locus for technology as well as anything else that has been created. 
Like all other experiences, technology is a development that grows out 
of ordinary experience. What is ordinary experience? Ordinary 
experience is the pre-reflective side of man's existence; it is his range 
of daily activities in the everyday world characterised by an indefinite 
pattern of transactions with things in his environment, an indefinite, 
extended pattern of doing and undergoing something, some place, some 
time with some thing. With reference to the ontic dimension of human 
existence, ordinary experience is the familiar, common mode of man's 
involvement with things: such as doing things in his surroundings, e.g. 
manipulating, using, consuming them, driving a car, preparing and 
eating a meal, etc., etc. The list is inexhaustible. 
However, certain things are readily available to facilitate man's 
involvement with things. These things are ubiquitous that we are hardly 
aware of their familiar presence. These things defme the first ontic 
structure of technology, namely, technics: artefacts created and used 
for human purposes. They are responsible for shaping ordinary 
experience through constructing a domain of well-circumscribed objects 
among which man moves. When man uses technics to do (or for) 
work, he fmds himself located within a multiplicity of technics which 
stand out from a common background; his surroundings and the useful 
objects in it come to be contextual, i.e. emerge from a more or less 
unarticulated horizon. In every transaction with his environment, man 
comes across and utilises technics. In other words, transactions which 
man carries out in his environment, are mediated by technics. He is 
engaged with technics in ordinary experience no matter what the task 
is. Those entities which man encounters in concern, Heidegger calls 
equipment. Such that in our dealings, we come across and utilise 
equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. 
Thus, technics cover all artefacts which can be said to exist for 
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something. Technics include more than tools; it includes things like 
machine, instruments, implements - anything which is for something. 
This conception of technic covers particular technics which are 
functional (such as a hammer whose handle has been broken). We have 
identified a technic any time we ask the question 'what is it for?' How 
then does a technics differ from simple material object? According to 
Heidegger, something is a technic when it is not ascribed to physical 
properties. 
For instance, to say that something is a hammer is not to 
impute physical properties to it, such as being blunt, having 
a certain hardness, or being made of steel. But from man's 
actual use of the hammer, it will be appropriate to ascribe 
relations to the hammer such as being used to pound in nails, 
straightening out metal securing shingles, being used skilfully, 
clumsily, rapidly. These relations make sense only in the 
specific mode of encounter with the technic in question; in 
other words, they are relations to persons, meanings conferred 
on entities for the sake of executing tasks. (Hood, 1968, p.355 
-356). 
Undoubtedly, technics have a physical existence. But this does not 
nUllify the distinction between technic and material objects considered 
not from their utility standpoint. When we talk about technics, as being 
well or ill designed, convenient, handy or unhandy, suitable or 
unsuitable, we understand immediately that physical properties are not 
what is implied. Given this explanation of technic, our encounter with 
technic according to Heidegger, expresses itself initially in the form of 
an intention to bring about some deftnite transaction with our 
environment, as implied by the use of that technic. When a technic is 
taken and used by someone, it incorporates a projected transaction 
directed toward changing the environment, no matter how small or 
inconsequential the change might be (e. g. clearing the bushes for 
farming). Besides changing the environment in some ways, this 
transaction marks out the environment, and gives it, as well as the 
things in it, (the cutlass, the people using it , the coterminous 
surrounding) a context. A technic thus always opens some portion of 
the environment by referring beyond itself, something which is made 
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possible by man's being-in-the-world. The being of man in its ontic 
dimension makes the creation of technics possible because of his 
concern with entities. The openness of technic, in tum, makes the 
creation of technics possible to objectify and discharge human 
purposes. So ontically speaking, 
ordinary experience is the forward thrust of man in things 
that is structured contextually by technics. Technics are 
incorporations and expressions of this forward movement, 
forming and stabilising such movement. (op. cit. p.356) 
From what has been said so far about the nature of a technic, it is 
possible to say what is intended by referring to technology as a total 
arrangement of technics. It is simply, that technics are never used in 
isolation; they always occur as members in a context of technics. (i.e. 
a totality of tools, implements, materials, energies, and other items of 
use). Such context include science and persons. A total arrangement 
of technic might be a house, a carpenter's workshop or a factory. And 
to stress the spatial function of technic, Heidegger introduces the term 
'contextual-totality', to describe the total arrangement of technic. 
6.4.4(b) Product 
Besides spatializing man's environment, contextual totality has another 
function which is to create a PRODUCT. Every member of a given 
contextual totality, i.e. all of the tools, materials, machines, energies 
and personnel, are directed to the realisation of some product or other. 
The product represents the final reference of the contextual-totality and 
comprises its unity as a pattern. Even if we have the entire technology 
of society as a total arrangement in mind, any given contextual totality 
belongs to a more inclusive one that is subsumed within an even 
broader one and so forth, until no final assignment or defmite terms can 
be found. If this is the case, i.e. if there can be any fmal assignment in 
ordinary experience at the level of technics and products, then it is 
understandable that we may be tempted to relate technology to 
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something external as the traditional concept did. Contextual totalities 
do not stand alone; they are mutually interrelated in man's transactions 
with his surroundings. Through the process of using technics to deal 
with entities, man experiences himself as the originator of his ongoing 
action and also as one who is the recipient. 
6.4.4(c) Nature 
The use of technics does not involve the manufacturing of product; for 
as they open our environment to disclose that it is a domain that 
contains more than technics and other kinds of artefacts, Nature 
becomes included. Technics mediate between man and Nature in 
ordinary experience. Through conceptual totalities, man is carried into 
the totality of human things called NATURE. And Nature becomes 
converted into technics and product. The conversion of Nature into 
energy and material has brought this about. The employment of 
technics necessarily refers to certain natural materials. Assignment for 
instance, are made by the shoemaker to leather, rubber, thread, nail and 
other material in manufacturing shoes. But the materials for work of 
any kind come from Nature and are rendered serviceable for that work. 
Patterns, forms and structural possibilities which are present in natural 
entities are released and incorporated into experience by the use of 
technic. They are potential factors in the manufacturing of projects and 
they originate from the material revealed in contextual totalities. 
Through spatializing his environment, man penetrates Nature, which is 
included within technology and at the same time is beyond technology. 
Technology also encompasses Nature in the form of energy. And so 
nature is not only around man in the form of material, but also before 
man as energy. Nature offers direction for the execution of tasks; 
suggesting to man how he might make better use of his environment. 
Just as Aristotle's view of Nature is no longer acceptable to modem 
science, so too is the relationship between Nature and technology. 
Nature, within the contemporary view, has lost its formal character, as 
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it has become elementary and abstract, capable of elaborate symbolic 
manipulation under highly special and artificial conditions, which can 
be given a multiplicity of forms. Thus, Aristotle's distinctions between 
matter and form, artificial and Natural things, become inapplicable. 
After all, an unequivocal conception of nature is difficult. Thus, what 
we see is some form of stipulative definitions adopted for the purpose 
of investigation; such as the definition of Nature as 
"the sum total of elementary forces and materials in the 
universe. " 
(Hood, 1968, p.359) 
6.4.4(d) Theory 
Given the awareness of the relativity of our knowledge of Nature and of 
its dependence upon our somewhat specialised approach to it, and given 
the realisation that our knowledge is effective in solving technical and 
human problems and endowed with creative power, we begin to see the 
coming together of technology and Nature, making science. Thus, in 
this century, we have witnessed the effective and creative power of 
theory making possible many of the extensive changes which we find in 
such diverse areas as agriculture, manufacturing, communication and 
war. The development of modem science, together with that of 
technology, has caused a bridge to emerge from Nature to technology, 
connecting the potentialities of Nature with the possibilities of 
technology, --- something Aristotle and Plato would not have thought 
possible. Contextual totalities include THEORY. We are able to 
respond to Nature as something in its own right, because we spatialize 
our environment and realise that there are natural objects apart from 
objects for use. It is in theory that the technological horizon undergoes 
a profound modification. Here, the world of ordinary experience is 
changed into a theoretical conception of material objects. With 
technics, it is possible to undertake a theoretical study of Nature. But 
for the contribution of technics in the genesis of a technological 
horizon, within which the human can be distinguished from the natural, 
science would not be possible. The support for technology has come 
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from science, following the realisation that the study of Nature can help 
man in dealing with his environment. As a new attitude toward Nature 
and technology developed during the nineteenth century, technology 
and science were united. A view of Nature as the storehouse of energy 
and indefinite supply of power and material waiting to be appropriated, 
became prominent, contrary to the Aristotelian view of Nature, as 
mentioned earlier. The engineers and the physicists see Nature as a 
'calculable ensemble of forces'. Indeed modem science, in 
Heidegger's view, did not arise merely because Nature demanded it, 
but because of a new conception of Nature as a complex arrangement of 
forces and energies. This allows experimental method to uncover them 
as they are. Clearly, the rise of modem science, not ancient or 
Aristotelian science, of theoretical physics, of experimental design, and 
of modem technics, has been as a result of the emergence of a new 
attitude, a new conception of man and his relationship to entities. 
Both science and technology become perceived as means for the 
domination of entities taken as materials and stores for possible 
energies contrary to the traditional conception. The energies and 
possibilities released and amplified by science and technology are not 
merely accessories to human existence, not merely an extension of 
external capacity, but belong essentially to man's bringing Nature near. 
His openness makes possible the determination of the space of Nature. 
According to Heidegger. 
at the ontic level, both theory and production tend toward 
the functional manipulation and use of natural possibilities. 
Thus, science and technology are rooted in the same 
conception of nature, both arose out of the same horizon. 
Interestingly, the distinction which Aristotle made between theory and 
making misses the integral connection between theory and technique. 
Technique, or making, is not an accidental but an integral feature of 
modern technology; technology includes science and technique. It is 
theoretical by nature. Indeed as implied by Aristotle, 
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the union between knowing and changing the world, is 
far more intimate than the mere assignment of the fruit 
of theory to practical application. 
Theory is dependent upon making, and making is dependent upon 
theory, both being identifiable strands of the experiment. Theory and 
technique show themselves in two different ways: (1) by means of the 
experiment, transactions are effected with Nature. Theory obtained in 
this way leads to, and renders possible, changes in application, e.g. 
nuclear physics through knowing nature creates nuclear reactors. In 
turn, the application of theory becomes a new source of knowledge not 
to be found in the laboratory alone. It furnishes new equipment for 
more effective experiments, which again yield new gains in knowledge, 
and so on, in continuous spiral. In this manner the dynamic union of 
theory and application, knowing and making, become inseparable in a 
way in which Aristotle thought impossible. Thus, technology 
encompasses both theory and making, a fact which cannot be accounted 
for by the traditional conception. 
6.5 RYLE'S CONCEPT OF THE MIND 
Gilbert Ryle's concept of the mind, wrapped up in his dogma of the "ghost in the 
machine", is supportive of contemporary thinking, but fiercely critical of Descartes' 
mind-body distinction. He attempts to answer the question why is it that most people 
know how to make correct use of concepts which apply to mental activity but cannot 
state the logical regulations governing their use? In doing so, that he makes it clear 
that the problems which we have when we talk about mind-body problem, our 
knowledge of other minds, solipsism, etc., are rooted in the errors of philosophers. 
Of relevance here is the problem which modern European thinkers have in abandoning 
the idea of the existence of mind and body forcefully put by Descartes. As stated 
before, Descartes in his writings, implies that the mind dwells in bodies and shares 
none of the characteristics of material things. 
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According to Ryle, to think that the mind is a ghost mysteriously embodied in a 
machine (body), is to commit a 'category' mistake of confusing the logic of discourse 
about bodies and things, with the logic of discourse about minds. For example, to 
think that the University is an entity in the same sense that its component colleges, 
libraries, laboratories etc., are entities, would be to make a category mistake. Also to 
think that 'team spirit' has the same kind of reality that batsmen, fielders, umpires do, 
would amount to making the same category mistake. 
Certain categories are used to describe the physical world. They are 'things', 'stuff', 
'attributes', 'state', 'process', 'change', 'cause and effect'. The error which we 
commit, according to Ryle, when trying to theorise is to suppose, that there are 
'things' called 'minds' comparable to things called 'bodies', and that there are mental 
'events' like physical ones, which have causes and effects. To think of the mind in 
such terms is paramechanical. Mind in this fashion is regarded as immaterial, hence 
the term 'ghost'. It is believed to press levers, open windows, relieve shocks, exert 
reactions, much as if it were material. We also commit what Ryle regard as a 
'category' mistake, when we teach, that the mind knows itself in a peculiar direct 
manner. This is a paraoptical view of self-knowledge, reinforced by the optical 
phenomena aspect of Galilean science, which has replaced the paramechanical 
hypothesis of minds. 
For Ryle, there is no such 'thing' as mind. It is a solecism to speak of mind as 
knowing this or choosing that. The correct thing to say, is that a person knows or 
chooses. Some of our actions show qualities of intellect and character. And the fact 
that we know or choose, can be classified as a 'mental fact' about us. According to 
Ryle, it is an unfortunate linguistic fashion which leads men to say that there are 
'mental acts' or 'mental processes' comparable to 'physical acts' and physical 
processes. 
The error of talking as if there were a mind, is derived from our failure to distinguish 
different types of statements, and from supposing that what is characteristic of words 
in one kind of sentence is also characteristic of words in other kinds of sentences. For 
instance, words such as 'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever', and 'humorous', are 
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'dispositional' words, according to Ryle. And in the statements in which they occur, 
they do not assert matters of fact, but capacities, tendencies, propensities, etc. So that 
you cannot say to a sleeping man that he knows Russian, and then affirm an additional 
fact that he has blue eyes and dark hair. Dispositional statements are similar to 
hypothetical propositions of modem logic. They are indicative sentences and may be 
true or false in the sense that they are verifiable under certain conditions. A man 
knows Russian if, when he is spoken to in Russian, he responds appropriately in 
Russian. But no one criterion of performance is sufficient. Ryle asserts, that in 
addition to 'dispositional words', there are 'occurrence words'. The latter apply to 
our high-grade activities, which may be called 'mental'. Driving a car, is an instance 
of occurrence, whereas, paying heed, is an instance of disposition. (A state of 
readiness.) The double-process which misleadingly suggests itself here, (with the 
bodily activity, e.g. driving a car going on more or less by itself and intermittent 
mental process trying to parallel what is going on in the body), is not two processes, 
but one. Thus, when we say, that a person heeds what he is doing while driving, we 
are making a 'seem hypothetical' statement. A heedful person drives differently, 
because he is alert to chance holes, pedestrians; but the heeding is not itself an act in 
addition to the act of driving; it presupposes no other agent other than one who is 
driving the car. 
Moral and religious thinkers have been driven to assert the autonomy of the mind, 
following the successes of physical science, from the time of Galileo. Many theorists 
were excited by the expectation that the world might ultimately be explained, in terms 
of motion of the bodies according to laws which can be demonstrated mathematically. 
Of course, these moral and religious thinkers were interested in human freedom. 
According to Ryle, the laws of nature are not 'fiats', i.e. authoritative, or warrants. 
Law statements are 'open' hypothetical sentences, i.e. sentences in which the 
conditional phrase contains a universal term such as 'any', or 'whenever'. Such 
sentences do not, like categorical sentences, affirm the existence of anything. 'Causal 
connections', for example, do not exist in the same sense as the existence of bacteria 
and the disease they are alleged to cause. Thus, statements about physical laws do not 
mention anything. they are merely predictive of behaviour. 
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Ryle puts forward the view that, instead of the mind, there is behaviour. However, 
behaviour frequently involves 'higher order actions' in which the second agent is 
concerned with actions of a first agent, as in spying or applauding. Our higher order 
acts may be directed upon our lower order acts, as in the case of self-criticism. 
According to Ryle, we will ordinarily refer to this as self-consciousness. This is 
unsympathetic with the motion of introspection, wherein we look into our own mind 
and discover its workings. In fact, when we do engage in the so-called introspection, 
according to Ryle's conception, we are engaged in retrospection, instead. Any 
attempt at introspection, i.e. to glimpse ourselves in the act of thinking, is hopeless. 
Clearly, Ryle rejects the claims of introspective psychology, based on the paraoptical 
model of knowledge. But he seems to accept the fact that we do know our feelings 
immediately. However, he carefully distinguishes feelings which are agitations, from 
moods and tendencies, which are dispositions. He maintains that for tendencies which 
are dispositions we have no immediate knowledge, only as they eventuate in actions, 
can we form any estimate of them. Hence, our knowledge of ourselves, come from 
our observing of our own behaviour. 
6.6 THE UNITY OF "KNOWING-HOW" AND "KNOWlNG-
mAT" 
As technology is concerned with action, and knowledge, Ryle's concept of "knowing-
how" and "knowing-that", becomes pertinent here. In line with the concept of unity 
of "mind and body" (or "knowing-that" and "knowing-how"), or knowledge and 
action for that matter, it may perhaps be helpful to examine some of the views about 
knowledge and action. 
According to Powell (1967), three commonly held views can be discerned. The first 
view relates that when we are concerned with action, we are supposedly concerned 
with "knowing-how", and not "knowing-that". Polanyi (1967) seems to have 
expressed the same view in his assertion that technology teaches action. And, 
according to the second view, actions are supposedly explicable by reference to (or in 
terms of) rules, commands, prescriptions or imperatives; they are characterised by the 
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fact that they are neither true nor false. The third view asserts that if actions are 
explicable by reference to matters of fact, then they are matters of facts about the 
agent (or individual), his desires, wants etc., and, in particular, the end which he 
desires to bring about. With reference to what might be regarded as the "standard 
instance" of an action explanation, there must be some beliefs on the part of the 
individual that there is a causal connection between his performance of an action and 
the attainment of his desired end. It is not very clear yet how relevant his beliefs are, 
in this case; for instance, what difference does it make if his beliefs are true or false? 
However, in reassimilating "knowing-how" to "knowing-that", it is assumed that, if 
some actions are to be explained by reference to matters of fact, then we cannot admit 
a radical distinction between some of the things people do, and some of the truths that 
they learn. (Powell, 1967, p.9). 
Ryle's distinction between "knowing-how" and "knowing-that", seems to reflect this 
non-admittance of a radical distinction. 
6.7 THE DEFENCE AGAINST INTELLECTUALIST LEGEND 
The intellectualists' traditional view which distinguishes between the truth which 
people learn and the things they do, is summarised in Ryle's words, 
there are certain parallelisms between "knowing-how" and "knowing-that", 
as well as certain divergence. 
The fact that in talking about things that people do, we say nothing about the truth 
which they learn, is implicit in the passage below: 
Theorists have been so preoccupied with talks of investigating the nature, 
the source and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have 
for the most part ignored the question of what it is for someone to know 
how to perform tasks. In ordinary life, on the contrary, as well as in the 
special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with people's 
competencies than their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with 
the truths they learn. (Ryle, 1949, p.28). 
Ryle in his book argues that there are no internal acts of the sort put forward by the 
intellectualists going on during the performance of an act. The verb "know" does not 
indicate occurrence. For reasons put forward by Ryle and Ayer, to say that a person 
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knows, is not to say that he is performing an inner act. Apparently, his (Ryle's) 
response has been on the consequence of the intellectualists view, namely, the 
separation between theory and practice, or that the mind thinks and the body responds 
accordingly. The usage of the epithet "intelligent" to describe an action is nothing but 
a reinforcement of this view. 
The epistemologists (like others) have always fallen into the trap of expecting 
dispositions to have uniform exercises. By recognising that verbs such as "know", 
and "believe" are ordinarily used dispositionally, the epistemologists then assume that 
there must, as a consequence, exist one-pattern of intellectual processes in which these 
cognitive dispositions are actualised. For example, if you believe, that the earth is 
round, you must from time to time be going through some unique proceeding as 
cognitive, judging, or internal re-asserting with a feeling of confidence that the earth 
is round. (Ryle, 1949, p.44) 
Briefly put, the intellectualists' position is that actions are classified as "intelligent", 
only if they are preceded by an internal act of theorising, and that it is this internal, 
anterior performance which earns the action the title of "intelligence". In other 
words, an action is said to be "intelligent" when the action is carefully or skilfully 
executed, i.e. when it is performed in a thoughtful manner. Such that acting 
rationally, means 
having one's non-theoretical propensities controlled by one's apprehension 
of truths about the conduct of life. (Ryle, 1949, p.26). 
Proponents of intellectualist views then try to reassimilate "knowing-how" to 
"knowing-that", by saying that intelligent performance involves the observation of 
rules, or the application of criteria. (Which in some sense describes performance in 
technology). It then follows, according to the proponents, that the operation described 
as intelligent, must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledgement of these rules or 
criteria. In other words, the person performing the operation must first go through 
the internal process of avowing to himself certain proposition about what is to be done 
('maxims', 'imperatives' or 'regulative proposition', etc.) and only then can he 
execute his performance in accordance with those criteria or rules. According to 
Ryle, 
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he must learn to preach to himself before he can practice. The chef 
must recite his recipes to himself before he can cook according to them; 
the hero must lend his inner ear to some appropriate moral imperative 
before swimming out to save a drowning man; the chess player must run 
over in his head all the relevant rules and tactical maxims of the games 
before he can make correct and skilful moves. To do something thinking 
what one is doing is, according to this legend, always to do two things; 
namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or prescriptions, and 
to put into practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It is to 
do a bit of theory and then do a bit of practice. (Ryle, 1949,). 
As already stated, Ryle rejects this intellectualist view, on two important grounds. 
The first, that to perform intelligently does not require prior internal performance. 
And the second is that the class of intelligent performances is much wider that that 
allowed by traditional philosophers. 
Expounding his first objection, Ryle points out that to posit an internal act of 
theorising before performance, results in an infinite regress: 
The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this: The consideration 
of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or 
less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be 
intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed 
and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone 
ever to break into the circle. (Ryle, 1949, p. 138) 
Regarding the second of his objections, Ryle points out that there exist a lot of classes 
of performance in which intelligence is displayed, but of which the rules or criteria 
are not formulated. Thus, if there are no rules or criteria for such performance, then 
there cannot be prior act of considering rules or criteria. 
The wit, when challenged to cite the maxims, or canons, by which he 
constructs and appreciates jokes, is unable to answer. He knows how to 
make good jokes, and how to detect bad ones, but he cannot tell us or 
himself any recipes for them. So the practice of humour is not a client of 
its theory. The canon of aesthetic taste, of tactful manners and of 
inventive technique exercise of those gifts. (Ryle, 1949, p.137) 
Many performances, which cannot be defined in terms of the apprehension of truth, 
may be counted as intelligent. For instance, making and appreciating jokes, making 
and appreciating pictures, the tipping and tumbling of a clown, are but few examples. 
That Ryle equates these performances as "know-how", is even open to question. 
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Intelligent performance should necessarily be what is performed intelligently. 
However, that many philosophers have tended to define all other mental-conduct 
concepts in terms of the cognition, the verb to "know" is, after all, such a concept. It 
is clear that intelligent performance has been unduly restricted when intelligence is 
defined in terms of cognition. This is not to suggest that the concept of cognition 
should be stretched to cover all intelligent performances. According to Powell 
(1967), 
it is either necessary to provide some justification for using a concept of 
cognition in connection with the wit, who is said to "know how" to make 
good jokes and how to detect bad ones, or misleading to use a word like 
"know" in spheres where questions of truth appear to be irrelevant. To 
grant that there is no intelligent performance which requires an internal 
act of apprehending truth is not to grant that no intelligent performance 
requires to be understood by reference to truth. (p.23) 
Powell is, in effect, saying that we should not use the term "know" indiscriminately to 
describe actions as intelligent. Such usage of the term should be restricted to actions, 
of the kind to which reference to truths is required. 
Truths can be established and learned about through such actions as bridge building, 
plumbing, gardening, cooking, installing telephones and electricity, sailing ships and 
launching rockets. But there are no such truths to be established and learned with 
respect to actions like making and appreciating jokes. If imposing such restriction, 
would constitute a problem, then, at least the distinction between actions of the kind 
which truths are relevant and those to which rules are not relevant (e.g. making and 
appreciating jokes which have no truths or rules or maxims) should be made. 
Nevertheless, to use the word "know" to describe any action as intelligent without due 
consideration of the kinds of criteria which are involved, may result in it becoming 
vacuous. Thus, there will be no reason why we cannot talk about moral or aesthetic 
knowledge, provided we are prepared to call it "knowing how". Whereas there can 
be medical knowledge on the grounds that there are medical truths, there is no moral 
or aesthetic knowledge, since there are no aesthetic truths. 
The idea of getting something right, also applies to the actions performed by people. 
Intelligent performance, is regarded also as one in which the agent applies criteria in 
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performing: i.e. tries to get things right. Apart from there being the questions about 
what it is to apply criteria, there are questions also about the nature of the criteria 
being applied. These criteria or standards are independent of the agent, just like the 
criteria by which we judge that one is right about the state of the ice, is independent of 
one, i.e. one's behaviour. However, the criteria for some right (intelligent) 
performances, are not necessarily to be elucidated by reference to certain sorts of 
truths. For instance, the criteria for the hero who swims to save a drowning man are 
not to be understood in terms of certain sorts of truths. And a distinction is needs to 
be made between knowing-how to tell the difference between a chalk and cheese, and 
knowing-how to tell the difference between a bad and good joke. Although intelligent 
performance does not have to be preceded by internal acts of theorising, there is still 
the need to make the distinction between different kinds of intelligent performances. 
6.8 KINDS OF INTELLIGENT PERFORMANCES 
The individual's knowledge of certain truths and his ability to do certain things, has 
been distinguished using the epithet, "knowing-that" and "knowing-how". Surely 
there is a difference between having mastered the theory of driving a car and actually 
being able to drive a car. One may know all the relevant facts about say, installing 
telephones, but be unable to perform such a task. What is implicitly invoked here, is 
the point about the conditions for knowledge. A necessary condition for someone to 
be said to know p, is that not only that p must be true and that he must believe p, he 
must also have evidence for the truth of p. To make the conditions of knowledge very 
high, sometimes what seems to be meant, is for one to be able to cite the evidence by 
which p is established as true. This amounts to nothing but the expounding of theory 
of, say, telecommunication, and it is unrealistic to suppose that the person who is able 
to expound theory, really "knows". Nevertheless, to suggest that the person who 
cannot expound a theory but who can install a telephone also knows, is to make the 
condition for knowledge more flexible. 
It seems misleading to assert that it is possible to know a person merely from his overt 
behaviour. Mainly because not all the things which a person performs, in the sense 
explained above, can be regarded as exemplifying knowledge. That a person knows 
something can be denied on the grounds that this is not the kind of thing which can be 
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known: e.g. the difference between right and wrong, or good and bad paintings. 
However, the difference between knowledge of certain truths and having an ability to 
do certain things is not so great as we have been invited to believe. Furthermore, the 
possession of a skill does not merely depend on what one does, but on what one does 
correctly, and rightly. 
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6.9 SUMMARY OF "BROAD" (CONTEMPORARy) VIEW OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Remember, it is the distinction between mind and body, in which the former is 
superior to the latter, that has led to the dismissal of technology as a form of human 
knowledge. Both Heidegger and Ryle in their exposition have argued, that the 
philosophical basis on which technology is dismissed as a form of human knowledge 
is naive. Both of them have favoured a philosophical basis which presupposes the 
unity of "mind" and "body". 
The foregoing exposition has identified a tradition which is different from the Plato-
Aristotelian one, which, after two thousand years has been left behind. However, 
what this exposition has clearly shown in effect, is that what happened before Plato in 
terms of thinking about phenomena, is in tune with what is happening nowadays. Of 
equal importance, is the acknowledgement of the concept of technology as a form of 
human knowledge. 
6.9.1 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY 
OF THE TWO PIDLOSOPIDCAL VIEW POINTS ABOUT 
TECHNOLOGY 
Before examining the extent to which this "broader" philosophical view of 
technology has influenced schools' approaches to the defmition of technology, 
it is vital that the implications for the psychology of technology of these two 
philosophical views of technology be considered. 
The main concern of this investigation is about the psychology of technology, 
not philosophy of technology. Thus, it makes logical sense to examine the 
consequences for the psychology of technology of the two philosophical 
viewpoints presented here, so that the "broader" philosophical view point for 
which this investigation shows sympathy, can be seen in its proper context. 
It is not out of place to suggest that the "narrow" philosophical conception of 
technology, has elements of, or can be identified with, Cartesian tradition, 
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because the importance of technology is downgraded. Piaget, to a large 
extent, is in sympathy with this tradition. Although, as a rationalist he talks 
about action, etc., his is not into technology. Indeed, technology is not 
important in Piaget's scheme, science and mathematics are important instead. 
Rationalists do not accept that knowledge is knowledge of this physical world. 
They maintain that because of the changing nature of this world, it cannot be 
known, or be the proper object of knowledge. Thus practical experiments 
cannot provide absolute knowledge. 
The consequences of this philosophical viewpoint for the psychology of 
technology are far reaching. By implying that mental states are produced by 
physical and chemical changes in the body, descriptive psychology fmds it 
difficult to function as it should. It may be that, a better understanding of this 
point will be attained by considering the psychological implications of the 
"broader" conception of technology. 
The "broader" concept of technology which incorporates Heidegger's 
conception, sees the rationalist tradition, for which Piaget shows sympathy, as 
inadequate. Within this "broader" philosophical view, technology is positively 
evaluated and regarded as an activity involving a combination of knowledge 
and action. 
Within Heideggerian tradition, knowledge of the physical world is implied 
where reference is made to knowledge. Technology, as a form of human 
knowledge etc., is concerned about things that works in this world, and thus, 
knowledge of the physical world is understood. 
What the above paragraph is suggesting is that the conception of technology, 
within Heideggerian tradition, lends itself to descriptive psychology, that is, 
the description of mental states themselves accurately through the process of 
self-examination and analysis. This is something which is missed by taking the 
rationalist view of technology. 
147 
Due to the fact that actual reaction to phenomenon is important, Heideggerian 
conception has become the foundation for phenomenology. 
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CHAPTER-7 
APPROACHES TO DEFINING DESIGN & TECHNOLOGY IN 
SCHOOLS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Thus, an understanding of Design Technology in which the essence is seen in the fact 
of methodological characteristics of the procedures employed, and in the fact of 
human activity, seems to correspond to the usual (or today's) meaning or 
understanding of it. In other words, the conception of Design and Technology as a 
purposeful activity, a process and a form of human knowledge, appears to be in tune 
with today' s understanding of it. What this means in effect is that to attempt a good 
description of technological thinking will require such an understanding of 
technology. This understanding is implicit in, the definition of design and technology 
for schools' use by the National Curriculum as shown below. 
7.2 DESIGN & TECHNOLOGY: SCHOOLS' DEFINITION 
According to the National Curriculum document, Design and Technology is defined as 
the pupils' 'capability through combining their design and making skills with 
knowledge and understanding in order to design and make product, (DFEE 1995, 
p.2). Earlier definitions also had these characteristics. However, between the time 
when the momentum for the inclusion of technology as one of the areas of learning 
and experience in the secondary school curriculum which should feature in a rounded 
education, was gathering strength as from the early 1960s and its apparent full 
acceptance in the 1980s, (DES 1985., Dodd 1978), numerous and indeed different 
defmitions had been expressed to reflect the two 'complementary' framework of 
conceptual definition of technology mentioned earlier. A few of these views will now 
be considered. It has to be noted, at this point, that some of these views have inherent 
difficulties. 
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Black and Harrison (1985, p.3), regarded technology as the 
practical method which has enabled us to raise ourselves above animals 
and create not only habitats, food supply, comforts, ....... but also our 
arts, music, painting, sculpture, literature. 
It is true to say that, without food technology, it would be difficult for us to have 
painting, sculpture or literature. 
What Black and Harrison's definition does is to lump together an awful lot and 
attribute it to technology. For instance, securing food supply is a technological 
process, in a way in which securing painting is not. Certainly, one can make a strong 
claim for technology in relation to food supply, but a weak claim for technology in 
relation to painting. Thus, it is not too difficult to see that this definition seems to be 
fraught with difficulties. These difficulties are, however, less apparent in Gradwell 
and Welch's, definition (1983) wherein the fact of human activity is underlined. They 
accordingly assert that 
.... the use of technology involves mankind linking technique (consisting 
of the laws of science and a knowledge of how things work) and action. 
Action in this context, refers to the process of creating new systems: new 
tools, machines, processes, information and eventually techniques . 
... .. technology is the skill of inventing, designing, planning and problem 
solving ..... the process of technology. . ... technology is a uniquely human 
activity, that it comprises an ever expanding body of knowledge and that it 
is a dynamic and pervasive force within society. 
This seems to embrace the principal ways in which technology ought to be 
conceptualised. 
The definition put forward by Quebec Ministry of Education does not appear to do 
justice to man's creative urge to explore more and more through technological 
advances, but to emphases the methodological nature of the procedure involved. It 
defmes technology in a number of ways for a Quebec-based Introduction to 
Technology course: 
from a historical point of view, technology may be defined as a study 
of manufacturing process, a study of industrial operations carried out in 
the light of the result it is proposed to obtain. In its general sense, 
technology may be described as an art which borrows certain principles 
from the exact sciences and which examines existing objects in order to 
150 
design new ones which will fulfil well defined needs .... as an element 
of education, technology is considered to be the outcome of a more or 
less lengthy process which originated in a need that could only be 
satisfied by technical means and whose outcome is undetermined. 
necessary for human sustenance and comfort. 
It appears that this definition goes beyond what it says, to make life very 
uncomfortable for human sustenance. For example, building a rocket to go to the 
moon might have a long term aim of improving comfort, but man's creative tendency 
to explore more and more is not given any attention. With this definition, the 
tendency is to push the frontiers back through technology, rather than just providing 
for sustenance and comfort. It is like saying that technology is home economics. It is 
self implosive, not dynamic, but progressive. 
Although the rest of the definitions do not carry with them serious unjustifiable 
assumptions, they either stress the fact of human activity in technology or the 
methodological characteristics of the procedure involved. 
Thus, in HMI's view, technology is concerned with meeting people's need or 
purpose; the controlling of the environment; the application of scientific and other 
resources; the creative process of using human knowledge and physical resources to 
solve practical problems. 
According to Page (1982), 
technology is the process by which people cope with their environment. 
It is therefore a problem solving process which has as its start, human 
need and as its goal, human achievement, and as its continual companions, 
the resources and restraints of human knowledge, human skills and the 
world's natural resources. 
And for Allsop et. al. (1982), it is 
a disciplined process using scientific and technological concepts and 
materials to achieve a human purpose. 
This is another attempt to bring together the two complementary frameworks. 
For Roy (1978), 
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· ..... technology is ........ the activity of applying organised knowledge to 
the development of tools, products and processes for human purposes. 
The acknowledgement of the process component of technology is apparent here. 
Morris (1977) sees technology as 
"the application of science to achieve a practical goal or purpose". 
Whereas Kestenbaum (1975), thinks 
" ..... technology ..... meaning the application of scientific knowledge to 
serve social requirements. " 
These two authors are implying that technology is based on scientific knowledge, as 
well as other forms of knowledge. 
According to Watkins and Meador (1977) technology 
· .... systematizes and applies practical knowledge for the benefit of 
man. Both of these authors see technology in terms of its methodo-
logical procedure, and of course implicitly stressing the natural 
systematisation of human activity. 
Marshall (1975) thinks that 
· .... an activity which seeks to find optimum solutions after 
considering alternative possibilities. . .... is a social rather than 
an individual activity . . . .. its roots are in the satisfaction of 
human needs, ...... Technology acts in a social setting and 
has profound consequences for this material, social and moral 
environments . 
Attention is focused here on an important dimension of technology which has not been 
mentioned. It is technology as value- or context-determined. Technological activity 
is not limited only by its knowledge base, unavailability of materials, etc.; it is also 
limited by those whose purpose it serves, and the context in which its outcome is to be 
used. 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1974) catalogues technology as 
the systematic study of techniques for making and doing things. 
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This means or activity by which mankind seeks to change or 
manipulate the environment. 
In so doing, it endorses the methodological characteristics of the procedure involved 
in technology. For Suspend (1973) technology has to do with 
" ....... man's efforts to satisfy his material wants by working on 
physical objects ....... " 
This view does little justice to man's creative ability. In Hamilton's view (1973) 
technology is 
" . .. the means by which man extends power over his surroundings. " 
There is a mystical overtone here. Man should be working in harmony with his 
surroundings because he is a part or product of it. This view seems to alienate man 
from his surroundings. Accordingly, De Bono (1971) thinks that, 
"technology is the process of producing something useful through 
the application of knowledge. " 
Implicit in this defmition is problem-solving. Harrison (1970) regards technology as 
"the disciplined process of using scientific, material and human 
resources to achieve human purpose. " 
This is a comprehensive way of saying that technology has to do with problem-solving 
here and now. By underlining the creative element in man through the process of 
design, Deere (1969) asserts that technology is designed. 
to meet a need ..... being concerned overall with the optimum rather 
than the unique. The two are brought together in what I will call the 
design triangle .... common to technology in any era, and in any field. 
The proposition is that there are three basic decisions to be taken, 
.... each of the three decisions is influenced by the other two, ...... 
The three decisions are these: (1) choice of material ..... 
(2) determination of shape and form .... 
(3) selection of method of achieving 
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form . 
. . . . . this design triangle is the very heart of technology. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary definition is: 
..... theoretical knowledge of industry and the industrial arts; a 
discourse or treatise on an art or arts; ... the scientific study of the 
practical or industrial arts; ..... the science of the industrial arts. 
In both views, there is an emphasis on "practical". 
The definitions offered so far tend to bring together these two complementary 
frameworks. 
7.3 MODELS OF DESIGN PROCESS IN SCHOOLS' 
TECHNOLOGY 
However, of importance from these different views (see appendix-l1c), is the almost 
concurrence that technology within the school curriculum, (a) involves a creative 
problem solving process. (The activity of applying organised body of knowledge); (b) 
utilises resources including capabilities and human awareness. (A body of organised 
knowledge); (c) achieves human purpose. (The product of organised knowledge). 
However, it will therefore appear that no matter how one defmes or conceptualises 
technology, underlying these attempts is the idea of bringing about change or 
exercising control over the environment. A process which is considered to be a 
particular form of problem-solving, of designing in order to effect control. In fact, 
this process is common to all technologies, whether they be concerned with the 
provision of shelter (building construction technology), food (agriculture), clothing, 
health and communications, or so called high technologies such as electronics, bio-
technology, fuel extraction etc., or 'alternative technologies' . 
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7.4 THE TWO PRINCIPAL DIMENSIONS OF DESIGN 
The various stages of design process cited represent the iterative (horizontal) 
dimension of design. This particular dimension provides the basis for the structure, 
which allows for imaginative response and logical thought. It also gives rise to the 
idea of design as a plan, scheme, an outline, or a plot or intention, which is 
formulated in the mind prior to actual execution. (Dodd, 1978, p.52) 
It follows logically, that the other dimension, namely, the morphological (vertical), 
represents the progression of design from abstract to concrete. (Asimov, 1974). 
In other words, the various stages of design process mentioned earlier, viz., invention 
(research development), design, making (production and construction), using 
(operation, sales and management), are characterised by conceiving (thinking in 
abstract terms), imaging (thinking in concrete or spatial terms), fabrication (thinking 
with one's hands/construction), testing (operation and observation of discovery). 
7.5 DESIGN AND INTELLIGENCE 
It has already been shown that "purpose" is implicit in technological design. There 
cannot be purpose without thought. This suggests the presence or use of some 
intelligence, and the vertical dimension of design points to this. The indication here is 
that at the strategic level, this design process necessitates the exercising of intellectual 
and motor skills. After all, any time we design something, we seem to use certain 
thought processes, and then manufacture our artefact to see whether in fact our design 
is valid. (STEM, 1981, p.68) 
Obviously, with reference to technological designing, design is started whenever a 
need or a problem has been identified. A designer then works towards a solution 
using his or her experience and simultaneously keeping in mind the tools and materials 
available. (A designer here can be anybody, from a housewife thinking about how to 
arrange her kitchen for easy access, to the profeSSionals e.g. architect). 
Emphasising this intellectual dimension of design process, Dodd (1978) quotes 
Alyward (1973, p.43) as suggesting that 
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design ...... is a form of control which can only exercised 
provided individual s have acquired the necessary knowledge 
and understanding. 
And Alan (see Dodd, 1978, p.43) argues that in addition to the emotional response, 
participation in design requires, 
"a skill to identify and understand problems; to sift information 
and represent reasoned argument. " 
Pemberton adds 
in all, individuals will require the ability to obtain and analyse 
information; to form judgements and make assessments. 
Bloom (1956), sums up the process of design in his taxonomy of educational 
objectives in describing the process of growing intellectual maturity: 
What is needed is some evidence that the students can do something 
with their knowledge, that is, that they can apply the information to 
new situations and problems. It is also expected that students will 
acquire generalised techniques for dealing with new problems and 
materials. Thus, it is to be expected that when the student encounters 
a new problem or situation, he will select an appropriate technique 
for attacking it and will bring to bear t he necessary information both 
facts and principles. This has been labelled 'critical thinking' by 
some, 'reflective thinking' by Dewey and others. In the taxonomy 
we have used the term 'intellectual abilities and skills'. The most 
general operational definition of these abilities and skills is that the 
individual can fmd appropriate information and techniques in his 
previous experience to bring to bear on the new problems and 
situations. This requires some analysis or understanding of the new 
situation; it requires a background or knowledge or methods which 
can be readily utilised; and it also requires some facility in discerning 
the appropriate relations between previous experience and the new 
situation. 
It is obvious, that the bringing together of skills, experience, knowledge, 
understanding, imagination and judgement, in the execution of a specific task, 
represents the dominant feature of activity in the area of technological design. 
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7.6 TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGN 
It has to be made quite clear here that, having acknowledged design as providing a 
means whereby knowledge can be applied, and therefore central to technology, 
'technological' design, as opposed to artistic design is particularly implied. To 
understand technological design, and indeed technology, requires a grasp of 
technological concepts, which are grouped into control, energy, and structure. (These 
make up the knowledge structure in technology). 
Technological concepts are essential in any design and technological activity, if those 
engaged in it are to be able to make design decisions, as well as to think, plan and 
express themselves in three dimension. (STF, 1977). These concepts have to be 
intellectually grasped sufficiently enough to be used for design decision-making 
purposes. Thus, technological concepts such as 
p.ll) 
loan, strength and structural stability; energy transfer, efficiency, 
engine stability, mechanisms, open and closed loop control systems, 
hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical systems, sensors and transducers, 
amplification, display systems; materials and their choice for 
structural purposes; communications, modulation, transmission and 
reception; optical instruments, elevation in drawing, etc. (STF, 1977, 
are evidenced in technology curriculum. Their use in practical design, distinguishes 
the technological designer from the artist engaged in three-dimensional art. If 
anything, as will be seen later on, design and technology curriculum reflects these 
skills and concepts. 
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7.7 DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY CURRICULUM IN -
SCHOOLS (THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM) 
7.7.1 Brief Historical Development 
In 1988 Design and Technology became the only new subject in the 
Curriculum. It was looked upon favourably by the politicians, notably the 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher and Kenneth Baker, as a significant 
element in a technological revolution that would transform British industry. 
However, the new subject was expected to bring together a number of 
divergent traditions. It was not to relate spectacularly to gender, yet, had to 
incorporate well-established (but very different) subjects ranging from Metal-
work and Motor Vehicle Studies to Home Economic Studies and Needlework. 
The new subject was also expected to cover the emerging area of Information 
Technology. However, faced with a vast range of potential content and few 
common skills, the first Working Group analysed the technological process. 
Our model was adopted, which moved from identifying needs; generating 
designs; their planning and evaluation. 
The thought behind this model was that planning and cooking a celebration 
meal for a family involved the same processes as the design, development and 
retailing of a wall-bracket for a bookshelf. This is the version of the order as 
from 1988 until November 1994, on which many of the GCSE's Design and 
Technology syllabuses were based. There were four attainment targets (Te 1 
- 4), which made up Design and Technology Profile Component (PCI). These 
were equally weighted. Information Technology (pe2 and TeS) was a separate 
profile component and attainment target. This curriculum was abandoned 
because of the tests that were planned for Key Stages I, 2 and 3. Due to 
teachers' boycotts and disruptions, Ron Dearing advised that the National 
Assessment should be limited to the core subjects. As teachers were suddenly 
expected to offer a new subject to unfamiliar groups of pupils in many schools; 
they had to tear out heavy-craft facilities and replaced them with computer 
rooms or bright new workshops. Indeed there was a genuine confusion at this 
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stage about the substance of the subject. Apart from inadequate availability of 
resources due to the extension of design and technology to all pupils, the 
emphases on assessment and testing by the government meant that class-room 
practices (that is teaching) had to take a secondary position. Blue Peter-type 
curriculum where cards, plastics and sellotape replaced wood, metal, fabric 
and food emerged thus proving difficult to assess. The Statement of 
Attainment was set beyond the capabilities of the pupils. The application of 
sound practical skills was stifled by the need for a lengthy process of writing to 
define a market, compare designs or evaluate the usefulness of a completed 
project. 
By mid 1992, a decision was taken to revise the Design and Technology 
curriculum; this was assessment-led, being based on design and making tasks 
(DMTs). By the end of 1992 the revision was overtaken by the influence of 
Ron Dearing in 1993, who settled proposals made the programme of studies 
(POS) instead of Design and Making Task (DMTs), the dominant feature. 
This represented the starting point for the review. The Statement of 
Attainment was severely cut, and the outcome represents the final National 
Curriculum document, which is now the predominant curriculum of Design 
and Technology. 
7.7.2 Summary of the New Design and Technology Curriculum 
The new Curriculum came into force at Key Stages 1 and 3 in September 
1995. The new GCSE syllabuses were published in January 1996 and 
introduced in September 1996 for examinations in 1998. The new attainment 
targets are abbreviated as AT. At Key Stages 1 to 4, there are two attainment 
targets Designing (AT-I) and Making (AT-2). At Key Stages 1, 2 and 3, 
there are no statutory requirements for assessment other than that teachers 
must report on achievement to parents at the end of the school year. 
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7.8 CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGy) 
A quick look at the sample of a technology syllabus used in schools England 
and Wales would reveal the kinds of principles of analysis and interpretation 
being asked of students, when they are engaged in the activity of designing, 
making, testing, (manipulation), communications and evaluation. 
Admittedly, technology involved making things for use. The process of 
producing something for use is an involved one, and the details vary with the 
article e.g. from transistor radio through large dam, to space vehicles. But 
certain steps are common to all technology subject. Consideration of the 
possible courses of action and the selection of the course of action, are really 
the important steps. (Francis 1961). 
The creativity involve in the process of producing something requires powers 
of synthesis as well as those of analysis. The ability to synthesise is more 
important, than the ability to analyse. It could be hardly disputed, that the 
majority of the tasks fulfilled by technology have been through a synthesis of 
elements which have physical character (some of which were thermal, 
mechanical, and electromagnetic), as well as devices of chemical and bio-
chemical properties. Synthesis presupposed analysis. Every synthesis of 
elements presupposes that to a certain degree, knowledge of their causal 
relations and properties be known. In other words synthesis presupposes a 
certain level of knowledge of causal relations and properties. Logically as the 
task of synthesis became more complex higher levels of knowledge of causal 
relations and properties became necessary. 
In technology the problems to be solved usually were more variables than 
equations, and the relationships were more of inequalities than equations: for 
instance, cost to be less than so much: working load not to exceed a certain 
value: loads likely to be less than so much. This can be likened to linear 
programming. However there were some variables which were non-numerical 
and could not be represented by mathematical symbols. These variables 
include aesthetic and sociological considerations. As this part of the 
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technological problem had no unique solutions many comparable merits 
existed, and the decision about the appropriate one called for judgement. 
7.S.1 Manipulation Activity 
Schools' design and technology curriculum was not necessarily about designing 
and making, it was also about manipulating objects or systems. In the teaching 
of technology subjects, pupils might be required to manipulate, for example, 
dimensions, (as in technical drawing, architectural/building designing), or 
systems (as in electrical/electronic and mechanical engineering subjects, ego 
fault tracing etc.) This was a feature which was not very difficult to find in the 
various aspects of the technology syllabus. 
For instance, manipulating dimensions, such as shape, size, colour, solidity 
etc., was typical in technical drawing (Design and Communication, now 
termed Graphics), and to a greater extent, in Design and Realisation. Some of 
these dimensions were related, and others were not so related. In any case, 
their manipulation, was in terms of isolating, juxtaposing, categorising and 
combining. The mental ability involved in doing such tasks included 
perceptual discrimination, categorisation or setting up classificatory concepts. 
The pupils in effect used these abilities to relate the concepts or principles 
mentioned above to tangible things, such as house, tables. Similarly, in 
engineering (control) subjects, such as electrical/electronics, mechanical 
engineering, (Technology), which was concerned with controlling systems, the 
same thing was found happening during the early stages of learning these 
subjects. The introduction of the component parts of a system, and their 
various functions in relation to the whole system, feature prominently during 
the early stages of learning engineering subjects. In circuitry for example, 
where there was a range of components such as transistors, capacitors, 
reactors, etc., each one having more than one related concept, e.g. 
electrification, and amplification; in the case of capacitors and transistors 
respectively, the pupils had to learn, as beginners in an engineering technology 
course, to relate the appropriate concept to each component, in terms of its 
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particular function in the circuit as a whole. This required the same mental 
processes as those described above. 
Manipulating a system, say, a piece of equipment, so that it successfully 
achieves a particular goal, was also part of technological activity. The 
realisation of such a goal might also involve assembling, disassembling, 
operating, maintaining, trouble-shooting or a combination of these procedures. 
Larson et.al. (1986) pointed out that an understanding of the structural and 
functional relationships of the components of the system was necessary in 
order adequately to perform tasks which involved the manipulation of a 
system. In other words, the pupils must know (or learn) the parts of the 
system and how they interacted spatially and functionally. For instance, to 
trace a fault in a piece of equipment such as the oscilloscope or in an 
electrical/electronic system of, say, a motor car or electrical circuit, required 
that the pupils should know the characteristics of each control knob, their 
location and spatial arrangement, the names, functions of each control and the 
interrelationships between the controls. However, each of these control knob 
or components of the system, has one or more related (functional) concepts. 
What the pupils had to do during fault-tracing, or testing, (or manipulating a 
system), was to relate appropriate concepts to each component within the 
system. 
7.S.2 Manipulation Tasks 
In manipulation activity in technology where pupils were required to rotate 
images, assemble them, change colour, texture, or form, the importance of 
spatial ability or relationships in facilitating this task had been underlined. 
Indeed, the high scores on spatial ability tests by engineers and scientists, have 
not only served to distinguish them from other students, but have served to 
remind us about the link between technology education and spatial ability and 
achievement in science, for instance, which has been well documented. 
Physical science students have shown a consistent pattern. They were 
frequently shown to have greater spatial ability than the Arts, Social Science, 
or Biological Science students: (Lewis, 1964), (Hudson, 1964), (Butcher and 
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Point, 1969), (Bradley, 1981), (Smithers and Collins, 1981). The evidence 
pointed to the fact that spatial ability could be nurtured or acquired, rather than 
being a natural trait. In this respect, whereas Blade and Watson (1955) 
reported a significant improvement in spatial scores among male engineering 
students after a year's study, similar improvement was reported by Brinkaman 
(1966) after three weeks of training both boys and girls in elementary 
geometry. Bishop (1973) added to this body of evidence by reporting that 
primary school pupils who used structured apparatus in mathematics 
performed better in spatial tests than children from other schools. 
7.8.3 Spatial Ability Task 
Mere observation would show that spatial ability tasks varied considerably 
with respect to the thought-processes and skills required. For instance, 
embedded figure tasks deployed the ability to ignore a complicated or 
confusing background. Other tasks, however, required subjects mentally to 
manipulate two or three dimensional figures. IQ tests, e.g. AH4 and AH5, 
quoted by Heim 1968, 1970), do have items, described as 'spatial', which 
require the ability to see relationships between patterns, and not items that 
involved mental rotation or visualisation. The items in Raven's Progressive 
Matrices (1956) could be similarly described. Therein, the subject noticed the 
pattern of changes in a series of diagrams so that he could select the next from 
a number of possibilities. 
7.9 CREATIVITY IN DESIGN & TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ASSESSMENT 
Technology knowledge has a tacit dimension which is inaccessible to formal 
academic studies, but which is transmittable by personal contact. Attempts 
have been made to systematise this personal knowledge involved via studies in 
the area of creativity. (Bolton, 1972, p.205). Given the fact that technology 
has creativity as an important element, there exists a body of knowledge about 
the kinds of traits involved in individuals recognised as likely to produce novel 
and original solutions to the multifarious problems. This body of knowledge 
relates that some of the traits are best described as thinking skills or strategies, 
often identifiable as intellectual abilities such as convergent and divergent 
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production. Others include the nature of personality characteristics; 
motivational category such as needs, interests, and attitudes. In considering 
the broader conception of the nature of intellectual ability, Guildford (1950, 
1954) in the USA, and Hudson (1956, 1958) in the UK, have suggested that 
that 'effective' thinking (in this instance as applied to design technology 
subjects), would have two complementary characteristics: 
first the capacity to range flexibility or diverge, in search 
for the relevant factors in connection with the particular 
matter in hand, and second, the capacity to focus or 
'converge' on one's thinking on whatever factors have 
been decide upon as relevant. (Freeman, 1968, p.29). 
Yet both divergent and convergent thinking are different in character with 
respect to the problem situations that originally initiated these kinds of 
activities using the theoretical base put forward by Guilford (1950, 1954). 
Buttle et.al.(1965), M'Comisky and Freeman (1967) and Freeman et.al. 
(1968) designed and used the A-C performance task to test or assess the 
creative design ability in technology subjects, namely, architecture. 
The power of the A-C performance task is such that it could differentiate 
between pupils who have received instructions or education in connection with 
a particular ability (in this case architecture), from those who have not, and 
hence be measuring the ability in architecture. 
It appeared to point to or indicate the relationship between the ability on the A-
C performance task and the ability in the four areas of architecture subjects 
Le.: 
(1) Architectural Design 
(2) Architectural Construction 
(3) Building Construction 
(4) Supplementary: (normally vocational work, embracing the 
measuring and sketch of existing buildings and model making; 
the latter, chiefly in the context of architectural design as 
above.) 
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Freeman demonstrated, that students with lesser facility on the A-C 
performance task, will perform poorly on the divergent thinking parts of the 
test, and poorly on the architectural design. This is due to their incapability to 
'range round' flexibility, ie. to diverge, when thinking over a particular 
problem. However, these same students tend to score higher on convergent 
thinking parts of the task than on the divergent. This suggests that 'divergent' 
thinking is closely related to creativity in architectural (technological) design, 
in terms of intellectual resourcefulness and fluency in origination and 
developing ideas. However, 'convergent' thinking, i.e. the sort of thinking 
which we call for when dealing with logical- type problems, which leads, 
because of our previous education or training, to one right answer only would 
seemingly have an inhibiting effect. Furthermore, the abilities involved in A-
C performance tasks have elements which are common in other technology 
subjects, such as, electrical/electronics and mechanical engineering. 
For instance, in electrical/electronics engineering subjects, the parallels can be 
seen at two levels. At the first level, there are some similarities between the 
task-demand of the A-C performance task as a whole and the task-demand 
involved in the early stages of design technology or engineering education. For 
example, A-C Performance tasks basically involve a set of blocks, which 
pupils are required to organise in terms of different concepts e.g. size, shape, 
solidity, etc. This is similar to what is involved in the early stages of learning 
about components in electrical/electronics (technology) subjects. In circuitry, 
for example, where there is a range of components, such as transistor, 
capacitor, reactor etc., each one has one or more related concepts; e.g. 
rectification, amplification, in the case of the transistor. The pupils have to 
learn, as beginners in an engineering (technology) course, to relate the 
appropriate concept to each component, in terms of its particular function in 
the circuit as a whole. Thus, it can be said that the same mental processes are 
involved in both: perceptual discrimination and (clear-headed) differentiation 
in relating concept (such as rectification, amplification etc.) to tangible things 
or objects: components, in the case of electrical/electronic circuits; blocks, in 
165 
the case of the A-C performance task. In both cases the appropriateness of the 
concept which is related to the particular objects, must be seen in terms of 
what is involved as a whole. 
At the second level the similarity between the ability involved in the A-C 
performance task and electrical/electronics engineering, has to do with the 
capacity for originating and developing ideas particularly in design and 
creativity. This kind of ability is pronounced in the 'divergent' part of the A-C 
task. In this part of the task it is worth remembering that, the pupils are 
required to range around in thinking and sample possibilities in their search for 
the relevant factors in arriving at a solution to the particular sub-test on which 
they are engaged. In technological designing as in electrical/electronic courses, 
one would find similar kind of demands perhaps much more complex kinds. 
Some mention ought to be made here about the basis of M'Comisky's A-C 
performance task. As mentioned earlier the basis of A-C performance tasks 
was Guilford's model (1959) of the structure of intellect, where divergent 
productive abilities (as seen in technological activity) is one of the range of 
human abilities. 
Guilford's work (1959) is best understood within the frame-work of the 
general concept of intelligence. The theoretical background of formation, on 
which he has built his work involves the conception of congeries of primary 
abilities which are related to each other in multiple second order factors 
defining wider ranging abilities of greater generality. (Freeman et.al., 1968, 
p.20). 
The incorporative theory of the mind referred to as the 'structure of intellect 
model', which emerged afterwards is fully discussed in a well known article 
namely, 'the three faces of intellect' by Guilford (1959). Guilford derives his 
theory from a whole body of critical work some of which are his, stimulated 
by the work of Charles Spearman (1904) on speculative conception of general 
intelligence which needed qualification and elaboration. It is from Spearman's 
166 
theory that the central problems in studying intelligence and ability namely, the 
existence of general intelligence; the existence of special as opposed to general 
traits; the existence or multiple group factors, first came to light. Since then 
there has been a great deal of expertise to facilitate the analysis of multiple 
intellectual factors have developed. (Burt, 1927); (Thompson, 1939); 
(Vernon, 1950); (Thurstone, 1938). 
However at the same time parallel consideration was given to the use and 
development of psychological tests and test batteries, as well as practical 
education. Of importance was the attractiveness to early educators or the 
notion of 'g' as a factor of general intelligence, because 'g' factor generated 
the idea of using a single numerical score as an index of general intelligence. 
The development, construction, and use of psychological tests using multiple 
factor analysis by Spearman, Burt, Vernon, Guilford, etc., as well as the 
reported low correlation between individual scores on different tests gave rise 
to the investigation of multiple intelligence factors. This involved a theoretical 
re-examination and the development of 'g' concept as a general intellectual 
factor. 
It is worth remembering, that with respect to the general theories of multiple 
intelligence factors two camps namely, theories of Vernon (1950) and Burt 
(1949) representing the British views and the theories of Thurstone (1935) and 
Guilford (1959) representing the American views exist, but differ in some 
important respects. Drawing our attention to this distinction and outlining 
some important difference(s) clearly Wiseman (1967, p.177) asserts that, the 
British tend to see the structure of the mind as an hierarchy general ability, 'g' 
subsumed by many factors each of which may be broken down into similar 
elements. Thurstone and other American writers on the other hand, conceive 
of the mind as consisting of a miscellaneous assortment of primary abilities. 
These however are themselves related to each other and by the technique of 
'second-order' factors more pervasive and wide ranging abilities may be 
postulated. Both views at the end reach the concept or hierarchical structure 
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and the end product of the two opposing schools bear strong resemblance. 
No doubt before long, further research will bring the emergence of a 
rapprochement. 
Basing his theory of intelligence on the existence of multiple 'group' factors 
Guilford assumes that, there are special intellectual abilities which taken 
collectively may be regarded as forming intelligence. He likened this to a 
commonwealth rather than a nation. 
By using a comprehensive theoretical system or model called the 'structure of 
intellect model' which incorporates known intellectual factors, Guilford 
predicts additional abilities not previously shown. These abilities have been 
classified in three different ways namely: 
a) a difference between the visual, forms, numbers and meaningful object 
involved, is classified as the difference in 'CONTENT'; 
b) a difference between relations and classes, (and other such mental 
structures), is classified as a difference in PRODUCT'; 
c) a difference between processes such as understanding (cognition) and 
memory, is classified as difference of 'OPERATION'. 
After rigorous experimental research and analysis four kinds of CONTENT six 
kinds of PRODUCT, and five kinds of OPERATION, are revealed. These 
combine one kind of CONTENT with one kind of PRODUCT and one kind of 
OPERATION to yield a total of one hundred and twenty unique outcomes each 
a potential intellectual ability distinct from other abilities. 
Guilford and his associates deployed their structure of intellect model, to 
generate hypotheses regarding unique intellectual abilities. With tests 
constructed for each in tum they reported approximately seventy (70) 
intellectual factors. Thus, in brief, Guilford's system had been constructed to 
articulate the range of human abilities including those 
involved in creative endeavour. (Freeman et. aI., 1968, p.22) 
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This suggestion has generated a great deal of research. The reports therefrom 
point to the fact that 
creativity, effective thinking and the solution of different 
problems, usually involve the sequential use of convergent 
and divergent thinking (Freeman et. al., 1968, p.23). 
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7.9.1 How Technology is taught in Schools 
In England and Wales, we can certainly draw on the experiences of the St. 
William's Foundation project based at the University of Sheffield, Division of 
Education. Teachers of technology subjects have often adopted the strategy of 
preventing pupils from thinking about problems. They have always advised 
pupils to consult them whenever they have difficulties with their work. 
According to Lords (1987, p. 15), the principal reasons for this situation has to 
do with lack of time and the individual attention which each pupil tends to 
require. 
If technology is defined as a problem-solving process, then the opportunity 
must be provided for pupils to solve problems. 
However, in England and Wales, the picture appear to be slightly different. In 
the schools visited, with provision of technology in design and technology, 
science and sometimes, home economics (HE) department etc., it was common 
to fmd that teachers of technology subjects adopted much of design and 
problem-solving approaches in their teaching. 
The teachers' experience of design work was brought into their teaching 
exercise, which allowed them to put technology within the framework of 
design process. A design brief was always available, which had a design 
process progressing through problem-analysis, possible solutions, realisation 
and evaluation, as already mentioned. Some of the design briefs were tightly 
prescribed, with a narrow outcome, and others were more "open" ended, with 
diversity of outcome. The class size and the ability of the pupils determined 
how open a design brief was to be. Project work was also used, although 
limited to two terms, usually toward the fmal year. This was more or less to 
satisfy the requirements of the examining boards. 
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7.9.2 Atmosphere for Observing Pupils' 'Technological Thinking' 
Having accepted the notion of design and problem-solving as being at the heart 
of technology, it makes sense to look at these processes. 
If pupils are working through a technological problem so that as soon as they 
get into difficulty, they ask the teacher for the answer, then that would not give 
anyone interested in this area of investigation confidence with respect to the 
information about the thinking skills used by the pupils. The only useful 
situation would be one in which the pupils will have to fall back on their own 
thinking. This is when it is possible to fmd out how they are trying to tackle 
the problem. 
Given the teaching condition in a typical technology classroom, it is quite 
difficult to find such a 'useful' situation, because of the difficulty in separating 
teaching and learning technology. 
From my experience of observing problem-solving activity during technology 
lessons lasting from about one hour, there was perhaps two minutes in which 
children actually solve problems. Of course these two minutes are very 
important for an investigation of this nature. If it is assumed that problem 
solving is at the heart of the process, then technology must be seen as helping 
the pupils think about solving problems. It was essential to provide the 
opportunity to solve problems, and to find out how children cope with problem 
solving when given such, that the tasks described later were designed and 
administered. 
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SECTION - 4 - DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
CHAPTER 8 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
8.1 OUTLINE 
The purpose of this exploratory study is to investigate the relationship between pupils' 
technological thinking level and the demands of a technological curriculum. It is 
apparent from the psychological aspect of the relevant literature review that a 
Piagetian approach alone is inadequate if we are to get closer to describing the 
phenomenon of technological thinking, and the activities involved. The use of other 
protocols, such as those described by Biggs and Collis, Case, Blooms' categories etc., 
in addition, look promising, and imply that the pupils have to be observed whilst 
actually engaged in technological problem solving, and thinking about it. 
Accordingly, the broad outlines of the experiment are as presented below: 
(1) Pupils at the secondary school level in two Inner London Boroughs, Ealing and 
Wandsworth, were surveyed to determine their levels of technological thinking, using 
a battery of tests/tasks designed by the investigator. 
(2) A taxonomy of the different schemata required for understanding design 
technology was developed using a Piagetian framework. This was modelled after the 
taxonomy for science constructed by Shayer and Adey. 
(3) The investigator used the developed design technology taxonomy to read and 
analyse the 1996 new National design technology curriculum activities currently in 
use, to determine the level of thinking that they appear to demand from the pupils. 
Furthermore, the investigator used Bloom's taxonomy to redevelop the test items or 
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written questions for the design & technology curriculum. Practical tasks were also 
developed. In what follows here, each of these two data collection processes will be 
considered separately. 
(4) Pupils responded to the written and practical tasks. 
(5) The investigator analysed all written and practical tasks responses for their 
cognitive level. 
(6) The results were tabulated, compared and interpreted. 
The remainder of the chapter explains in details the subjects and population from 
which they were drawn, description of the instruments and procedure used; there is 
also a taxonomy of responses, and a taxonomy for analysing design technology used 
in this investigation. 
8.2 THE INSTRUMENT 
8.2.1 TEST INSTRUMENTS 
Remember that one of the main objectives of this study was to elicit the 
process skills or "technological thinking", which pupils in secondary schools 
use when they are solving a technological problem. 
To do this, tasks which were thought to test "technological thinking" were to 
be constructed or assembled and administered. But prior to the construction 
of these tasks, something about the nature of technology in general and in the 
classroom in particular was needed. 
The review of technology and its meaning for education at the secondary 
school level served this purpose, and revealed a problem-solving process of 
design, which required the exercise of intellectual, as well as practical skills. 
The review did not say something about pupils' process skills or 
"technological thinking" - at least not directly. It merely gave an idea of the 
nature of technology in secondary schools, and provided a basis or guide for 
the construction of "technological thinking" tasks. 
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It was difficult to say what "technological thinking" was (even operationally), 
at the secondary school level. But it was thought that a glimpse of it was 
possible after tasks which presumably tested pupils' "technological thinking", 
had been constructed, administered, categorised, and analysed. Thus, on the 
basis of the review on the nature of technology, tasks that were supposed, or 
whose purpose was, to tell us something about the process skills or thinking in 
technology, were to be constructed. 
8.2.2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, DESCRIPTIONS OF AND 
ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE TESTS 
The task of designing a "technological thinking" task was the next step, if the 
above information was to be used in eliciting the process skills which pupils 
use when they are solving a technological problem. 
As a general description, a "technological thinking" task was thought to be the 
construction of a "device": (e.g. household goods, vehicle for artistic 
expression, machine, measuring instruments,), or the construction of a process 
or system: (e.g. timetable, production schedule, ambulance service etc.), 
which will perform a specified function. An investigation of the natural 
conditions, (e.g. sociological: census, accident, statistics; scientific: crystal 
structure, human strength; technological: power in machine tool), or man-
made: (causes of accidents, effects on environment or a device or system) was 
also thought to be a good technological task. 
From the general description above, it was obvious that a technological task 
would be essentially one in which a defmite aim or thing has to be achieved or 
produced. The pupil (or person) engaged in such task, would have to think 
about the ways and means in which this definite aim was to be achieved. 
Thus, it made sense to think in terms of design, making, testing, etc., etc. It 
was assumed that an important component of "technological thinking", would 
be Piagetian scientific thinking, particularly as both are related on 
epistemological grounds. This was only part of the story Piaget, after all, did 
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not ask his subjects to design or construct, for example, a pendulum, which 
would have been a typical technological task. 
He instead asked them to find out the underlying principles of operation, given 
that they had designed or constructed a pendulum. Thus, the two tasks are 
different, but it was assumed that there would be some similarities. Therefore, 
in devising technological tasks, particular examples of technological tasks, 
such as designing, constructing, including a pendulum (science) tasks etc., 
were considered. On the basis of my observation of how pupils actually 
proceeded, a set of categories was to be constructed, and served as a basis for 
assessing pupils' "technological thinking". 
In this respect, a simple and typical technological task was designing, 
constructing or building an artefact or a system etc., or making a system work, 
as in tracing a fault in a system (a motor vehicle electrical circuit). The 
assessment of the process as was to be ongoing, observing the pupils at work. 
By observing a number of pupils doing the same tasks, a set of categories for 
scoring their production, process, performance, was to emerge. So that the 
only way forward, was to actually observe pupils doing meaningful 
technological tasks, (using a video camera where possible), and then construct 
measures (tests) on the basis of this. 
Having got this information empirically, success on this was related to success 
on Piagetian tasks. It was suspected that the correlation between them would 
not be significant. However, it was important that the tasks be syllabus 
related. Six tasks were administered on the assumption they would measure 
slightly different aspects. 
However, intuitively, there was a difference between practical problem-solving 
of design, and scientific reasoning. Although practical problem-solving 
required a certain amount of scientific reasoning, perhaps it required 
something else or may be not. It may be that pupils who are good in science 
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are good in technology: conversely, pupils who are good in technology, can 
they be good in science? 
The tasks to be administered were not complicated. In this respect, teachers of 
technology subjects were asked what suitable problems to give to their pupils, 
given that the pupils could understand so much knowledge and principles, and 
could use certain mechanisms or apparatus. The assumption here was, in 
effect, that given a certain level of knowledge about the material that a pupil 
could use, what was a suitable problem to give to him? It is assumed that 
pupils have knowledge about a particular area or aspect of the tasks which they 
will do, e.g. electronics. Otherwise, that what would be tested may be their 
knowledge of electronics, and not the trial process. The same tasks were given 
to children of different ages, so that something about their levels of thinking 
could be said. Thinking altered with time, and in order to make a statement 
which was appropriate to a child, knowledge (or description) of his level of 
technological thinking was required. By giving tasks that stretch across 
different ages, such knowledge or (description) was facilitated. 
My main interest is related to the psychological processes involved in the 
application of knowledge. 
8.2.3 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TASKS 
As pupils with mixed abilities constitute the population in comprehensive 
schools, tasks were designed which allowed individual pupils to utilise the 
ability or abilities they had most developed. For example, it was not 
uncommon to find pupils with reading disability who might well possess 
normal visual imagery and thought process, doing poorly in a written 
examination. The tasks were designed to take account of this sort of difficulty 
by making sure that their possible effect on the pupils' assessment was 
minimised. This ensured that the task satisfied a wide range of ability. 
With this idea in mind, the requirements for some of the tasks included: 
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(1) administering the task verbally (where necessary) and giving the 
testee the opportunity or option of reading the questions; 
(2) requiring short answers, but providing extra space on the 
answer sheet for more able students to express themselves; 
(3) as far as possible, using simple diagrams liberally to answer 
questions. 
Meeting these requirements could be painstaking and time consuming on the 
part of the designer. 
Thus, the main factor taken into account when designing the tasks was that 
besides being relevant to the curriculum structure of the school, the task must 
allow pupils of wide ability range to give responses which they felt were 
satisfactory. It must be designed such that it measured the mental processes of 
the pupils in relation to their immediate area of study. Furthermore, these 
tasks used concepts that (we hope) the pupils have developed during their 
various practical activities, or principles that have been introduced during the 
teaching periods. 
8.3 GENERAL DESCRIPrION OF THE MEASURING 
INSTRUMENTS USED DESIGNING & MAKING -
(THE TASKS AND THEIR DESCRIPrION) 
Two categories of tasks were administered namely, design and manipulating 
tasks. 
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8.3.1 DESIGN TASKS 
Tasks D 1.2 to D 1.3, although they have been adapted from STEM (1981), 
have the main features of design in the National Curriculum used today in 
schools. 
(Note: It should be noted that "design" is intended to include "technological 
design" where technological concepts are used.) 
8.3.1.1 Task D 1.2 
Having been satisfied concerning the pupils' understanding of the 
concept of design by questioning and interviewing, task D 1.2 was 
designed to make the pupils think about the quality of designs. In 
general terms, the abilities called for when pupils are engaged in a 
technological design activity have already been mentioned earlier. The 
claim is that they include: the ability to perceive a misfit between an 
artefact (or a system) and a required need; the ability to judge the 
quality of the misfit (how well does it work) and to express this 
judgement; the ability to recognise that some things may be done to 
improve or rectify or change an artefact or if there is a good fit, leave 
things as they are; the ability to identify relevant criteria needed to 
improve the quality of fit etc. Let us say that there is a definite aim 
which we want the pupils to achieve. The pupils are supposedly 
thinking technologically, when they design something in accordance 
with a set of aims or objectives. However, there are always many or 
alternative solutions to a technological problem. So that one has to 
choose the best possible (or alternative solutions), and give reasons for 
their choice of solution. It has already been made clear, that the basis 
of such choice is an adequate understanding of the relevant 
technological concepts. For these reasons, it is hoped that a glimpse of 
"technological thinking" used in solving the problem would be apparent 
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Task D 1.2, is partly designed for this purpose. Regarding design 
quality as something which is personal, Task D 1.2, shows pictures of 
some designs which are bad, and some which are not so obvious. 
Pupils are required to give their reasons for choosing either. This task 
is also intended to stress the point that, in general, we design things 
because we want to solve a problem. More specifically, what Task D 
1.2 is meant to ascertain includes whether: 
a) the pupils can perceive, describe, discuss or otherwise 
communicate or even identify through investigation, a fit or misfit 
between an artefact or system and a set of human requirements (needs); 
b) they can judge the quality of the fit or misfit, (e.g. how well 
does it work?) and express this judgement; 
c) they can recognise that something may be done to improve, or 
rectify, or change an artefact, or if there is a good fit, leave things as 
they are; 
d) they can identify relevant criteria needed to improve the quality 
of fit; 
e) they can analyse a misfit (design problem) in ways which take 
into account such factors as: 
i) economic (cost, time, availability of material). 
ii) social (awareness of others and of the effects of the designed 
artefact on them). 
iii) ethical (morality of the proposed change). 
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f) they can combine all the aspects of design problem in a balanced 
interactive way; 
g) they can match ends with means and vice versa; 
h) they can look at a particular solution and trace the origin of the 
problem (as in fault tracing); 
i) they can generate a variety of possible solutions to a design 
problem (a measure of the level of understanding of a particular 
technological concept.); 
j) they can narrow the variety of possible solutions and show 
commitment to a specific practical proposal; 
k) they can explain and justify their reasons for their choice of one 
in preference of others; 
1) they can create a mental picture in their minds of an artefact, 
system or parts of such items and their description; 
m) they can manipulate images (rotate, assemble, change colour or 
texture or form). 
Scoring Criteria 
There was no time limit for this task. This task was assessed using 
adult criteria 1, for correct response, and 0, for incorrect response. 
Adult criteria were established by giving the task to ten design and 
technology teachers and using the mean response for each item for 
scoring the pupils. (See Appendix-I). Furthermore, pupils' responses 
were classified using SOLO (Structure of Observed Learning Outcome) 
taxonomy: 
o - for unistructural, functional etc., response; and 
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1 - for multi-structural, structural etc., response. 
These responses were then assigned appropriate Piagetian levels. e.g. 
(2)-for---(2B), 
(3)-for---2B/3A. 
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TASK D 1.1 
, A colfee lable 
3 The inside 01. pencil sh.fpenef 
·5 A spanner 
7 A Citro III CX 
~_! l~ 
2 A li'tlck 
4 A casselle fllCJe with cassettes 
100000000000001 
100000000000001 
6 A by cllb with' Jeey attached ' 
8 Controls on , cooker 
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TASK D 1.3 (AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY) 
This design task is intended to make the pupils write down their thought 
processes and sequence of ideas which occur when they are thinking about 
their design. This task should tell us whether or not they use the design 
process as described by Harrison and others. Again, pupils' responses are to 
be categorised according to the complexity of the responses. 
Your school's Geography Department requires an aerial photograph of your 
school for their map reading course. 
Design a device that will carry the camera shown below to a height of at least 
25 metres above your school to take a photograph. 
Make a brief note on its construction: then write down your thoughts on the 
design procedures as they occur. 
Scoring Criteria: This task was scored according to how simple, 
(immediate), unistructural or how complex, multi-structural, pupils, responses 
were. o - for simple etc. responses 
1 - for complex responses. 
These were further related to Piagetian levels. 
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AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH 
g 
.-
.. 
WEIGHT 500g. 
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-.-__ PRESS TO 
TAKE 
PHOTOGRAPH 
8.4 MANIPULATION TASKS 
Manipulation tasks included: 
8.4.l(A) SPATIAL ABILITY TASK M-SR 1.1 (Thinking about 
Shapes) 
M-SR 1.1, is concerned with the mental manipulation of shapes and solids, 
rather than pattern recognition, and tests how well the pupil can think about 
shapes. There are four sections in this task. The first three sections begin 
with some examples, to help students to understand what is required of them. 
They will have to do these first, before they start the real questions, and stop at 
the end of the section where it says STOP NOW!!! 
Items 9 - 16, require the pupils mentally to rotate two-dimensional figures: 
items 17 to 32, require the pupils to visualise the surface of a three 
dimensional solids. An embedded figure task is also included in the M-SR 1.1 
task. (See Appendix - 3 for details). 
The scoring will be in terms of 1 or 0, i.e. right or wrong. 
Below are examples for each section. 
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-SE€TWN 1 
In this- seetien; all- the items- have-5 snapes-. The- first- shape in- efteft row is- a- S€luare-with a 
piece missing. From the other 4 shapes in the row, A, B, Cor D, choose the one which 
will fit onto the first to form a square. Circle the letter by the shape you have chosen. 
For example 
- \. .. 
c.. 
In this example; C is the eorrect answer. It fits together with the first shape in the 
row to make a square. 
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-SECTION 2 
In this section, each question has a picture of a model made with building blocks. 
This is followed by 4 drawings. One of these drawings shows the shape of the 
model looking down on it from above. Draw a circle around the letter by the 
drawing which is correct. 
Here is an example 
CD [JdJ[P 
__ ~ __ . __ ~ __ oce __ l __ O_~ ___ ~_~_D_~ _ S_____________ Q9~ ____________ B __________ ~________ ~ ________ __ 
-
The model is made of two long blocks lying side by side. When it is look at from 
above, it looks like drawing A. So letter A has been circled. 
T=; the next example yourself. 
Yc:~:: teacher ¥lill "tell you if your answe= .is right. 
J~s~ ,u~ a circle round the letter by the dra¥li~ ¥lcich SOO¥lS 
~t~~ ~~e model would look lixe from above. 
A B 
188 
, 
'-
SECTION 3 
In this section each question has a picture of a model made by folding a stiff card 
cut-out-shape. Besides the picture of the model are 4 drawings of cut out 
shapes. Choose the shape which when folded would make the model shown in 
the picture. 
Circle the letter under the cut out shape you choose. 
V 
Cut-o\:o: ~bE;>es 
V 
~::;:'E:: 
~ -::.::-
=E.:e !:--c= () .... ~ ..... ,: " """-- -
-
... 
Cut out shape A, when folded so that the straight edges are together, would form 
the cone shaped model in the first picture, so a circle has been put around the 
letter A 
18t 
~ 
. 
I 
I 
1 
I 
! 
SECTION 4 
CAN YOU FIND THE BOXES? 
The boxes A, B, C, D, E, F and G are somewhere in this large picture. When 
you find them put the letter by the box in the square on the big picture. 
We've done the first one for you. 
A 
-
< []j [8 i I , r [1 . I [ - ': I II ! : : 
-
!' G 
I t , , 
~ · 1 
J t I I i 
: I I I 1 i f # / 
.i 
! Ii i 
, /" 
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8.4.1(B) FAULT TRACING TASK 
The aim of this task was partly to simulate fault as may be encountered in a 
complex electrical/electronic or motor vehicle electrical system. Besides, more 
importantly, to impute the logic or processes used by the pupils when they are 
testing circuits or tracing faults etc. This had the advantage of relating the 
apparatus constructed to the pupils' work situation and providing incentive for 
them to reach a solution. For this task the pupils need not have received 
instruction on circuit testing etc. 
8.4.1.1 Description 
This consists of a sealed box (see overleaf), on which is mounted a 
series of electric components namely, bulb holder and bulbs, switches, 
and a number of terminals, which are interconnected inside the box. 
The pupils are required by the use of a test lamp or voltmeter, to 
determine the internal connections of the components. 
This is in essence a combinatorial problem requiring the pupils to 
manipulate a series of variables to form a number of combinations. 
Many technology subjects teachers will readily accept, that it is not 
unusual to observe that many pupils fmd it difficult to carry out a 
systematic test procedure even after receiving intensive instructions on 
the methods of circuit testing. In fact, testing is an important 
component of technology curriculum. As a guide to the construction of 
this apparatus a simple non-electronic arrangement was thought to be 
appropriate for helping the pupils through the methods of fault finding 
and circuit testing etc. Thus, in the construction of the apparatus, the 
electrical components and wiring were very simple. Moreover, the 
solution to the problem was to be independent of a knowledge of 
electricity and the pupils needed at most five minutes to reach a 
solution. In other words, none of the pupils will be given any 
instruction on circuit testing methods (for the wiring inside the boxes, 
see the circuit diagrams on the next page.) 
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PartI 
FAULT TRACING TASK 
SEALED BOXES 
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Part II 
To what extent is the pupils' ability to manipulate a series of variables 
related to their formulation and use of a system or combinatorial 
analysis? This is to be determined by the construction of an identical 
electrical apparatus whose circuit diagram is shown in fig( 1). 
The design of this electrical apparatus is such that whilst the pupils are formulating the 
one-to-one combinations, they must also carry out operations to eliminate a variable. 
The operations are (1) to form the complete series of one to one combinations using 
the four sockets BI to B4, and at the same time (2) manipulate four variables, (i.e. 
the connections to four sockets Al to A4) in such a way as to nUllify their effect. The 
construction is such that on to a box are mounted two rows of sockets labelled 
respectively Al to A4, and BI to B4. Directly above and below these two rows, are a 
pilot light and a single socket. To cause the light to work, two connections have to be 
made with the two flexible leads provided. That is, from C to A3, and from B2 to 
B3. It is believed that something about the logical structure used by the pupils would 
be disclosed by this task. (Note: the pupils would be asked to give reasons for 
adopting any particular approach to solving this particular task. 
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8.4.1.2 Designing the Instrument 
Two apparatuses were constructed. The first electrical 
apparatus (Part I) whose internal connection is shown in figure 
(1) consists of a sealed box on which is mounted five (5) sockets 
named: Z. 1. 2. 3. 4. and a pilot light. The internal connections 
are via two relays (or ICs) which are connected in such a way 
that, to cause the light to work the pupils have to make a 
number of connections with the flexible leads provided. The 
connection which completes the circuit for relay (2) causing the 
bulb to light is Z. I. 3. If a pupil makes the connection Z. I. 3. 
4. the relay (2) is energised and the bulb circuit is broken. This 
can be likened to the bleaching action of the liquid (4) in 
Piaget's colour liquid experiment. Granted that this first part of 
the task can be solved using a one-to-one series of combinations, 
success in this part would suggest that the pupils are able to 
form some of the series, but not all as it is possible to reach a 
solution without forming all six combinations required. 
To what extent is the pupils' ability to manipulate a series of variables related to their 
formulation and use of a system of combinatorial analysis? This is to be determined 
by the construction of an identical electrical apparatus whose circuit diagram is shown 
on figure (2a). 
The design of this electrical apparatus is such that whilst the pupils are formulating the 
one-to-one combinations, they must also carry out operations to eliminate a variable. 
These operations are (1) to form the complete series of one to one combinations using 
the four sockets BI to B4, and at the same time (2) manipulate four variables, (i.e. the 
connections to four sockets Al to A4) in such a way as to nullify their effect. The 
construction is such that on to a box are mounted two rows of sockets labelled 
respectively Al to A4, and BI to B4. Directly above and below these two rows, are a 
pilot light and a single socket. To cause the light to work, two connections have to be 
made with the two flexible leads provided. That is, from C to A3, and from B2 to 
B3. It is believed that something about the logical structure used by the pupils would 
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be disclosed by this task. (Note: the pupils would be asked to give reasons for 
adopting any particular approach to solving this particular task. 
8.4.1.3 Methods Used for Part 1 
The pupils will be presented with the apparatus and five flexible leads: each lead being 
fitted with a single plug at one end, whilst the other end is bare. The pupils will be 
told that they are required to cause the light to work by using the leads of any number 
and making any connection. It will first be demonstrated to them that the light in fact 
works, by using a four pin plug, which can be fitted into the four sockets. The 
flexible lead from this four pin plug, will be connected into socket Z, which causes 
the light to work. A second identical plug that will not cause the light to work when 
connected to the socket Z will be connected to the apparatus, as part of the 
demonstration to show the pupils that the connection Z is a factor in the solution to the 
problem. Each plug will be so connected so as to prevent the pupils deducing the 
actual connections made. 
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8.4.1.4 Methods Used for Part II 
The methods used for Part IT will be similar to the one just 
described above. The pupils will be presented with the apparatus, 
and two (2) flexible leads, which are fitted at each end with a 
single plug. The pupils will be told, that they will have to make 
the right connections with one or both leads. Furthermore, that 
one of the two (2) leads must be used to make the connections 
between socket C and the row A The plugs and sockets will have 
to be coloured, so that the pupils will have to connect colour to 
colour. 
o 
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8.4.1.5 Scoring Procedure/Recording System Used 
The pre-prepared sheets which will be used for recording, is as 
shown for both tasks. With them, it should be possible to record 
the processes used by the pupils in their attempts to reach a 
solution. The scoring procedure is as shown below. 
The pupils were scored 1, for successful completion of the task 
and 0, for unsuccessful completion. Time taken to do the task, 
was also recorded. 
Answersheet 
Name.----------------------- Age.-----years. --------months 
Class.---------------------- Sex. ----- male 
----- female 
i A., 3-3\ B-~~!!-BIB_o! B-~ B-a :11' I . . • i i , I j)-~ 3-3: D-U\ Ji-a: il-a: B-3 I 
I ~ ' \ ' II , . , I A, U't' ~-~\ 1-4. 2-~\ 2-4\ }-l.. " .A 11- 211- 3: l-l..12-3i 2-4.!3-'- I 
. , 10 '! • . I . I I 
,I .. t H I 1-2! ~.! ~-4. 2-; II I -- 12-'21..' --L 2-4' 3-'~ 'I . 1-2\ 1-,;.,;...... -). - .) \ . . , ~ ~ .. . I I I 
A. ,,,, \ 1-2 1-31~-l.. 2- 2-J. II }-l.. l:l. 11-~ 1-3\ 1-l..\2-3! 2-1..13-~ 
J,. '~)" 1-2 1-311-4.!~ ., 24 u 1-~ 1- ~ 1-"'12-312-l..13-4. .}-.!.. ~A 
~-2i 1-3\1-4 2- II 1-2! 1-311-~ 2-3i 2-l..; 3-4 A 2 -41 }-l.. ~ A- I I I • . 
\.t. 1-211-3!1-4. f2_ II 11-21 1- 31 1-l..12-3i 2-l..' 3-4. I 2- 3-4. ",\. 
. , !' I I , I 
A 1-2jl-3 1-4. 2_' .1 II \1-~ 1-3: 1-J 2- 3i 2-1.: 3-~ I 2 -l.i }-l.. ::A 
I " • I 
A 1-2\1-3 1-4.j2- 24 3-l.. IIA 1-- 1-3 1-l..1 2-31 Z-LI 3-4 I 
'! 
A' .. 1-2 1-3'1-l.. 2-~ 2-( 3-4. ::. 1-~ 1-- 1-L 2-3\ 2-~3-4. u"" , 
A 1-2 1-3 1-l.. 2- 24 3-l.. l:A. 1-2 1-~ 1-l.. 2-3\ 2-1..1 3-L 
A 1-2 1-3 1-4. 2-3 2-~ }-l.. Il! ~ 1-, 1- l-l..j 2-3\ 2~13-l.. 
--
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8.4.1(C) Abstract-Concrete (A-C) Performance Task 
However, given Dodd's (1978) summary description of the 
design process involved in technology, a task was needed which 
could allow the 'divergent' and 'convergent' thinking abilities to 
be observed and described. In this respect, M'Comisky's 
(1961) A-C performance test, which purported to make the same 
intellectual demands as those in 'core' design technology 
subjects, namely, design and construction, was adopted. The 
theoretical underpinning of M'Comisky's task is the broader 
conception of the nature of intellectual ability put forward by 
Guilford (1950, 1954) in the USA, and Hudson (1958, 1956) in 
the UK. 
8.4.1.Cl Attraction of A-C Performance Task 
It is principally for the reasons outlined in the Contextual 
Analysis section of the Literature review that the A-C 
performance task has been adopted in this investigation to 
emphasise both aspects of thinking. There are two parts to each 
aspects of thinking, so that the combined score for the four parts 
gives a measure of the testee's overall ability to think 
8.4.1.C2 Description, Administering and Scoring of the Test 
The A-C performance task, is made up of sixteen blocks, with 
ten characteristics which are different. (see fig.-2) Some of the 
characteristics are related, e.g. size, height, and others are not 
related, e.g. shape, colour. There are, however, four parts to 
this task. The first two parts require the pupils to think 
"divergently". In the first of these, the pupils are required to 
arrange the sixteen randomly presenting blocks into two groups 
of eight blocks each, in four different ways: the particular 
principle on which the individual pupil does this is in each 
instance chosen by himself. An instance of a two group sorting 
in terms of size is as shown. 
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Fig . ..1 
A-C Performance Task (16 Blocks) 
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Fig.3 A-C Performance Task (2-group sorting in terms of size) 
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To summarise the first task: sixteen randomly presented blocks, 
to be arranged in two groups of eight blocks each, in four 
different ways, using any principle. In the second task, the 
pupils are required to sort the blocks into four groups of four 
blocks each, in three different ways. This second divergent 
thinking series is the most difficult part of the test. 
In the remaining part of the test, the pupils are required to think 
"convergently". In the first section, the pupils are required to 
again arrange the blocks into two groups of eight blocks each, 
but in the six different ways which they are required to do this, 
they are told what principle to use. In the second section, the 
pupils are required to arrange the blocks in four groups of four 
blocks each, in nine different ways; once again, they are told 
which principle to use (see figure-4) 
In these last two parts of the task, the pupils are required to 
focus, ie. "converge", their thinking on a particular sorting 
principle that they have been told to use, and to exclude the 
consideration of the irrelevant characteristics of the blocks while 
doing this. The demands or requirements on the part of the 
pupils are different in this part of the test, from the first part, 
where the pupils were required to "diverge" their thinking while 
deciding what particular principle to use for the sorting. When 
these two sets of scores (for "convergent" and "divergent" 
thinking parts of the task) are taken together, they give some 
indication of the 'balance' in the pupils' thought processes. All 
pupils' ability to carry out the required sorting; and for time 
taken in carrying out the sorting. Total accuracy score is 
obtained by combining the accuracy scores for the four parts of 
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for the four parts of the test. Also the total time taken is obtained 
by combining the accuracy scores for the four parts of the task. 
~/1 'I- A four-group sorting in terms of SHAPE SIZE 
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8.S OTHER TESTS ADMINISTERED 
8.5.1 SCIENCE TIDNKING TEST 
One Piagetian task (Pendulum task) was administered and scored in accordance 
with the procedure outlined by Kuchemann (1979) (see appendix-4). In this 
science thinking task, pupils' ability to sort out the effects of three variables, 
namely, length, weight, and push of a pendulum, is investigated. It is 
imagined that this "sorting" ability will be similar to those in A-C performance 
task. This test was to give some indication of pupils' current thinking level. 
8.6 RELIABILITY AND V ALIDITY ESTIMATES -
Reliability: 
The internal consistency of the tests was determined using a measure (Cronbach's 
coefficient alpha) whose coefficient is derived from the correlation between each item 
in the test and every other item in the test. (See the appendix-8) for the estimates for 
the individual aspects of the test.) An average reliability coefficient of 0.89 was 
reported for all the tests. 
Validity: 
Content: Nine design and technology teachers were each given a sample of the tests 
to rate on a 1 to 5 scale (1 =low, and 5 = high), according to whether they represented 
the main core of design and technology work in school. The investigator explained the 
tasks in detail to each teacher before giving them out. The results showed a high 
degree of agreement, suggesting an acceptable content validity. (See appendix (7) for 
details of the teachers' rating of the tests) 
Concurrent Validity estimate was obtained. Scores obtained from the tests were 
correlated with the pupil's technology examinations scores. A correlation of 0.8 was 
obtained. 
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8.7 SAMPLE (General Remarks) 
To make valid statements about pupils' technological thinking levels/skills in 
secondary schools, ideally, the sample should include properly weighted 
representatives of: 
(1) all the schools in the locality/region where there is design 
and technology department. 
(2) boys and girls; 
(3) rural and urban schools; 
(4) five age groups; 
(5) three to five socio-economic groups; 
In this investigation, as in all empirical studies, the factors which were actually 
investigated, were limited by time and money. Three schools across two Inner London 
Boroughs graded, according to their academic success/standards etc., by teachers as 
"bad", "moderate", and "good", were chosen. 
However, the real guiding factor in deciding which variables to consider, was the 
overall aim of the investigation, which was to provide teachers and others concerned 
with technology curriculum data which will be useful. For instance, how are pupils in 
years 7 to 11 likely to think when solving technology problems. 
The sampling strategy used here involved picking out the chosen schools and testing 
as many samples of pupils representative of the year groups. 
The results from this sort of survey ensured that reliable statements about pupils in the 
schools tested were made. This was, however, of limited value. Nevertheless, given 
the description of the schools chosen, it was possible to also make some extrapolation 
to other schools which were similarly placed. No attempt was made to investigate or 
control for the variation in social economic status of the pupils. 
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8.8 SUBJECTS 
The subjects who participated in this exercise, were chosen from 3 schools, namely, 
Villier's High, Featherstone High and Battersea Technology, across two Inner London 
Boroughs of Ealing and Wands worth. With the total support and co-operation of the 
schools Departmental Heads, the experimental work went smoothly. 
As a general remark, the schools selected fell within slightly below and above the 
National average in pupils, performance. The schools were located in areas of Inner 
and Outer London where the ethnic mix was balanced, slightly tipped towards the 
ethnic minority population ie. Asian, (Villiers & Featherstone High), and Afro-
Caribbean, (Battersea Technology College). 
Each of the selected school's design and technology department was reasonably 
equipped to ensure that all the pupils access the National Curriculum which all the 
three schools teach. The teachers in all three schools were dedicated, experienced and 
well qualified in the subject. The investigator was familiar with the design and 
technology department of the three schools, having been a member of the staff. The 
schools were mixed gender comprehensive schools, and pupils were of KS 3 & 4 
levels (age range between 11 and 16yrs). 
The schools' design and technology departments adopted a curriculum approach that 
introduced the pupils to the knowledge and skills that might be required for a long 
project through several preparatory short "skills modules." Broad project themes 
that tended to unite the subject specialism within the department, were often identified 
at the Faculty planning meetings. Whereas, the faculty in one school consisted of 
science, technology and art, in another, it consisted of art, home economics and 
technology. Projects were often identified by each teacher to relate to a theme and to 
involve the pupils in using the skills developed in the skills modules from each 
curriculum area. 
It must be emphasised that, no attempt was made to compare the performance of each 
year group either between or within these schools. Instead, the thinking typically used 
by pupils of each year group was described and analysed. Teaching strategy included 
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giving sometimes a short lesson on a particular topic, issuing information sheets relating 
to the topic and prescribing a task to do either individually or in pairs. 
In total one hundred and ninety seven pupils (95 boys and 102 girls) from the three 
schools were randomly selected to participate in the research work. The subjects were 
distributed amongst the year groups and Key Stages as follows: 
KS Year _~ Boys Girls Grand Total 
3 7 30 25 
3 8 25 35 60 : 
## ____ •• i_.F~.".i .... _H<o_ ~.-~ ... -~ .. -.~ .... . ii ••• Jo.. .... _____ ., __ 
3 9 28 20 48 
4 10 12 22 34 197 
Missing year 7 year 8 year 9 year 10 
Group 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE TESTED AMONGST THE YEAR GROUPS 
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8.9 PROCEDURE 
S.9.l(A) Pilot Study 
A fuller report of this pilot study has been published in the International 
Journal of Technology and Design Education,(1992, 2,2, pp.54-64) 
The pilot study was undertaken by the investigator with 50 pupils in secondary 
school in Sheffield in order to determine whether the planned procedures were 
possible. 
The investigator read and analysed the Curriculum on design and technology, 
pupil's work, as well as developed and discussed with teachers tasks which 
were administered to pupils. 
The subjects were tested during design and technology lessons which often 
lasted more than one hour, usually with the co-operation of the teachers and 
the heads of the departments. At other times, free class periods provided the 
most favourable time for the exercise, and the technology or science or home 
economics room, was the venue used. The pupils were told initially about the 
purpose of the whole exercise and of the tests. Then instructions on how to 
proceed were read out as written on the test papers. They were allowed to ask 
questions where they were in doubt about what was required of them. Some of 
the tasks required a pair of pupils sitting opposite each other to discuss how to 
solve the problem (as in fault tracing). Their discussions were recorded. A 
video camera was used to film the pupils solving problems. Their approval 
was sought prior to the exercise so that the camera was not hidden. 
For some of the tasks, there was no time limit for completion, except for the 
A-C performance task. This was to allow sufficient time for thinking. 
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8.9.1(B) Analysis Done 
Mindful of the overall aim of this investigation and the notion behind 
designing many tests for pupils of different ages etc., a lot of questions 
began to surface. These questions stem from those posed at the 
beginning of chapter-I. Attempts at answering them provided a guide 
to the kind of analyses best suited for the data collected. 
It was also interesting to know whether or not these tests related to 
anything else other than themselves. Furthermore, looking at the 
categories of the tests, it was asked, what was the relationship between 
the pupils' capacity to see a good design and their capacity to 
manipulate objects? Last, but not the least, with regard to 
technological thinking, was what was so termed, largely accounted for 
in terms of Piaget's formal operation? These and other exploratory 
questions lent themselves to three types of analyses, namely, 
psychometric, simple developmental and qualitative. 
Whereas psychometric analysis told us something about the structure of 
technological thinking, the question of what happened with increasing 
ages of the pupils required a simple developmental analysis. It was 
hoped that differential levels of operativity would emerge from the 
latter analysis. Qualitative analysis would be done on the test results. 
8.9.1(C) Statistics Used 
Some correlation (Pearson's Product-Moment) and factor analyses were 
done. Irrespective of the limitations of factor analysis, it provided a 
useful description of what was involved in pupils' performance. Chi-
Square and Analysis of Variance were also used. 
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8.9.2 DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY CURRICULUM ANALYSED 
The other aspect of the experiment described here was about looking closely at 
the technology curriculum used in secondary schools, and for each activity 
therein, to try and assess the demand it made on pupils' thinking, i.e. the 
abilities needed to achieve success in it 
The categorisation of teaching and learning activities in technology was 
uncommon, perhaps because the curriculum was not published in such detail as 
to allow one to tell from the printed page what sort of activities were supposed 
to be going on in the class room. It would be practically impossible to analyse 
the bits of knowledge which comprised an examination syllabus into cognitive 
demand levels, where the syllabus did not give indication of the actual 
teaching/learning procedures to be employed. 
Even in other well-researched curriculum areas such as Nuffield science 
schemes, with its detailed guides, one hesitated to give levels to the activities 
since what actually occurred in the schools' laboratory were nothing more than 
individual teachers' idiosyncratic interpretations of the printed version. 
The most that could be done was to postulate the demand level of an activity, on the 
assumption that it would be taught exactly as written. The mediating role of the 
teacher between the written curriculum and class room activity was a problematic one 
both for the curriculum worker and anyone attempting to analyse the curriculum. 
In view of this problem, samples of pupils' own work on certain aspects of the 
curriculum activity were also used to provide vital clues to the demand made on them 
by the curriculum. Besides, the objectives of each of the different aspects of the New 
National curriculum on design and technology were read thoroughly and subsequently 
categorised in accordance with Bloom's taxonomy. These categories were then 
related to Piagetian protocol, and assigned the appropriate characteristics as shown 
overleaf: 
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Bloom's Categories Piagetian Categories Levels 
Pre-operational 1 
Knowledge Early Concrete 2 
Comprehension Early Concrete 2 
Analysis Late Concrete 3 
Application Early Formal 4 
Synthesis Late Formal 5 
Evaluation Late Formal 5 
8.9.3 DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY TAXONOMY (DEVELOPMENT) 
Design and technology taxonomy was another instrument developed and used during 
this investigation for estimating the level of thinking in Piaget's terms, demanded by 
design and technology education. This taxonomy was designed using Piagetian 
framework and Shayer and Adey (1981) taxonomy in science education. Apart from the 
fact that the literature review section points to the need for a taxonomy in design and 
technology (Siraj-Blatchford, 1993), (Roden, 1997), it is in acquiring a deeper 
understanding of the ways pupils think in design and technology in order to facilitate a 
development of a good design and technology curriculum that motivated the present 
development. 
The development of this taxonomy for design and technology required an understanding 
of and retlection on the work of Piaget in science due to its strong relationship with 
design and technology as demonstrated in the literature review section as well as other 
areas of the curriculum that was reviewed in the previous section. Its application 
requires reading through and analyzing the objectives in the New National Curriculum 
on design and technology KS 3&4, and a very delicate deployment of Bloom's and 
Solo's taxonomies, plus pupils responses to design and technology tasks given. 
In the contextual analysis section of the literature review, some of these process skills 
were identified as combinatorial reasoning, classification, seriation ability, proportional 
reasoning, causality, frame of reference. Some general remarks about each of these 
were made. Here, a detailed description of each process area and their levels will be 
done. How it has been (or can be) used in design and technology work has been 
demonstrated and explained in the results and analyses section. 
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8.9.3.1 CLASSIFICATION 
At Preoperational level the pupils will begin or be able to: 
• represent an object or recreate one with a mental image. (a child creates a similar 
object as the one described in a reference book or seen physically. 
• draw pictures to represent an object. (circles, squares, and triangles) 
• see the association between objects (two things that go together, cup and saucer) 
• recognize objects/artifacts/places etc. because of specific characteristics ( plane by 
shape and name) 
• recognise qualities (colour, texture) 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• group objects and pictures according to their similarities (cups, tables, chairs) 
• describe a quality, attribute, or characteristics of a place or thing in the environment 
/context. 
• describe how characters/components are similar or different. 
• describe part of an object/artifact 
• recognise more elaborate words in the text (associates oscillation with pendulum) 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• coordinate two attributes of objects and to group the objects according to that 
coordination. 
• state the multi-dimensional characteristics or attributes of a place, thing, or concept 
in topic. 
• synchronize the characteristics of an object in a topic to the events which they share 
incommon. 
• classify by multiple criteria 
• analyze part-whole relationships of components in a system. 
• state the main idea of a project/subject/topic. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• reclassify characteristics of objects in different ways. 
• form classification systems not given by the teacher, when necessary. 
At Late Formal pupils will begin or be able to 
• hypothetically elaborate on any of the details of a project/object (hypothesizes the 
various purposes and qualities of a system) 
• comprehend the essence of underlying associations. 
make hypothetical arrangements with hypothetical objects. 
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8.9.3.2 SERIATION 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to 
• attempt to order objects/components/events of a project but parts are often misplaced 
(planning scheme) 
• develop an awareness of dimensions (tall/short, big/small) and placement 
(frontlback, in/out) 
• perceive objects/components/events in a system/project as separate, distinct and 
unrelated. 
• have difficulty understanding and remembering rules (recipe for pizza) 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• list the objects/components of simple project 
• state simple functions of main tools/component 
• order properties along one relevant dimension (planning) 
• understand time sequence/schedule (keeping to time scale) 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• order a set of objects/events along a variety of relevant dimensions, if required. 
• question the order of procedure/events if there is inconsistency 
• lists the procedure/events/objects/components of a complex activity in chronological 
order. 
• understand and recall rules/principles that are explicitly stated. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• synthesize the series of action/events which formulate the theme of the project/work. 
• relate components' functions as series of attempt to reach a solution and thus produce 
and outcome of the explicit ordering of actions. 
• begin to understand (how the) actions of one components/character interact(ing) 
sequentially with actions of other components/characters 
• explain flashback and foreshadowing. 
At Late Formal pupils will begin or be able to: 
• produce an account of the implicit order of activities/events 
• draw conclusions about hypothetical relationships in a system. 
• hypothesize about actions that are possible beyond what is given. 
understand an infinite series of actions/events (input - output process). 
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8.9.3.3 SPATIAL TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIPS 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• relate to all spatial situations in project with self as the center. 
• respond to action by what is known rather than perceived 
• not to deal with speed, time and distance 
• acknowledge spatial relationships (functional characters need to be constant) 
• be aware of temporal relationship. 
• judge spatial order by final position in time and space (smaller/lighter is faster) 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• understand technological concepts (e.g. elevation, organisation) 
• respond to activity tied to the person 
• identify directionality and position. (left/right, up/down) 
• conceptualize time dominated by space (design to suit changing times) 
• manipulate technological concepts 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• not consider all spatial/temporal relationships simultaneously. 
• describe an event/activity spatially when asked to interpret. 
At Early Formal level pupil will begin or be able to: 
• interpret technological concepts in tasks to themselves. 
• understand relationship in an activity when more than one independent relevant 
variable is involved such as space, time 
• interpret activity/events in terms of their spatial/temporal relationship 
• consider spatial/temporal relationships simultaneously. 
At Late Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• explain abstract spatial relationships. 
• organize implicit temporal relationship. 
• appreciate and critiques the variety that spatial/temporal descriptions brings to an 
events/activity. 
8.9.3.4 CAUSALITY 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
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• state that actions in activity lead to one another (magically) 
• see actions of activity as separate occurrence. 
• state that every effect has a cause, but it may not be related to the facts. 
• Believe that all moving objects have life (cars) 
• Accept details when action consequences are related to rules. 
• state conclusions unrelated to the evidence or details. 
• enjoy repetition of action 
• lump entire sequence of events together. 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• describe simple representations. 
• explain that somehow action one led to action two and action two led to action three. 
• defend right actions as those which satisfy self needs 
• have difficulty with actions in a task beyond direct experience. 
• difficulty with conclusions that do not fit directly with stated/set task 
• explain one factor causes of action/events. 
At Late Concrete level pupils will being or be able to: 
• construct the causes of an explicit action. 
• predict direct consequences. 
• impose structure on reality. 
• identify teacher's explicit purpose. 
• accept consequences when based on details. 
At Early formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• construct and link the causes of an action that are implicitly stated. 
• interpret physical causes for given action. 
• appraise the value of components and their relationship to action/system/events. 
• identify teacher's implicit purpose 
• identify inconsistencies and gaps in causal connections. 
At Late Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• use models to comprehend a complex action/event. 
• explain distortions of causal connections using alternative models. 
• evaluate the context to determine the causes of action/events. 
• construct conclusions based upon understandings of a variety of implicit and explicit 
actions/events. 
• interpret how solutions occurs. 
• formulate predictions based upon future actions/events. 
• consider multiple causes for actions/events and that actions/events have multiple 
effects. 
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8.9.3.5 FRAME OF REFERENCE 
(IMAGING / SPECULATING) - CLUES 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• state activity/events in terms ofhislher own self (egocentricity.-- I have made a 
puppet.) 
• require pictures or an auditory stimuli to establish the state of an action/event in a 
project/activity . 
• not to take the perspective of another in an action. 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• describe actions/events colourfully. 
• experience new perceptions and can modify the meaning of a concrete. 
• expect the action to be resolved realistically. 
• break down structure of object/project 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• recognise that technical word may have different meanings. 
• recognise that there differing but alternative solution, and not necessarily able to 
resolve or co-ordinate the conflict created by these. 
• break down the structure of an object/ project. 
• defend actions that are comfortable and familiar. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• compare real world with world presented. 
• given an appropriate model, recognise that there can be differing parts/view and can 
co-ordinate these . 
• relate to other worlds established (visualise, imaging). 
• focus on an object, person, or region. 
At Late Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• produce and discuss alternative models that have different points of view. 
• describe other's perspective and can co-ordinate it with own. (Evaluation) 
• interpret and accepts alternate accounts of a situation. 
• relate to the performance/ functions of components. 
• produce an explanatory model of the teacher's idea/view. 
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8.9.3.6 CORRELATIONAL REASONING 
(functional relationships-- in elevations, components, structure ratio load-stress) 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• conclusion about changes in design or system are unrelated to the evidence presented. 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• relate design or system to owns experience (modelling) 
• overlook information that is related to the conclusion about design or system. 
• Intuitively explain relationships within system or design. 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• understand compatible combinations of components/events in a system/design 
• perceive changes as design/action occurs. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• explain reciprocal actions/events in a system. 
• see positive and negative relations as having equal value in a design/action 
• make predictions about out comes when all the details are not stated. 
• determine the nature of a relationship outside hislher own experience. 
• explain inverse and direct relationships of components in a system. 
At Late Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• find proof for implicitly stated changes 
• compare confirming and unconfirming details 
• spontaneously see correlated relationship in a system. 
• draw conclusions based upon implicitly stated changes. 
8.9.3.7 PROPORTIONAL REASONING 
(elevations in D/C) 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• develop concepts such as less, more, greater. 
• identify an object when only one part is perceived. 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
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• state simple relationships. 
• describe common or different physical features in a design/component/setting. 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• analysis simple comparative propositional relationships (good-bad) 
• analysis simple relationships. (components and their functions) 
• compare similar relationships that are explicitly stated. 
• understand proportions in a design that are unidimensional. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• explain reciprocal actions in a system. 
8.9.3.8 FORMAL LOGIC 
(fault tracing/testing) 
At Preoperational level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• explain solutions or problems in design technology. 
At Early Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• not to approach resolution of problems in design technology systematically by 
attributing to one factor or cause. 
At Late Concrete level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• state solution when details are provided. 
• produce single inferences when details are explicitly stated. 
At Early Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• summarise the theme of a project. 
• produce inferences when information is implicitly stated. 
At Late Formal level pupils will begin or be able to: 
• describe conditional situation based upon the design. 
• criticise and appraises other's style, setting, characterisation, theme context. 
• generalise from one action to another. 
• describe changes/transformations. 
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SECTION - 5 - RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
CHAPTER - 9 
RESULTS 
9.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the scores obtained from the tests administered to the pupils were 
presented for each of the year groups. A preliminary description of these results was 
first given. Thereafter, the scores were subjected to psychometric, qualitative, and 
simple developmental analyses. Whereas psychometric analysis involved 
identification of factors of technological thinking, qualitative analysis involved 
describing the factors identified and giving meaning to them, besides categorising the 
pupil's responses. Simple developmental analysis ended this part of the analysis, and 
involved describing how pupils thinking developed as they move up the year. The 
other part of the analysis concentrated on the design and technology curriculum 
(teaching and syllabuses) used in secondary schools, to see to what extent it was 
matched to the pupil's technological thinking. 
Following the above outline, the treatment of data was as follows: 
- The raw data which consisted of practical and written responses of pupils to design 
and technology tasks, were analysed for their cognitive level using SOLO taxonomy. 
Pupil's response level on the SOLO taxonomy was compared with their cognitive level 
on Piaget's formal reasoning task (Pendulum task). 
-Both sets of responses were analysed amongst others, to find out whether categories 
of descriptors could be created for different cognitive levels of responses. These were 
organised into (or related to) developmental levels. 
-Pupil's SOLO responses level and Pendulum tasks were compared to each 
other. 
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- From the literature review, eight appropriate Piagetian schema relating to 
design and technology were selected. They are classification, seriation, spatial 
ability, frame of reference, causality, correlational reasoning, proportional 
reasoning and formal logic. 
-Design and technology curriculum and its cognitive level of demands were 
compared with the pupil's score on the Pendulum task. 
9.2 RESULTS -1 DATA PRESENTATION 
9.2.1 MEAN SCORE, STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR ALL THE 
TESTS AND YEAR GROUPS 
In presenting these results some of tables and statistics results have been 
deliberately place in the appendix in order to free the text. 
Tables-(1 to 4) show the mean scores and standard deviations for all tests, and all 
year group them combined. Scores from the three tests categories (design, 
manipulation and science thinking) were quite reasonably high for each of the year 
(see appendix-6) and combined groups. A high mean and standard deviation scores 
were noticed for manipulation tasks (MSRT, ACT) and design tasks (D1.2). 
The histograms and line graphs for all the year groups combined reveal, 
amongst other things, that the sample group tended to use 
"unistructural/functional" category/strategy (D1.3ust) more often than 
"multistructual" category (D1.3ms). It was also noted, that the sample group 
tended to spend more time on the divergent thinking aspect of the task 
(ACDN-TDIV), than on convergent thinking (ACCON - TeOM). The fault-
tracing task (Ff -TFf), also showed similar time consumption characteristics. 
These patterns were repeated to a lesser degree in each of the year groups 
when closely examined. (see histograms and line graphs for each year group in 
the appendix-6). 
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Mean Std Variance Col Sum % 
Deviation 
ACCON 1. 64 1.67 2.77 100.0% 
ACDIV 1. 91 1.77 3.14 100.0% 
ACT 3.55 • 3.33 11.10 100.0% 
,)/·l 9. 51 ~ 2.79 7.76 100.0% 
D1.3 .35 .48 .23 100.0% 
D1.3LLC .64 .48 .23 100.0% 
D1.:1Ms .11 .31 .10 100.0% 
D1.1USF .88 .33 .11 100.0% 
FT .35 .48 .23 100.0% 
MSR1 2.70 1. 81 3.26 100.0% 
MSR2 4.09 2.67 7.15 100.0% 
MSR3 3.11 1. 93 3.74 100.0% 
MSR4 4.25 2.16 4.68 100.0% 
MSRT 14.14 6.93 47.97 100.0% 
P~T, 2.09 .37 .14 100.0% 
[~:~REA 1. 83 .93 .87 100.0% 
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9.3 PUPILS' COGNITIVE RESPONSE LEVEL (MEAN 
RESPONSE LEVEL) 
Pupils cognitive response level was obtained using the Mean Score Value X and Chi-
square values. 
Category/ 
Tasks 
D1.3 
Dl.3LLC 
Op. 
ACf 
MSRI 
MSR2 
MRS2 
D1.2 
Dl2.MS 
D1.2 USF 
FIT 
Sci.Res. 
PSL 
Level of 
Rating 
E/F/LF 
LC3 
LFs 
LC3 
LC3 
LF(S) 
LC/EF 
EFI 
LCI 
LC3/EF4 
UF 
Scoring 
Code 
o or 1 
0-3 
0-8 
0-8 
0-8 
0-8 
0-16 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
1 - 3 
2-3 
x 
.35 
3.55 
2.7 
4.09 
3.11 
9.51 
.11 
.88 
.35 
1.83 
2.09 
SD Remarks 
.48 about 35% used ElF/LF 
65% did not . 
.64 .48 about 64 % used Concrete 
36% did not. 
3.33 65 % used Concrete Opp. 
functions; 35.5 % did not 
1.81 27 % used Concrete Opp. 
functions; 73 % did not. 
2.62 40.9% used Concrete Opp. 
functions; 59% did not. 
1.93 50% used Concrete Opp. 
functions; 50% did not. 
2.79 50% used Concrete Opp. 
functions; 50% did not. 
.31 11 % less were at EF 
.33 88% used Concrete Opp. (match) 
.48 35 % used Concrete Opp. (match) 
. 93 82 % used Concrete Opp . 
18% did not. 
.39 Concrete Operation. 
On average pupils were operating at Concrete Operational level Mean and Chi-square 
tables indicate so (see appendix-9). It would appear that they would respond 
appropriately to tasks which match with their level of cognitive operation or function. 
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The pupils' level of written responses from both practical and written tasks were 
analysed and arranged in five categories using SOLO taxonomy criteria (See the 
section on the instrument used) as the format. 
The categories were coded as follows:-
No Response = 0 
Pre-Operational - 1 
Concrete Operations - 2-3 
Early Formal Operations - 4 
Late Formal Operations = 5 
Analysis of the data therefrom showed the pupils' Mean Cognitive level of responses 
to both practical and written tasks was translated as a multi-structural response. This 
was in concurrence with the score on Piaget's pendulum task which indicated that the 
majority of the pupils were at the concrete operational level of reasoning. 
A sample of responses from pupils in each year group on task D1.2 is as presented 
below/overleaf. Note that the numbers in brackets are interpreted as follows: 
(3/1), (2/0) 
3 and 2 represent concrete operation as shown in the above table. 
1 and 0 represent multi structural and unistructural responses according to the 
Structure of Observed learning outcome (SOLO). 
RESPONSES TO TASK D 1.2 
KS3 (7) 
25/3 (M) 
1. Bad ---Because it is a bit too low (3/1) 
2. Bad ---Because it might come off (3/1) 
3. Bad ---Because someone might take some bits out 
4. Good ---So you do not have to carry it around with you. (2/0) 
5. Bad ---Because if someone was fixing their bike, they would only have one 
spanner .(2/0) 
6. Bad ---Because you do not have any where to put it.(O/O) 
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7. Bad ---Less space for people (3/1) 
8. Bad ---Because you might burn yourself.(311) 
9. Bad ---No response (0/0) 
10. Bad ---Too small to put ice-cream. (311) 
11. Bad ---Because it is not too strong (3/1) 
12. Bad ---It might catch fire (2/0) 
13. Bad ---Too small. (3/1) 
14. Good ---Can be used to cut wood. (2/0) 
15. Bad ---Not too strong (3/1) 
16. Good ---You can put your tea in (2/0) 
26/4 (F) 
1. Good ---It has a lot ofbalance.(311) 
2. Good ---So you don't loose your ties (2/0) 
3. Bad ---Because ifit drops it will break (3/1) 
4. Good ---It keeps your tapes neat. (2/0) 
5. Bad ---It might be too big 
6. Good ---Because if you loose your key you have to look for the star (2/0) 
7. Good ---So you can travel. (2/0) 
8. Bad ---Because the controls are too high and they might get hot and burn 
when touched. (3/1) 
9. Good ---So you can use it to undo things.(2/0) 
10. Bad ---Because the top is too small and you won't be able to get it out.(311) 
11. Bad ---Because you don't know how strong it is. (3/1) 
12. Good ---Because Good----Because you can sit comfortable beside the fire. 
(2/0) 
13. Good ---So you can keep your books out of the way, (2/0) 
14. Good ---So you can cut the things (2/0) 
15. Bad ---All of the stuff will fallout. (2/0) 
16. Bad ---Because the water will come out; because the spout is too low. (3/1) 
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9.4 CORRELATION 
The data from the test results were examined for pattern of association and to tease out 
any factor(s) which underlined or accounted for the values of the variables. It was 
important to see whether the tests related to something else other than themselves. 
All the tests administered to the pupils, were correlated, one with another. (See 
correlation co-efficient table-b). Clearly, although there were a few large correlation 
co-efficient values, many of the values recorded were small but statistically 
significant. 
The Largest correlation co-efficient in the data matrix were as shown below. 
Variables r 
(AIC convergent and Divergent thinking) .87 ACCON with ACDN 
ACT (Combined Total Scores from AlC Conv. & AlC Div.) 
.96 
TCON,TDIV,TDCT 
D1.2MS with Age 7 
MSR-2 with D1.2 
MSRT with D1.2 
Ff with TFf 
MSRI with MSR2 
MSR3 
MSRT 
(Time Variable) 
(Design thinking in Multi-Structural terms) 
(Design task - Spatial task (elevation» 
(Design task - All spatial, embedded test) 
(Fault Tracing - Time) 
(Object Matching - Elevation) 
(Object Matching - 3D) 
(Object Matching - All spatial) 
Table-(a) Largest Correlation Coefficients 
.84, .83, .72 
.40 
.40 
.45 
.49 
.50 
.44 
.69 
Convergent and divergent aspects of AIC perfonnance tasks were highly correlated, 
so too were spatial ability tasks. The capacity to see a good design and to manipulate 
correlated to a value 0.4. The positive correlation from these and others showed on 
an ad hoc basis that there were positive associations between the scores of pupils 
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within the group. This implied that any individual variations were derived from 
variations in a trait or process which underlies, to some extent, performance on the 
task. 
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9.5.1 FACTORS AND THEIR DESCRIPTION 
Factor 1: General Intelligence/Cognitive Ability Factor 
This is an IQ or general ability-type factor; all divergent and convergent 
components/elements of A/C performance tests loaded heavily on this factor. 
This factor also has most of the sub-scale test positively loading on it although 
not heavily. 
The first factor, composed of Variables ACDIV, TDIV (divergent thinking), 
Variables ACCON, TCON (convergent thinking), seemed to be a straight-
forward General Intelligence, or IQ/General Ability-type factor. 
Variable ACDIV, TDIV was divergent thinking, and this type of thinking has 
been known to encapsulate other types of thinking, e.g. scientific thinking, 
mathematical thinking, etc., because of its very nature. Thus, it was not 
altogether surprising that this variable correlates positively with other 
variables. Furthermore, this Variable (divergent thinking), appears to spread 
its importance between two dimensions; ie. it contributes to two other abilities. 
Thus, it could be called a mixed factor. Variable ACCON, TCON 
(convergent thinking), as another dimension of creativity, was in some ways 
related to that aspect of general intelligence (ability), concerned with the 
pupils' focusing their thinking on a particular principle or characteristic (e.g. 
colour or size), which they had decided upon as relevant to the grouping of the 
blocks of wood. Indeed, each of the dimensions of creativity in technology, 
ie. "divergent" thinking (Variable ACDIV, TDIV) [the pupils' capacity to 
range flexibly in search for relevant principles or characteristics with which to 
group the blocks of wood], and "convergent" thinking (Variable ACCON, 
TCON), as described above, were often identifiable as intellectual abilities. 
The science thinking task (Variable - SCIREA) performed by the pupils, had 
divergent and convergent elements. The pupils, in doing this task were 
required to sort out the effects of three variables viz. length, weight, and push. 
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They presumably went through phases of exploration (divergent thinking), then 
analysis, and finally synthesis (convergent thinking). All these can be 
identified with general intelligence. 
Therefore, it was not out of place to say that much of what Variable -ACDIV, 
TDIV (divergent thinking), Variable - TCON, ACCON (convergent thinking), 
Variable - SClREA (science reasoning) involved was very much the traditional 
definition of intelligence; ie. perceiving relationships between elements in a 
general sort of way. 
It is a bit surprising, however, that divergent thinking is actually an element of 
this factor (g), although some people have found that this is quite common. As 
a very broad dimension, no one is particularly sure how useful it is to have 
divergent thinking. Nevertheless, it has been found in this particular factor. 
Divergent (Variable - ACDIV, TDIV) and convergent (Variable - ACCON, 
TCON) elements of the task are complementary characteristics of "effective" 
thinking. The latter, can be identified with the broader conception of 
intelligence. (Guilford 1950, 1954; Hudson, 1956, 1958). 
Briefly, this thinking involves the capacity to range flexibly or diverge in 
search for relevant factors in connection with a particular matter being dealt 
with and the capacity to focus or converge one's thinking regarding whatever 
factors that have been decided upon as relevant. 
As implied above, divergent thinking was concerned with the production of 
ideas, and the test which was administered to the pupils required them to 
produce different (novel) responses in relation to things. Presented with an 
object, e.g. transistor, the pupils produce concepts associated with the object, 
and subsequently, are able to relate them to the object within the appropriate 
context. 
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Thus, in producing ideas from thinking about the different uses to which an 
object can be put, the ability to perceive relationships was vital, just as it was 
vital when putting them together. Clearly, as dimensions of the creative aspect 
of technology, divergent thinking was concerned with the exploration and 
production of ideas, whereas, convergent thinking was related to "synthesis" 
i.e. focusing of thought or putting ideas together. 
Divergent thinking (Variable - ACDN, TDIV) , because of its very nature, 
permeated other kinds of thinking, including scientific thinking, mathematical 
thinking, etc. Thus, in science, traces of both divergent and convergent 
thinking abound. However, convergent thinking was known to be closely 
associated with science thinking and IQ as "definiteness", "precision", and the 
like, were qualities or characteristics of IQ, and science. Convergent thinking 
as described above, in science and A-C performance task administered to the 
pupils, exhibited similar qualities or characteristics. 
Thus, pupils who were "good" at synthesising might be said to exhibit 
intellectual abilities in effect. To be a "good" synthesiser, one was required 
as a necessity to possess a certain degree of ability to analyse. After all, 
synthesis presupposes analysis, and in technology, as well as science, this was 
not an exception. In fact, tasks (A-C performance) were administered to the 
pupils which demanded the understanding of the whole structure, and bringing 
together ideas etc., which in effect presumed analysis. 
It can therefore be said that the "creativity" involved in designing and making, 
required the powers of analysis (in the above sense) and synthesis. Here, the 
elements of intelligence began to surface, and underlined the fact that 
technological thinking involves some creativity and some 'intelligence'. The 
relationship between creativity and intelligence has already been mentioned. 
Furthermore, the manipulation of a system task (Variable - FT, trouble 
shooting, or similar tasks e.g. assembling or disassembling), presumed 
analysis. The surface visualisation tasks (Variables MSR, 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
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showing the plan of the artefact or object was analytical in some respects. By 
means of isometric projection, the three (3) views or elevations of the object, 
could be brought together (synthesised) in their appropriate relationship. 
In an attempt merely to underline the importance of "synthesis" in design and 
making, which after all, is what 'IQ'. is about, (bringing things together, 
connecting things etc.), it was not out of place to say that, therein, the power 
of synthesis appeared to be more important than that of analysis. In some 
cases, this called for knowledge of causal relations and properties of the 
elements involved. Indeed, as the demand for higher knowledge of causal 
relations and properties of elements involved became apparent, there was a 
gradual move towards the domain of scientific explanation. 
The pupils' development of the above mentioned qualities appeared to be 
linked to their stage development level. This was apparent by examining the 
tasks that the pupils were asked to do. Task or Variable - SClREA (science 
thinking test), required the pupils to show the ability to sort out the effects of 
three variables, viz. length, weight and push of the pendulum, on the period of 
oscillation. As the length of the pendulum was the only important factor, the 
pupils were required to overcome what Wylam and Shayer (1978, p.9) called 
"strong intuitive feeling", to realise this by actually constructing or designing 
experiments which controlled the appropriate variables, and deducing 
therefrom, the effect of length. 
In tasks or Variables - ACDIV, TDIV (divergent thinking) and - ACCON, 
TCON (convergent thinking), the pupils were also required to sort sixteen 
blocks of wood into various groups using particular sorting principles, some of 
which were given, and others not given. By being able to "sort" things out in 
the tests mentioned above, the pupils were inextricably isolating, juxtaposing, 
categorising and combining concepts, dimensions, etc., besides co-ordinating 
activities. It was therefore not difficult to discern the kinds of mental 
processes or ability involved in isolating, juxtaposing, combining and 
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categorising etc. They would include perceptual discrimination, classification, 
categorisation and differentiation. 
These abilities appeared to be necessary if the pupils were to be able to relate, 
say, technological components to their functions, or length of the pendulum to 
the period of oscillation. The mental disposition of the pupils described above 
ran parallel with the psychological description of the characteristics of the 
pupils in Piagetian terms (between stage 2B and 3A/3B), as Variable - PSL 
indicated. This factor is regarded as essentially a "cognitive" factor. 
9.5.2 Factor 2: Spatial/Perceptual (Visual) Analysis 
Clearly all the MSR sub-scale tests are heavily loaded on this factor. 
In tasks/variables MSR 1 - 4 (see correlation matrix table-b), the pupils had to 
manipulate images. In this task, spatial-visualisation ability appear to have 
been used. 
The fact that design tasks D1.2 correlated with manipulation tasks MSRl-2 
was not surprising, but confirmatory of the important role of spatial-
visualisation ability in design and making activity. 
Thus, by looking at the variables (or tasks) composing this factor MSRl-4, it 
was not difficult to judge most of them as primarily visual. 
The importance of visual dimension of technological thinking cannot be over-
emphasised. The pupils' conception of technology appears to be a function of 
their level of perception or perceptual analysis. 
Generally speaking, our ideas are engendered firstly by our faculty of 
perception and, secondly, by that of conception. This factor, and the elements 
composing it, seemed to suggest that pupils first of all have to develop to a 
reasonable level the ability to perceive objects visually, before they can be in a 
position to think of them meaningfully in technological terms, or form ideas 
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about them. It was therefore not totally out of place to designate visual 
perception as the starting-point of any meaningful technological thinking for 
the pupils. In fact, the significantly high correlation coefficients between 
elements of this factor appear to support this assertion. 
Perceptual analysis appeared to be linked to the development of the ability to 
discriminate, differentiate and co-ordinate. For instance, for the pupils to be 
able to arrive at the conclusion that a particular object, as in Variable 01.2, 
was a design distinct from objects not designed, or that an artefact was a "bad" 
or "good" design, some form of discrimination must be deployed. 
In Variables MSRI-4 (see correlation matrix table-b), where the pupils had to 
choose a correct views from a number of similarly drawn views, the ability to 
discriminate seemed to be an aid to success in this activity. Furthermore, 
when they were engaged in the activity of causing the light to work, as in 
Variable - FT (fault tracing), the ability to discriminate appeared to have 
prevented them from making the wrong connections, e.g. putting the yellow 
plugs into the blue sockets, or a blue plug into a yellow socket. Another 
interesting point concerned the relationship between the pupils' capacity to see 
a good design and their capacity to manipulate objects. 
Remember, that manipulation tasks used here involve Variables -MSRI - 4 
(see correlation matrix table-b). 
Variable 01.2 was a measure of pupils' capacity to see a good or bad design. 
This capacity, is expressed in either uni- or multi-structural reasons. 
For instance, a uni-structural response to item -I in test 01.2, ie. whether or 
not the table shown is a good design, would be:-
"Good. - resting things on." 
"Good. - because it is stable." 
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"Good. - because it is firm." 
And a multi-structural response to the same item would be:-
"Good. - it's got a flat top and it looks sturdy." 
"Good. - it is strong and could hold a heavy weight." 
"Good. - stable and sturdy good structure." 
The correlation matrix (see table-b), shows that Variables 01.2 correlated with 
Variables MSRI - 4, suggesting some relationship between the pupils' capacity 
to manipulate and their capacity to see a "good" or "bad" design. Although, 
this relationship (.40/45) is not very strong, nevertheless, it is significant, and 
appeared to be reciprocal. This partly meant that when the capacity to see a 
good or bad design was expressed in terms of uni-structural reason, the 
capacity to manipulate tended to be less, but improved when the former 
capacity was expressed in terms of multi-structural reasons. Thus, the 
relationship appeared to be reciprocal, such that to be able to see a good 
design, the pupils would have to manipulate dimensions (such as size, weight, 
height, shape, colour, etc.), of the object or design in some ways. 
For pupils to be able to judge a design as either "bad" or "good", it appeared 
that they would mentally rotate, and visualise the artefact from all conceivable 
perspectives, and at the same time, take a number of factors into account or 
consideration. Consequently, the significant correlation between the reasons 
the pupils gave for judging either way, good or bad, (Variable 01.2), and the 
range of manipulation tasks, namely, mental rotation of objects MRS1, mental 
visualisation of three dimensional figures or surfaces MSR 2 and 3 respectively 
and divergent thinking (Variable ACON), seem to suggest that the capacity to 
see a good or bad design, may be linked to their ability to manipulate objects. 
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9.5.3 Factor 3: Design Thinking Style 
This factor seems to represent design thinking style i.e. multi-structural and 
uni-structural/functional. Although Bi-Polar, Piaget's stage level also loaded 
heavily on this factor. Design categorisation D 1.3 MS and D 1. 3 USF, all 
loaded heavily on this factor. 
From the correlation matrix (see table-b), Variable D1.2 USF (thinking in 
terms of function), negatively correlates with Variable DI.2 MS (thinking in 
terms of structures), but, positively correlates with Variable PSL (Piaget's 
stage development levels). 
It is however important to remember, that Variables D1.2 USF, D1.2 MS, 
PSL were dimensions on which Test D1.2 (Design test) was scored, namely, 
functional/uni-structural (Variable DI.2 USF), structural/multi-structural 
(Variables DI.2 MS). Here are some instances of each dimension: 
"Functional" responses to the design task which requires the pupils to 
say whether the artefact no. 1 (see Task DI.2) is a good or bad design 
are thus: 
"Good. - It is some where to sit and drink" (Yr. 8) 
"Good. - because you would not have to put everything on the floor, 
kick them over. (Yr. 9) 
"Good. - because it is usual to put things on." (Yr. 10) 
"Good. - It is good so that you can put your coffee or tea on the table 
instead of the floor." (Yr. 11). 
Typical "Structural" responses to the same task are: 
"Good. - It's got a flat top and looks sturdy". (Yr. 7) 
"Good. - Because it is rectangle and does not fall over (stable)". (Yr. 
8) 
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"Good. - It is strong and could hold a heavy weight". (Yr. 9) 
"Good. - Because it is stable and strong". (Yr. 10) 
"Good. - Stable and sturdy good structure". (Yr. 11) 
These scoring dimensions emerged from the pupils' own response pattern. 
To reiterate, whereas Variable D1.2 MS is a measure of 'structure', and 
corresponds to adults' responses, Variable D1.2 USF, is a measure of 
function, and corresponds to how children respond. Clearly, this factor is a 
bi-polar (positive and negative), function/structure categorisation. and this 
seems to correspond to the sort of categorisation arrived at by Bruner, Olver 
and Greenfield et. al. (1966), when they looked at applications and divided 
them into 'function' and 'structure'. 
Function/Structure (Bi-polar) Element - What is Function and Structure? 
At face value, it was surprising that technological thinking was not associated 
with understanding of the functional aspect. Why must this be so? When we 
come to think about technology, do we not think in terms of functions? It was 
rather odd here that this was not the case, particularly, as one would expect 
those pupils who are good at technological thinking to have a very good grasp 
of function. 
Thus, one possible way of looking at or interpreting these results, could be in 
terms of the superficiality of the bi-polarity of structure. In other words, 
although 'structure' was something which was opposed to 'function', ie. 
bipolar, nevertheless, this was on the surface only. By closely examining the 
nature of pupils' functional and structural responses to the tests administered, 
there appeared not to be any such opposition between the two dimensions. In 
fact, there are instances, where the pupils used a combination of both 
dimensions at the same time in their responses as to whether or not the picture 
of the artefacts shown in test D1.2 is good. 
Examples of their responses to item -1 of D 1. 2 are as follows:-
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"Good. - Good for putting cups of tea on because it is square." (Yr. 
8) 
"Good. - It is strong and could hold a heavy weight." (Yr. 9) 
"Good. - Basic design, but strong and serves its purpose." (Yr. 11) 
An examination of the functional responses given by the pupils of all year 
groups, showed that they were quite low levels. It should be noted at this 
juncture that pupils were given scores where they responded in terms of what 
they can do with the objects shown (see test DI.2), more or less in a very 
concrete kind of way, thus, making the functional response a concrete 
operational kind of response. This was of course not a response that could 
throw out the whole functional response. It is an immediate concrete 
operational response. Here are selected examples of their responses to item -
15 of test DI.2: 
"Good. - moves things easily." (Yr. -7) 
"Good. - you can put things in it instead of carrying them." (Yr. -8) 
"Good. - a wheel-barrow is handy because human arms can only carry a 
little." (Yr. -9) 
"Good. - for moving items (heavy) ego garden materials." (Yr. -10) 
"Good. - transports things easily to short distances." (Yr. -11). 
In another test requiring the pupils to design something that could carry a hand 
camera to a specific height above their school for an aerial photograph of the 
school, some of their responses were more or less immediate: ego "Just take 
yourself and the camera up in a helicopter." (Yr. -7) "Scaffolding" "crane" 
(yr. -8) "Use a plane or a helicopter" (Yr. -to). 
From these responses, it could be implied that perhaps, what structure means 
here, is an understanding of function in a more comprehensive way. And 
responses to item -15 of test D 1. 2 such as: 
"Good. - you can fit more in a wheel-barrow than in your hands. " 
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(Yr. -7) 
"Bad. - when you wheel it, all the rubbish will come out." (Yr. -8) 
"Bad. - should have two wheels; bigger wheels." (Yr. -9) 
"Bad. - when you lift it up, the much will run out of the font." (Yr. -10) 
"Bad. - loading, a problem from rear end, back to high, could tip up." 
(Yr. -11); 
and also responses to the aerial photography task, such as, or which amount to, 
"Describing a balloon which uses scientific principles to lift the camera to a 
height above the school". (Yr. -8) "Using pulleys and ropes to take the 
camera and self to the top of the school building". (Yrs. -9, -10, and -11), 
seem to support this view. 
Since Variable D1.2 USF (thinking in terms of function) negatively correlates 
with the rest of the variables, it can be concluded that the "good" end of the 
bipolar factor, was the "structural" end. The implication of this was well 
borne out when the developmental analysis was done. This factor can be 
identified with cognitive style. 
9.5.4 Factor 4: Practical Ability 
This factor is concrete, very practical in nature. This is 'practical' ability. 
Design tasks D 1. 3 and D 1. 3 LLC loaded heavily on this factor. 
9.5.5 Factor 5: Logical/Systematic Thinking 
This factor seems to suggest some logical/systematic thinking in concrete 
terms. The fault-tracing task loaded heavily on this factor. This factor seemed 
to share some of the characteristics of Factor 2 in that, when manipulating a 
system as in trouble-shooting in a faulty system (Fask FT), besides knowing 
the names of the control knobs etc., the pupils were expected to know their 
locations and how they are spatially related. 
9.5.6 Factor 6: Science Thinking 
This factor was related to science reasoning suggesting that technology 
thinking includes scientific thinking but is not determined by it. 
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It is worth stating here that factor analytic techniques do have inherent 
limitations. One such limitation is the restriction on the number of variables 
which can be included in tests. Such that, if one added another set of tests, 
then a different set of results, or another factor, would emerge. In other 
words, the more tests one added to the analysis, the more factors that would be 
extracted. Due to this limitation, caution has been exercised in discussing the 
above results. 
It was also interesting to note the relationship amongst the factors. (See factor 
trans-function matrix table-d) 
FI negatively related with others and positively with self 
F2 positively related with F2, F3, F4 and self 
F3 positively related with F6 and self 
F4 positively related with F3 and self 
F5 positively related with F2, F3 and self 
F6 positively related with FI, F3, F4, F5 and self. 
These factors are related to the schema identified in some important ways, in 
that the schema could be found operating within each factor. 
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Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1 .86792 .46019 .06920 .08421 .01775 
Factor 2 -.26743 .66313 -.54294 -.34483 .24201 
Factor 3 -.35792 .49482 .70013 .20276 .22143 
Factor 4 -.15945 .10776 -.42521 .77854 -.14415 
Factor 5 .10627 -.28869 -.12708 -.06810 .79388 
Factor 6 -.06107 .05389 -.00673 -.45126 -.48071 
Factor 7 -.08147 -.07607 .11510 -.13597 .09988 
Factor 6 Factor 7 
Factor 1 .10877 .10447 
Factor 2 -.12537 .02779 
Factor 3 .20078 -.08002 
Factor 4 .36491 .14863 
Factor 5 .49040 -.11763 
Factor 6 .74529 -.05610 
Factor 7 .05504 
·IDM-
Hi-Res Chart It 2:Factor ~lot of factors 1, 2, 3 
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9.6 DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS 
Having identified and described the meaning of the factors elicited by means of 
factor analysis, I find that the development of abilities (or developmental analysis) 
becomes much easier. Through such analysis the sort of changes that take place 
with increasing age of the pupils can become apparent. In other words, the 
interest here is in pupils' developmental pattern, particularly, as data have been 
collected from different age groups. 
Thus, what follows is, or represents, an account of the increase, stability, or 
decrease, in pupils' test scores over the age range under investigation. 
This is done by plotting a graph of mean (grand) scores against the different year 
groups for each of the identified factors . Indeed, it is expected that some tests 
would be more interesting than others in terms of pupils' responses. 
9.6.1 FACTOR (1) - GENERAL INTELLIGENCE/ABILITY 
10~---------------------------------------------------------' 
8 
6 / 
4 
2 
~ O~ ________________ ~ ________________ ~ ______________ ~ 
year 7 yearB year 9 year 10 
Group 
FACTOR (1) GENERAL INTELLIGENCE/ABILITY 
245 
ACCC 
ACOI' 
ACT 
TOIV 
TOCl 
TCO~ 
c 
ro 
C1> 
20 ~-------------------------------------------------------
10 
-
.- - -
---
.-------~ 
~ OL--------------~----------------~--------------~ 
year 7 year 8 year 9 year 10 
Group 
FACTOR (2) PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS/SPATIAL ABILITY 
9.6.2 FACTOR (2) PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS/SPATIAL ABILITY 
There seemed not to be any developmental trends with respect to perceptual 
analysis/spatial ability factor. One-Way Analysis of Variance, indicated no 
significance at 0.05% level amongst the year groups. If all the variables in this 
factor were put together, (MSRT) a developmental pattern emerged which 
indicated that pupils perceptual analysis/spatial ability increased with age. One-
Way Analysis of Variance indicated significance at 0.01 % level suggesting some 
progression. (see appendix4 /jj 
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FACTOR (3) FUNCTION/STRUCTURE 
9.6.3 FACTOR (3) FUNCTIONS/STRUCTURE 
With this factor, whereas 'Multi-Structural ' thinking showed some decreases 
during the early years. 'Uni-structural ' /functional' thinking increased and 
levelled off at during the later years. One-Way analysis of Variance showed 
significance level between the groups Year 7 and Year 8. (see appendix .. I.§~) At 
Year 9, 'Multi-structural ' began showing signs of increase. It would appear that, 
pupils think first in ' functional ' /'uni-structural ' terms, then slowly moved towards 
' structural' terms. 
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FACTOR (4) PRACTICAL ABILITY 
9.6.4 FACTOR (4) PRACTICAL ABILITY 
There was an increased use of 'practical' ability during the earlier years, up to 
Year 8. One-Way Analysis of Variance showed signficant differences at 0.01% 
level. (see appendix·l.1d) Thereafter, it dipped slightly and stabilized during the 
later years. This seemed to support the outcome described for Factor (3) . 
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FACTOR (6) LOGICAUSYSTEMATIC 
9.6.5 FACTOR (6) LOGICAL/SYSTEMATIC 
There was a somewhat gradual drop in the use of systematic/logical thinking until 
about Year 9. One-Way Analysis ' of Variance showed no significant difference at 
0.05% level. (see appendix ... /Je) Thereafter, logical/systematic thinking began to 
increase. Further evidence suggest that pupils during the earlier years tend to 
' repeat ' actions (operations) illogically. As they progress through the years, 
these operations/ 
actions become systematic, logical . 
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9.6.6 FACTOR (7) SCIENCE REASONING 
This showed clear developmental patterns. The deployment of this thinking in 
technology work increased with age and tended to fall slightly after Year 9. The 
differential use of this thinking was not significant between the groups as 
indicated by the result of the One-Way Analysis of Variance. (see overleaf p. ) 
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FT 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable SCIREA 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
squares Squares Ratio Prob. Source D.F. 
.3903 .3903 .3941 .5314 Between Groups 1 
Within Groups 112 110.9430 .9906 
Total 113 111.3333 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable SCIREA 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
-11"'1 C"l 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 8.8218 8.8218 12.9830 .0005 
Within Groups 105 71. 3464 .6795 
Total 106 80.1682 
ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable SCIREA 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 2.2090 2.2090 3.6076 .0611 
Within Groups 81 49.5982 .6123 
Total 82 51.8072 
SUMMARY 
The above developmental analysis has pinpointed times/periods when certain 
characteristics exhibited by pupils can be harnessed to fit in with the 
curriculum being delivered. The analysis shows that during the early years, 
children tended to repeat action (operation) illogically; i.e. without being able 
to explain the action. However, as they progress through the years, their 
operation (action) becomes increasingly systematic (logical). This fits in with 
Piaget's developmental model. Teaching design and technology should begin 
with some activity (action) and then progress to more sophisticated levels. 
9.7 TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING - (An Empirical Dermition) 
The conclusion drawn from the structures or factors identified by the use of Factor 
Analysis, in relation to the definition of technological thinking is that, what is termed 
as "technological thinking" here, and judged by these tests results, seemed to have six 
components typified by the factors identified. 
Thus, "technological thinking" is that type of thinking in which the above six factors 
featured prominently, and perhaps other factors which were yet to be identified. 
It is not however, largely accounted for in terms of Piagetian scientific thinking 
because as clearly indicated, the first factor is not defined by Piagetian tasks. 
Nevertheless, Piagetian tasks formed one aspect of the tests, and it is apparent 
that other tests added to it providing further useful information e.g. the test of 
structural applications, test of visual analysis. 
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9.8 CURRICULUM ANALYSIS - (THE APPLICATION OF 
DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY TAXONOMY) 
The pupils were administered Piagetian pendulum test to ascertain their cognitive 
reasoning level. The results from the data collected indicated that a large percentage 
(70 %) of the subjects sampled were at Concrete Operational level of reasoning. 
Important aspects of the National Curriculum design and technology were analysed 
separately for their cognitive demands. Each cognitive level was given a value which 
was related to the SOLO value level. The value levels are as presented below: 
COGNITIVE LEVELS AND THEIR VALVES 
Pre-Operational Level = 1 
Concrete Operational Level = 2 
Late Concrete Operational Level (LC) = 3 
Early Formal Operation (EF) = 4 
Late Formal Operation (LF) - 5 
It will be recalled that the literature review section on contextual analysis identified 
some of the schemata needed for understanding design and technology subject area for 
example, classification and seriation abilities. By reflecting on the objectives as stated 
in the National Curriculum design and technology, and from my own familiarity with 
Piaget's protocol, further schemata were identified. They include proportional and 
correlational reasoning, spatial/visual ability, causality, and frame of reference. 
After the schemata have been identified, the next step in determining the cognitive 
demands of design and technology subject is to read though the objectives as stated in 
the National Curriculum design and technology. For instance, at key stage 3, one of 
the designing skills component objectives requires the pupils to (a) 'develop a 
specification for their product' 
This objective clearly asks pupils to categorise, classify (list ideas). As the pupils are 
engaged in this task they are also presumably evaluating which piece of idea should be 
included on the list of their specifications. Evaluation in this context is a component 
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of Bloom's taxonomy of cognitive aspect of knowledge. According to the table in 
section-6 evaluation relates to late formal operation in Piagetian protocol. Details of 
late formal operation were examined in section -2 of this thesis. The design and 
technology taxonomy attempts to describe the range of possible responses within 
design and technology subject demanded (or expected) of pupils (or which they are 
able to produce). From the example cited, mapping shows that pupils at this level are 
expected hypothetically to elaborate on details of the specifications aspect of the 
project. Further examples are shown in tables (e) and (f) overleaf, of how the 
curriculum objectives in design and technology (designing and making skills) have 
been analysed using the taxonomy developed for this investigation. When all the 
objectives under the designing skills component of the National Curriculum have been 
analysed, the average of the different level is obtained. This represents the level of 
cognitive demand made by this aspect of the design and technology curriculum.(see 
tables on pages 263 to 268 
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Tables (e), (f) : Showing how design and technology taxonomy is (or 
can be) used to assess the demands on (or the thinking of) the pupils 
as well as analyse the curriculum. 
Table (e) 
NC d&t Objectives Piaget's Schemata Piaget's level/ Bloom's Protocol Structure of 
(pupils are to be required to (read taxonomy for Observed-
taught to): understand tasks a range of ability for learning outcomes 
particular level) (SOW) 
KS3 Designing 
skills 
(a) identify Classification; Late formal Evaluation 5 
appropriate sources Categorisation (read d&t taxonomy 
of information that for a range of ability 
will help with their for this level) 
designing 
(b) use design briefs frame of reference Early formal Application 4 
to guide design (read d&t taxonomy 
thinking. for a range of ability 
for this level) 
(e) generate design Proportional Late formal Evaluation 5 
proposals that match reasoning (read d&t taxonomy 
stated design criteria for a range of ability 
and modify for this level) 
proposals to 
improve them 
(g) take account of Correlational Early concrete Knowledge 2 
the working reasoning (read d&t taxonomy 
characteristics and for a range of ability 
properties of for this level) 
materials and 
components when 
deciding how and 
when to use them 
(h) prioritise and Order/Seriation Late formal Evaluation 5 
reconcile decisions (read d&t taxonomy 
on materials and for a range of ability 
components, for this level) 
production, time and 
costs within design 
proposals. 
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(I) take account of Proportional Early concrete Knowledge 2 
the restrictions reasoning (working (read d&t taxonomy 
imposed by the within limits) for a range of ability 
capacities and for this level) 
limitations of tools 
and equipment. 
(k) develop a clear Classification!Seriati Early formal. Application 4 
idea of what has to on! Spatial ability. (read d&t taxonomy 
be done and propose for a range of ability 
an outline plan, for this level) 
which include 
alternative methods 
of proceeding if 
things go wrong. 
KS4. (0 to Correlational Early formal. Application 4 
determine the degree (relationship/lnequal (read d&t taxonomy 
of accuracy required ity) for a range of ability 
for the product to for this level) 
function as planned, 
taking account of 
critical dimensions 
and tolerances in 
determining methods 
of manufacture. 
(h) how graphic Spatial ability Early formal Application 4 
techniques, ..... can (read d&t taxonomy 
be used in a variety for a range of ability 
of ways to model for this level) 
aspects of design 
proposals and assist 
in making decisions. 
(I) to produce and Seriation ability Early formal Application 4 
use detailed working (read d&t taxonomy 
schedules that will for a range of ability 
achieve the desired for this level) 
objectives and 
provide alternatives 
to possible problems 
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Table (f) 
KS3 Making skills Piaget's Schemata 
(pupils are to be required to under-
taught to: stand tasks 
(a) use a range of Seriation ability 
processed to shape 
and form material, 
including forming 
by wastage, 
attachment, 
adhesion and 
combining. 
Piaget's Levell 
(d & t taxonomy) 
Early formal 
(read d&t taxonomy 
for a range of ability 
for this level) 
Bloom's Protocol 
Application 
(b) select materials, Classification ability Late concrete/(read Knowledge 
tools and equipment 
appropriate to the 
task 
d&t taxonomy for a 
range of ability for 
this level) 
(d) join and combine Correlational ability Early formal Analysis/ Applicat-
additional materials 
and components 
(read d&t taxonomy ion 
accurately in 
temporary and 
permanent ways. 
for a range of ability 
for this level) 
(t) interconnect a Correlational ability Early formal 
variety of 
components to 
achieve functional 
results 
KS4 (h) to produce Seriation ability 
and use detailed 
working schedules 
that will achieve the 
desired objectives, 
setting realistic 
deadlines for various 
stages of 
manufacture, 
identifying critical 
points in the making 
process and 
providing 
alternatives to 
(read d&t taxonomy 
for a range of ability 
for this level) 
Late formal 
(read d&t taxonomy 
for a range of ability 
for this level) 
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Application 
Evaluation 
Structure of 
Observed learning 
Outcome (SOLO) 
4 
2 
3&4 
4 
5 
I possible problems. 
Summary of both KS 3&4 design and technology curriculum analysis using the design 
and technology taxonomy is presented in the tables (g,h,i) below. 
Curriculum Analysis and Mean Cognitive Level 
Table-(g): Cognitive Schema necessary for the understanding of the 
concepts/work in Design Technology used in this investigation and the Mean 
Cognitive level required for each aspect. 
Aspects of D&T 
KS3 
Designing Skills 
Making Skills 
Material & Components 
Systems & Control 
Structure 
Schemata 
(d&t taxonomy) 
Classification (LF) 
Frame of Reference (LC) EF 
Proportional Reasoning (LC) 
Correlational Reasoning (EC) 
Seriation (L/F) 
Spatial ITemporal/Visuo (EF) 
Seriation (ElF) 
Classification (LlC) 
Correlational (ElF) 
Proportional Reasoning (LC) 
Spatial-Temporal (ElF) 
Causality (LF) 
Classification (LC) 
Correlational Reasoning (ElF) 
Classification (ElF) 
Correlational Reasoning (ElF) 
Seriation (ElF) 
Proportional Reasoning (LlC) 
Spatial-Temporal (LlC) 
Classification (ElF) 
Key: LC - Late Concrete 3 
EF - Early Formal 4 
LF - Late FormalS 
LevelsN alue 
s 
(SOLO) 
S 
3/4 
3 
4 
S 
4 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
MCLDT - Mean Cognitive Level of Design & Technology. 
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Mean 
Cognitive 
Level 
(MCLDT) 
x = 4 (ElF) 
X= 3.6 (LIC 
-ElF) 
x = 4 (ElF) 
x = 4 (ElF) 
X=3.6 (L/C) 
Table-(h): Cognitive Schema necessary for the understanding of the 
concepts/work in Design Technology used in this investigation and the Mean 
Cognitive level required for each aspect. 
Aspects of D&T 
KS4 
Designing Skills 
Making Skills 
Material & Components 
Systems & Control 
Products/Applications 
Schemata 
(d&t taxonomy) 
Classification (LC) 
Frame of Reference (ElF) 
Proportional Reasoning (LC) 
Correlational Reasoning (EF) 
Seriation (ElF) 
Spatial (EF) 
Seriation (LlF) 
Classification (LlC) 
Correlational (LlC) 
Proportional Reasoning (ElF) 
Spatial-TemporalNisuo (ElF) 
Frame of Reference (L/F) 
Causality (LlC) 
Spatial-Temporal (ElF) 
Correlational Reasoning (ElF) 
Seriation (ElF) 
Correlational Reasoning (ElF) 
Seriation (ElF) 
Spatial-TemporalNisuo (ElF) 
Correlational (ElF) 
Spatial-TemporalNisuo (ElF) 
Classification (ElF) 
Key: LC - Late Concrete 3 
EF - Early Formal 4 
LF - Late FormalS 
MCLDT 
- Mean Cognitive Level of Design & Technology. 
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Levels/Value 
s 
(SOLO) 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Mean 
Cognitive 
Level 
(MCLDT) 
X = 3.6 
(LC/EF) 
X= 3.8 (LiC 
-ElF) 
X = 3.7 
(LlC) 
X = 4 (ElF) 
X=4 (ElF) 
TABLE-(l): SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RESPONSE VALUES OF 
PUPILS' COGNITIVE LEVEL 
MEAN COGNITI PUPILS' MEAN COGNITIVE LEVEL (PMCRL) DESIGN AND OIFFEREN 
SCIENC VE (derived from tasks designed for this investigation) TECHNOLOGY CE 
E MEAN CURRICULUM BETWEEN 
REASON PIAGET (MCLDT) PMCRL 
ING MCLOT 
1.83 2.09 Design Tasks Level Design 
01.3 2.75 - c KS3& KS4 = 
01.3 LCC = 3.00 -Ie 
01.2 = 3.50 -Ic/ef 
01.2 MS = 3.00 -Ic 
01.2 USF = 3.00 -Ic X = 3.8 - Iclef 0.75 
X = 3.05 - c 
Making Making 
ACT = 3.55 - ef 
MSRI = 2.10 - e 
MSR2 = 4.09 - ef 
MSR3 = 3.1l-lc 
MSR4 = 4.25 -If 
FT = 3.50-lc/ef X = 3.7 -Ic/ef 
X = 3.5 -Ie 0.20 
The first and second columns of the above table-(i) shows the Mean Score from 
Piaget's reasoning task (pendulum task) and the Stage Cognitive Development Level. 
The third column shows pupils' mean cognitive Response level (PMCRL) to design 
technology tasks/questions. The fourth column indicates the Mean Cognitive Level 
of the activities in the National Curriculum Design Technology at KS3 and KS4. The 
last column shows the difference between pupils' Mean Cognitive Response Level and 
Mean Cognitive Level of the activities in the National Curriculum, Design 
Technology at KS3 & 4. 
The degree of appropriateness of the match can be interpreted by a comparison 
between the pupil's Mean Cognitive Response Level (PMCRL) Column (3) and Mean 
Cognitive Level of design technology at KS3 & KS4. This difference is listed in 
column (5) as the difference of the pupils Mean Cognitive Response Level PMCRL, 
and the Mean Cognitive Level of design technology at KS3 & 4. 
The grading and interpretation of the difference was as follows:-
260 
& 
0- .5 
.6 - 1.0 
1.1-1.5 
1.6 - 2.0 
at or half a level above Pupils' Cognitive Level 
a level above the Pupils' Cognitive Level 
a level and a half above the Pupils' Cognitive Level 
a level two times above the Pupils' Cognitive Level. 
Thus, 0 - .5 was regarded as an excellent match: 0.6 - 1.0 was regarded as a good 
match, 1.1 - 1.5 was regarded as a fair match and 1.6 - 2.0, a poor match. 
From the data presented, there was a good and excellent match between pupils' Mean 
Cognitive Response level and the Mean Cognitive level of design technology in 
respect of design and making respectively. 
Could the difficulties experienced by the pupils be due to a lack of motivation of the 
pupils or the teaching strategy used by the teachers? This aspect is worth 
investigating further. 
The issue of the relationship between pupils' Cognitive level of development and their 
responses to design technology work, was examined, particularly with regards to the 
exploratory questions posed at the beginning of this investigation. (Le. in Chapter 1.) 
The next and final section would attempt to answer and discuss some of the 
implications for these exploratory questions 
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SECTION -6 
CHAPTER 10 - DISCUSSIONS 
I will begin this section by attempting to answer each of the exploratory 
questions posed at the beginning of this investigation and then discuss some of the 
curriculum implications of the results obtained. 
10.1 Question 1: Will analysing students' responses provide us with responses 
that can be categorised into each of the developmental levels and what are the 
characteristics of those responses at each level? 
Analysing the responses of all students in the study provided a developmental 
sequence of the characteristics of the different cognitive levels. The responses have 
been organised according to the developmental stages adapted from SOLO Response 
Taxonomy and elaborated on in the guidelines created by the design and technology 
taxonomy developed for this thesis. Thus, the superordinate structure reflected the 
developmental levels or stages described by Piaget. The subordinate levels are 
organised according to students' responses. The structure for these responses 
reflected a combination of the SOLO Response Taxonomy and the Design and 
Technology Taxonomy developed by the investigator. The students, responses are 
from a written task and discussions of tasks. These data are presented in the 
following developmental sequence: 
10.0.1 PUPILS' RESPONSES TO DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY 
TASKS 
Pre-Operational Responses 
1. Pupils did not respond to the question. 
2. Pupils re-stated information from the question. 
3. Pupils responded with something irrelevant to the tasks given. 
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Early Concrete Responses 
1. Pupils responded to the question with a single fact relevant to the 
information provided in the tasks. 
2. Pupils, response focused on the specific event or objects in the task. 
3. Pupils considered all facts and events in the tasks as having equal 
importance. 
4. Pupils stated simple one-factor causes. 
Late Concrete Operational Responses 
1. Pupils responded to the question with more than one relevant factor. 
2. Pupils responded with facts both relevant to the specific tasks and with 
facts derived from other sources with their experiences. 
3. Pupils recognised contradictions in the tasks but were unable to explain 
and resolve these. 
Early Formal Operational Responses 
1. Pupils responded by connecting the relevant facts to overall principles 
and generalisations. 
2. Pupils related the relevant factors to inferential considerations beyond 
their direct experience. 
3. Pupils elaborated and embellished upon the responses. 
Late Formal Operational Responses 
1. Pupils responded with logical data that extended beyond what was 
required or given. 
2. Pupils responded with answers that related to both the task as a whole 
and to some inferences to hypothesis important from their own 
experience . 
3. Pupils stated broad general principles beyond the context of the tasks. 
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Analysing responses in this manner provided a developmental perspective of 
pupils' responses to design and technology. The Piagetian stage framework 
provided a sequence, ranging from pre-operational to concrete operation to 
formal operation. Within the sequence a subject can respond in a variety of 
ways; the manner in which the subject responded reflected his/her thinking, 
which corresponded to the characteristic nature of the subject's stage/level of 
development. Consequently, a pre-operational response consisted of either no 
response or a response that had no logical relationship with the question. An 
early concrete operational response contained one relevant detail and was 
related to the question. A late concrete operational response contained more 
than one relevant detail and was related to the question or task. Little attempt, 
however, was made by the subject to relate these details or incorporate them 
into inferential statements. Contradictions when recognised were left 
unresolved. The early formal response utilised the specific idea of tasks and 
began to state logical relationships and generalisations. Subjects, when 
responding, attempted to resolve contradictions. The late formal responses 
went beyond the materials presented by the tasks. The subjects responded by 
stating principles, resolving or posing contradictions, and by making 
predictions. This system of response analysis was a useful technique for 
interpreting the subjects understanding of material. 
10.2 Question 2: Will pupils respond with correct answers to questions when they 
are appropriately matched to their cognitive level? 
From the data presented on Table (Summary Mean PMCL & MCLDT), the 
indications were that the relationship between the pupils mean cognitive level and 
mean cognitive level of response was about 0.6. Chi-square Analysis also yielded 
values (see appendix-9) which suggested that the level of response and the level of 
questions were not independent of each other. This finding which indicated that a 
large majority of the responses were concrete operations was consistent with the 
scores on the Piaget Pendulum Formal Reasoning. The questions were analysed 
according to Blooms Taxonomy and related to Piagetian categories and SOLO levels. 
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Categories (Bloom's) Piagetian Solo Levels 
Knowledge Concrete 2 
Comprehension Concrete 2 
Analysis Late Concrete 3 
Application Early Formal 4 
Synthesis Late Formal 5 
Evaluation Late Formal 5 
10.3 Question 3: Can a taxonomy for estimating the level of thinking demanded 
by design and technology be developed? 
A taxonomy for estimating the level of thinking demanded by design and technology 
was developed. It appeared in the section on taxonomies. A taxonomy was 
constructed utilising the Piagetian framework and Shayer and Adey taxonomy. 
The creation of this taxonomy provided a method of estimating the level of 
thinking demanded by design and technology. It can be used to guide and 
select appropriate objectives and realistic activities for students. Further, it 
can assist in predicting how students will perform with design and technology. 
Therefore, it became an important instrument to be adopted when teaching 
design and technology simply by : 
(a) identifying the schema (e.g. classification) required for design and 
technology objective(s); 
(b) reading the curriculum objectives to see if they· require the pupils to 
analyse or apply according to Bloom's taxonomy of knowledge (or objectives). 
(c) using the table above to determine Piagetian level equivalent, e.g. 
analysis has as its equivalent late concrete operation. 
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I 
(d) using design and technology taxonomy developed for this thesis to 
map the range of thinking demanded by the design and technology 
objective(s). The design and technology curriculum taxonomy describes the 
range of possible responses or thinking within the subject area demanded of 
pupils or are able to produce. 
10.4 RECAPITULATION 
It will be remembered that the principal aim of this exploratory investigation has been 
to attempt to relate the psychological characteristics of the pupils to the demands of a 
technological curriculum, partly in the hope that the difficulties pupils have when 
solving design and technology problems could be explained in psychological terms. 
In order to achieve this, the investigator attempted to: 
(a) establish a technological thinking "style" typical of pupils in 
secondary schools; 
(b) assess the level of demands made on the pupils by 
technological activity (curriculum), and matching (a) and (b). 
Whereas, (a) above has involved describing pupils' actual thinking as they are 
involved in solving technological problems, (b) has involved analysing curriculum 
activity (teaching and syllabus materials). It is important to take both of the above 
steps (a) and (b), are important because the notion of "matching" presupposes that 
teaching and pupils' conceptual levels be well integrated. 
Furthermore, a Design and Technology taxonomy of the different schemata required 
for understanding design and technology was developed. The schemata identified by 
Piaget served as a basis for the taxonomy. Eight schemata were identified as 
important to Design and Technology learning. They were Classification, Seriation, 
Frame of Reference, Spatial-Temporal Relationship, Causality, Correlational 
Reasoning, Proportional Reasoning and Formal Logic. 
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The subjects were selected from three comprehensive schools across the London 
Boroughs of Ealing and Wandsworth. Each participants was administered Piaget's 
Test of Formal Reasoning. The investigator also selected major tasks from the 
National Curriculum on Design and Technology and then analysed them using the 
Design and Technology Taxonomy. This determined the cognitive schemata 
necessary for learning design and technology, and the cognitive level of the schemata 
contained in the task. The investigator prepared written and practical tasks and rated 
them according to Bloom's Taxonomy and the cognitive level of development. 
Thus, the Knowledge and Comprehension questions were constructed/structured so 
that they exhibit Concrete Operational thinking. Analysis questions, too, were 
structured to exhibit Late Concrete Operational thinking. The application questions 
were constructed to exhibit Early Formal Operational thinking, and the synthesis and 
evaluation questions were constructed to exhibit Late Formal Operational thinking. 
Thereafter, the investigator analysed all written and oral responses for their cognitive 
level, by comparing them to the descriptors indicated in the SOLO taxonomy. The 
data from the pupils' responses and their performance levels on Piaget's Test of 
Formal Reasoning were collected, analysed and compared. 
As is apparent from this investigation, technological thinking is not a phenomenon that 
can be determined in advance of time. So that the fact that pupils' technological 
thinking has been described presupposes that they have actually done some 
technological tasks and have been observed. This is important because a more 
accurate description of technological thinking has thus been ensured. 
However, in attempting to describe technological thinking, one of the assumptions has 
been that it will be largely accounted for in terms of Piaget's formal operational 
thinking. A good Piagetian, if there are any still left, will argue that the most 
important thing is the formal operational stage, because it seems to embody a wide 
range of abilities which children can apply to anything: technological problems, 
scientific problems, historical problems and everyday problems. This would have 
been the case if, after having administered Piagetian test of formal operation 
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(pendulum test), and carried out a factor analysis, the first identified factor was 
defined by the pendulum test with all the other tests loaded on this first factor. 
Further assumptions centred around the activities thought to be typical of 
technologists; for example, designing, making things work, manipulation, 
visualisation etc. 
Tasks which, included designing, manipulating systems and dimensions, science 
thinking, were assembled/designed on the basis of the above assumptions, and the 
pupils were observed doing these tasks by means of a video camera. 
The results from administering these tasks showed that technological thinking involved 
factors which included 'function/structure', 'general intelligence', and 'perceptual 
(visual) analysis', 'science reasoning', 'logical/systematic thinking' and 'practical 
ability'. These were explained in the previous sections and are linked to the different 
schemata required for understanding design and technology work, identified in the 
taxonomy; e.g. classification, categorisation. 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
Analysing students' responses to questions that are cognitively-rated can provide a 
developmental sequence of characteristics of the different cognitive levels. 
Students responded to questions with answers that were matched to their cognitive 
level of development. The data indicated that about 70% of the responses were 
Concrete Operational and that about the same percentage of the pupils were at the 
Concrete Operational level of development when measured by Piaget's Test of Formal 
Reasoning. Furthermore, pupils responded to questions at their Cognitive Operational 
level, rather than at the level of the question. They did not utilise abstractions in 
answering questions unless they were at the Formal Operational level of reasoning. 
A taxonomy for estimating the levels of thinking demanded by design and technology 
can be developed and appears in the Taxonomy section. Briefly, the development of 
this taxonomy for design and technology required a understanding of and reflection on 
the work of Piaget in science and other area of the curriculum, which was reviewed in 
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the chapter 2 of this thesis. Furthermore, it also required a very delicate deployment 
of Bloom's and SOLO taxonomies, and the analysis of the design and technology 
curriculum at Key Stages 3 and 4 besides, the pupils responses to design and 
technology tasks. 
This investigation is not to be thought of only in terms of empirical/ empiricism, but 
in terms of a combination of empirical and analytical factors. After all, this 
investigation sought to bring together the theoretical/ philosophical, the psychological 
and educational practice. In this respect, Heiddegerian philosophy becomes pertinent, 
in terms of functional analyses. Technology is part of our being in the world and 
should be seen in these terms, rather than in terms of 'structural' or abstract analysis. 
Most educationalists would find this notion difficult to accept. Technology should be 
about the 'New World', they would say. 
In terms of the teaching styles identified here, the teachers themselves may not have 
grasped this notion. They see technology along the model of science. For example, a 
15 year old pupil, starting an electronics course, and being given a test book on 
electronics, to read, and lectures to attend, represents a model of teaching which sees 
technology as an academic discipline or science, compared to a whole range of things 
that the pupil in question can be doing when making circuits etc., etc. Though we still 
have to go a long way to bringing out the full implications of the broader view of 
technology, the results from this investigation suggest that teachers ought to be much 
more into Heiddeger than Piaget. 
10.6 SUPPORT FROM OTHER SOURCES 
The results from this exploratory investigation fmd support from a number of sources, 
notably, psychometrics (structure of intellect) and developmental psychology 
(individual differences, cognitive style, Piaget). 
For instance, psychometrics, which is concerned with quantitative study of individual 
differences between pupils, has as its basis the idea that the effective way of teaching 
somebody will depend on what kind of person he is. Thus, a knowledge of the 
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structure of pupils, thinking or intellect is essential. These are however, required to 
ascertain this. 
It will be remembered that Vernon (1950, 1961), including his predecessor, 
Spearman, arrived at the idea of structure of intellect (group factor), after 
administering a number of tests, (ten or more), and factor analysing the scores 
therefrom, to infer the existence of underlying dimensions. 
In an attempt to account for what is responsible for the apparent better or worse 
performance of the pupils in one test than in others, given that the test scores are 
positively correlated, Spearman comes out with the idea of a general factor "g" 
(typically identified with intelligence). 
In this investigation, as can be seen, a number of tests were administered to pupils, 
and the scores therefrom were factor analysed to determine the existence of underlying 
dimensions of technological thinking. Six dimensions have emerged, and were 
described in the preceding section. There is, however, the possibility that more 
dimensions can be elicited. 
Furthermore, the functional/structural category identified can be regarded as 
representing pupils' "cognitive style". Similar category has been identified by Kogan 
(1970) and Witkin et.al (1977). The characteristics of field-dependentlfield-
independent, namely, stability and bi-polarity, are similar to the first identified factors 
in this investigation. 
The idea of "style" has arisen following reports from studies on convergent and 
divergent thinking which point to the fact that individuals tend to tackle problems in 
characteristic ways. In some ways, this is to encourage teachers to focus their 
interests on the pattern of pupils' leaming, and the ways their own patterns of teaching 
interact with these. 
The findings from this investigation also find support from Piagef s developmental 
work. It was reported here that the pupils appear to think first in "functional" terms, 
then they go on towards "structural" terms. From Piaget's developmental research, 
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we learn that adults think a bit more in terms of "structures", (as defined here), than 
"function". The idea of pupils thinking "functionally" is linked to the notion of the 
development of the intellect through doing things. That is, one develops 
intellectually, by performing action upon objects. 
The description of some of Piaget's basic concepts, for example, "action", "stages", 
"structure", etc., with which we are all too familiar, exhibits these characteristics. 
This investigation was designed utilising a Piagetian framework and correlated with 
information from the cognitive assessment work descriptive developmental taxonomy 
of Shayer and Adey, and the SOLO Taxonomy outlined by Biggs and Collins (1982). 
The investigator concurs with their research fmdings that not only can pupils' 
cognitive (technological thinking) levels be ascertained, but that the cognitive levels of 
curricula can be determined. Furthermore, the response pupils expressed to questions 
may indicate their cognitive level of development. 
10.7 CURRICULUM IMPLICATIONS 
Having identified and described the structure and development of design and 
technological thinking in secondary schools, the implications of some, though not 
many of the fmdings from this investigation for Design and Technology Education can 
be discussed in terms of: 
1. the development of the design and technology curriculum: (what should be 
the basis for design and technology curriculum developmentl); 
2. the teaching of design and technology to pupils. 
With respect to the development of the design and technology curriculum, given the 
results from this investigation, and the instances of what a design and technology 
curriculum does, it may be that design and technology curriculum planners will have 
to build on "functional" rather than "structural" responses. In other words, 
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"function" will be one of the factors which ought to guide developers of the 
technology curriculum. 
Whereas it is one thing for the curriculum to emphasise "function", it is another thing 
for the teachers actually to teach in a manner that expands this functional 
characteristics, in view of their "structural" disposition. 
Since it is apparent that not many teachers of technology subjects know how to 
describe the skills involved in technological work, this investigation has attempted to 
identify and describe some of these technological skills. Their development and 
importance in schools' technology work (class room) have also been shown. If 
teachers want to develop pupils as technologists, then they ought to be developing the 
skills identified here. 
However, as a result of the teachers being aware of these rather important skills, 
(which are more or less their pupils' preferred "style" of operating), the assessment of 
their pupils' progress can be observed and/or monitored. Moreover, they will be 
encouraged to make their pupils look equal during their teaching sessions. It is also 
important to remember that an important component of the pupils' understanding of 
design and technology, is an awareness of the schemata present in Design and 
Technology and the schemata present in the pupils when selecting design and 
technology. This knowledge and creating a match with it may be a crucial component 
to structuring a learning situation where the pupils will comprehend the design and 
technology. Through the construction of appropriately selected tasks which are then 
matched to the cognitive level of the students, and to design and technology, some sort 
of mediation/intervention can take place. This intervention can lead to comprehension 
beyond the Uni-structurallevel. 
The SOLO Taxonomy and the Design and Technology Taxonomy developed for this 
study can be applied to analyse pupils' responses and the cognitive levels that are 
present in design and technology. These techniques provide a rational and systematic 
process for attempting to mediate the interaction between the demands of the Design 
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and Technology and the pupils own cognitive level. Therefore, in selecting Design 
and Technology activity, it is necessary to: 
1) analyse the cognitive level of the pupils 
2) analyse the cognitive level present in the Design and Technology 
activity activity/test 
3) develop questions which enable pupils to respond at levels 
appropriate to the cognitive levels in the task 
4) assess the responses to the pupils 
5) mediate or match those so that comprehension occurs. 
The essence of response develops a new position in the teaching of design and 
technology as a result of this investigation. No longer is there a single correct 
response to a question. All responses become valuable data and are appropriate 
because they reflect the students' cognitive level of development. Response thus is 
perceived as more than a mere reproduction. It becomes a vehicle for informal 
assessment of students' cognitive level and a guide for selecting appropriate design 
and technology tasks for that student. 
In addition, there is the recognition that students' responses will be comprised of a 
wide range of answers from restatements to generalisations to hypotheses related to 
the task. The range of responses will be dependent upon the schemata contained in 
the task and the level of questions/tasks proposed by the teacher. 
Finally, when design and technology is discussed in a setting where questions are 
designed to match all cognitive levels of the students present, and all responses are 
valued, a positive atmosphere may be created. This atmosphere may foster further 
development of the students since they may be more involved in the activity under 
discussion. All students are able to participate in this setting since questions have 
been structured to meet their levels and all responses are valued. 
10.8 KEY MESSAGES FOR DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY TEACHERS 
• The conception of design and technology as a subject for the intellectually less 
able is misplaced. Design and technology is more than just practical skills. 
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Indeed, it is known to makes a considerable intellectual demands on children's 
ability. It is practical intelligence operating within the context of abstraction 
(science), expression(arts), and belief. Empirically speaking, technological 
thinking involves factors such as general intelligence, spatial/perceptual (visual) 
ability, function/structure (style), logical and systematic thinking. 
• It is possible to assess pupil's design and technological thinking/functioning levels 
providing the process areas to be taught have been identified. The taxonomy 
developed for this investigation outlines a range of skills that enables the teacher to 
map out the level of functioning of their pupils. It is possible to see when their pupils 
are making progress with the help of the design and technology taxonomy. 
• To design a good design and technology curriculum, a deeper understanding of the 
ways pupils think is required. The design and technology taxonomy developed for 
this investigation is intended to foster this understanding by providing a range of skills 
level in which teachers expect their pupils to fall with respect to the particular design 
and technology curriculum objective. 
• Developmental analyses show that, during the early years pupils tend to repeat 
action (operation) illogically ie., without being able to explain their action (operation). 
However, as they progress through the years their action (operation) become 
increasingly systematic (logical). In otherwords, children's thinking in design and 
technology tend to proceed from an immediate concrete operational responses 
(functional) towards 'structural' which is a more comprehensive way of understanding 
function. Where ever possible teach the functional aspects of design and technology 
first, then progress towards the 'structural' (Le. it would be beneficial to begin the 
teaching design and technology subjects with some activity (action) and then progress 
to more sophisticated levels.) 
10.9 WAY FORWARD 
In the drive towards a paradigm for teaching technology subjects, an even better 
understanding of the process skills involved in technology may result if: 
a) some of the important tests identified here can be validated and 
administered to a very large sample of pupils in the different year 
groups; 
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b) it can be arranged for teachers in different schools teaching the same 
syllabus topics to the same year group to make notes/lists of the aspects 
of the topics which they value most over a period of six to ten years. 
Such a list will be categorised to bring out levels of attainment and 
provide a means for effective assessment for the pupils. 
With some success, along this path, the effects of variables such as personality, sex 
differences, etc., may become known. 
10.9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Several areas for further investigation emerge from this study. The following 
recommendations for investigation are suggested: 
1. Further investigation should be conducted by using a variety of ethnic 
groups of students. 
2. It would be valuable to replicate this study using a kindergarten-through-
year- twelve student population. This would provide a comprehensive 
spectrum of descriptive responses for all cognitive levels of development. 
3. This study could be replicated by using a case study approach. 
4. Further investigation should be conducted in the development of taxonomies 
for other curriculum areas Information Technology and Home Economics. 
5. It would be valuable to replicate this study with students identified as gifted. 
6. It would be valuable to replicate this study with students identified as having 
IQs lower than 90. 
Though these areas are important and bear the hallmarks of replication studies with 
different groups, their immediate usefulness to the design and technology teachers 
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could still be remote. An immediately valuable study would be an exploratory 
research of in-service training using the analysis in this study to get a better 
understanding of design and technology teaching. Granted that some teachers of 
design and technology are not fully aware of the concepts in design and technology, 
some form of in-service training experience to enable them refine their conception or 
understanding of design and technology would be most valuable. 
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Appendix-l Design Task D1.2 
IN THE PICTURES SHOWN. YOU ARE TO INDICATE \'1HETHER THE DESIolJ.5 
I TO 16 ARE GOOD OR ~AD. AND THEN WRITE YOUR REASONS FOR 
YOUR CHOICE IN THE LARGE BOX ON ANSWER SHEET D-I.Z GIVEN . 
..-:7~' -f _ ., -,~;. u...--L Q/, ., ...• '4 , . • : • I ~., ~c-.J _I li-, " ...... " -..l __ c.-.... ~ ... -/e.,/ ·' ~-" ._. - 11- ~ I ' .t.-t- <c. . • ,.). :. t.. ~r- -:-""'-~ I. . ..Lc.4 ~ .';I~W' Z44 ~' •• ~"J. t. _~.I.: .-r," ..... f>o<.o, .J". ( _ •.• 
, A collee table 
3 The inside 01 a pencil sharpener 
7 A Citroell CX 
2 A lie rack 
4 A casselte rack with cassettes 
IDoonnnm~~onol 
looooooon nOODoi 
. 6 A key tab with a Jeey attached 
- ---
8 Controls on a cooker 
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five. LL./ 
: ~ '- . ..... . 
If-'-I . , " "'rl' " ~ 
I .. I .'" 
7 ,:,," ,,,1- t " .~ .. , . ..:-L· . 
r: " .'. : . c· " • . 
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9 A screwdriver 
" A bridge over a small stream 
ri.J-'f' . 
• 
'3 A small bookcase 
'5 A wheelbarrow 
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, 0 An ice-cream jar 
}t 
8, 
. ~ ._----
'2 A fireside chair -
14 A modern hacksaw 
'6 A teapot 
' . --. 
t a. ,~· 
--
·_--_ ... --
--- ANSWERSHEE'l' 01.2 
Teachers Re:5ponce:5 to D1. 2 
Thi.s Formed the Ba3i3 for A:lsessing The Pupil I S On this Particular 
Task 
INDICATE h~THER THE DESIGNS ON THE FOLLOWING SHEETS ARE GOOD OR 
BAD. l\'RITE YOUR REASONS FOR YOUR CHOICE IN !Ii:: LARGE EOL ~ ... 
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Appendix--2 'Task D1.3 Aerial Photography and 
Pupils' Responses. 
f-.\.nswersneet D'1-3 
t. TASK D ~ ~=] 
Name.----------------------- Age.-----years, --------months 
Cl ass.---------------------- Sex. ----- male 
----- female 
Your school's Geography Department requires an aerial photograph of your school for 
their map reading course. 
Design a device that will carry the camera shown - . 
25 metres above your school to take a photograph. 
- below to a height of at least 
Make a brief note on its construction: then write down your thoughts 
on the design procedure as they oc 
o 
o 
~ 
WEIGHT 500 g . 
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Appendix,,3 . Manipulation Task MSR 1.1 Thinking 
about Shapes 
n:c:ron 2 
IlrlA'7"U/ 
~,,~ 
G·Y~3·Lc 
1= ~a~3 ,ec~ion, ell t:e 1te~~ Cave : ~:a~e3. 
The ~~~,~ sea;e 1: eac: row is & '~~a~e ~l~~ a piece ~s~~. 
Fro: ~:e ot~er 4 !:a~es Ln ~~e ~o~, ~. ;. C. C~ ~. 
e:coee ~~e c:e whlch will ~1l ~~o ~:e !i~,. ~o :c=: a aq~~=e. 
Circle ~~e le~~er by ~~e a~ape ~ou ~ave e~oee~. 
!'or e:lUII,le: 
!~ ~~!s e=a~ole : 1s t~e ' e:rTe:~ a~awe~. 
I~ ti~s ~o;et~~~ ~i': t~e tirst $~?e ~ i~e =ow to :ake a 
try ~~e :e:t e:aspl: y~ur3el!. 
!o1.lr tu.c:::r "'ill tell ,OU 1t rour ~3\Je!' is r:';D~. 
< 
Do~' t ":ur: OTer Ul:l':il ::ol.:r teac:::e= teEs yo\: to :'0 so .. 
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1 I 
!: ~~, s.e~1o:, .ae~ ,~.a~!c: :aa & ;!c~~:e c! ~ :c~e! :ade 
~~~~ ~~!:i~o blcc~a. 
:~~ !a :o::o~.~ by 4 d:a~!:ea. 
c:. o! ~~ •• e d=a~!:03 aQC~1 ~~e E~~e c~ ~~8 :~~el loc~~ dov: 
c: !~ ::0: above. 
t:a~ a c~rele :c~~ t~e le~~er =r ~:e ~:a~!:; wh!:: !, cor=eC~. 
~~~~ !.~ a::. e:a::jJle 
f~ CD [JdJ 01 
Q 5 c. !"\=~~ oj; ~1.Au<S 
I:e ~:~el !3 :a~e 0: ~~o lc~; block~ lYL:; ~ide :~ Sl~e. 
Wilen ft i~ looked a"t !:r:c aboT " L ~ look:! l~e :':a·.~L!:.; ;. -
,= le"t~e: 4 ca, bee~ :~::le~. 
~~1 toe :e~ .:~~le yc~:r3el!. 
You: teae:!r ~ill tell you it 7e~r ,c,~er is rie:~. 
JuS~ r-ut a e1r:le r:~c~ t:e le~er ~r t:e i:3~~ whic~ !ao~, 
~~A~ t~~ =oiel wo~L:' lock l~e !=:: above. 
--7' 
i : \ I \ 
.LD) _______ I . 
. 
r. 
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FLDd tae cu~-o~~ a~pe wb~c~ woul~ =eLe ~~e :o:e! ~ i~ v~a 
!olded cc tbe ~otte~ linea. 
~~ ! circle round tbe letter beSide it. 
Do tbe qu esti cnl' on tbe :len tllree pL~tII ,::en SlO] . 
.).~ 
. 1' FP GJ 
.).6 
W 
19 
.J.. 
. ill 
1"-. /1 
! " \ I 
,I .. ·Y·· .. I 
. I •. ~
. 
~ 
! 
r-, 
V 
B 
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APPElIDIX 
SI:C'.!'IOF 4 LFS ~3 -I, 
I: ~~~ sec~10n ea=~ question bas a ~le~re a! a =odel :ade cy 
!o!d~ a s~i!! card cu~-ou~-abape" 
:Seaichs ~~e plc~.:re ct the model sre 4 d.ralo't.a.gs ct c::<: o:;~ :ba:?es. 
C~oo!le t~e sba.pe Io'ltic!: .... ben :011iec1 ..,01:1ci :lA}::e t:e ' Q1oc!el sbo"'z; L=. 
-:be !=~c-;u=e. 
C1r:!e the let~er u:der tb~ cut-out enape you ceoose. 
v 
Cu~-ou-; ::e.jlea 
n D V !::ote:l :zce ~:-== 
s-.. ~-' c a -': cD C ] ---- -
=\O~-c"J-: a;;a:?c A., _'ilen :C cld'cd so "::.£': ':::e ~~c. i .o!Q'" e ~ ~o" a.,...· to;: e "t~ er • Io'OU~l term t:e ce:e-a:~pei ~od!! i: ~:e tir:t-~~;~;~:·!~-~ :~=:le 
bas C6~ ~~t rO"lni t~e letter l 
Yow 1rr tb~ Qext e:ample Joursel!. 
Your tee.~cer ~Lll ~eLl :o~ it rcur ans .... e~ is r1~c~. 
! : , ! I ~ ... -.. -~ 
I I j" " "--1' 
'---".'-j 
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(\v; 
D ,· ~/:" " ' / 
I I I 
, .. ' ., ,-
9' I : X :: . ~ ........ -.. ,. ",-'" ... ... :'~'; :(.:, C 
c;Jt YOU FI!lt TEE 8CX::S 7 
The boxes A, a, C, D, E, P and G are soce~be~e in ~bis la=oe pic~u~e. 
Whe~ yeu !1:d ~ne= put the let~er ~y ~h8 box ~~ ~:e square 00 the 
big p1c-:ure. 
We've dene :~e !irs~ one tor you. 
A 
EJ 
"" D 
r7l , 
E p 
I f , 
t 
· 1 I , I ~ i i 
: i J r i I ! !. 
.' , / 1. I Ii J . ;. ~ ',: 
LI ~ ) • 
I I 
~ ,. 
~. . 
I I 
I 
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Appendix-4 I Science Thinking Test (piaget's 
Pendulum Task) 
SCIENCE REASONING TASKS 
NAME .•.••.••••..•..•. ...••• .••.••.•.•••.••.••.•• ____ ........................... . TODAY'S DATE .... .......... ....... .. ....... ...... ..... ...... ...... .. . 
BOY OR GIRL ........................... ....... _ .•••••••••.••.•..•• _ •••.•... CLASS ..••••..... ...•.. .... .....••.•.... .•...•................ ....... ........ 
SC.IOOL .............. ................... ... ........................ .... ........... . DATE or: GlnTlI .................. ....... ............................. . 
dav 
TilE f'ENOULUM 
Wo ~rc going 10 m.ko I pendulum . using"" SIIORT or LONG I,,"'g, 
Ind I LIGIIT or HEAVY wel~hl . 
and_ will "'." I GEN I LE or liARD pUlh , 
SHOI' ''''''9 
I 
lICHt ... u~ht 
i-, 
.\. 
C(Nru pw\h 
.. (fte. f ... , ... ~) 
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LONG . I"~ 
I 
• 
HI • ..,Y .... ',.... 
/ >' ... 
I r; 
H ..... O '101." 
O • 
( •• d_ •• ,",) 
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APPENDIX 
A. I SHORT mlng, HEAVY w .. gllI , GENTLE push. 
You, 
guon: _____ swinCJl . Experimlnl I 
A.2 LONG suing, LIGIIT weighl. GENTLE pull •. 
'fou, 
gu,u: _____ swin9S. Experimlnt 2 
""glh 
A.) Whu effect do you Ihlnk LENGTH, WEIGHT, and PUSII hive on Ihe 
number olswin9S in hall I minutel 
LENGTH: 
WEIGHT : 
PUSH : 
A,4a Now whll can we tell, 1/ anVlhing,lul1 from thlll exp"imlnll, about th.IIIICI 
01 LENGTH, WEIGHT and PUSH on Ihl nu,nbl, olswinCJl/ 
LENGTH: 
A,4b WEIGHT: 
PUSH : 
weigh I plllh 
A.4C Write down ani more Ixp"imlnl Ihal vau Ihink would be worth trving nUl , Ind upl.in why vou h ... 
chostn il. Also upl.in how this nl ... uperilnt titS in with "'periment I or 2 : 
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number 0' 
Ilnglh wlighl pu.h swings in 
Va -minule 
B. I Experoone"l I SflOItT IlrAvy ctrnnf 
B.2 e">CIri"'."12 ---- LcNCt U611T C;ENrLl~ 
B.3 LONG suing, IIEAVY weigh I, liARD push. 
your 
gueSl : ____ .wings. Experimenl J ----
B.4 SHORT ,lting. LIGHT weighl. GENTLE push . 
you, 
gueSl : ____ .wings. experomlnl 4 ----_ 
B.5 Now wrill down whal Ih .. 1 fou, oxporimonll .Ion. loll us .boul Ih. oll.CI of LENGTII. WEIGl tT ... <1 PUSH 
on Ihl numbe, of ,wings, 
'''<.1. for each I.CIO', nOlO <.lawn ollly Iho •• o.pe,i",enl. Ih.1 you nlad 10 00": 
I . LeNGTII : 
C. WEIGHT: 
.. PUSH : 
II. I. Ih •• vi<.lenci w .. k .. lor <.Ieci<.linll alJoul one of Ihl laclors Illan il is lur Iho 0111 ... 1 ___________ _ 
If 10, say which laclo' : __________ _ 
and 
EITHER .how lhal thl Ividenci 
i. 11111 .ufficilnl , 
. --
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OR exptain why il i. in.u/licilnl. 
1J·lexp orimenlS 
<.I ·loxperomlnu 
1.1 .. pe rionen I, 
APPENDIX 
1.119"' weigh , p"sh 
A.S Imaqinl that WI u .. rt ~gain with 5/fOfO'" Het\:"y ~£N'TU= 
.xpe,imenl I 
Which oth., arrangements wouJd 
you USi 10 IIU Ihe effecl Ih~1 
LENGTH h .. on the numbe, 01 swil19'1 
(Bul plOISI Ull as law I(r~n!)Cmcnll as 
possilJle ; PilI a sur (') nexllo any 
arrangc,nunts lhat yuu don't renlly 
naeu.) 
A.6 Again starting wilh expe,imenl I Stfoltl" f1EiWy qf1oln£ 
how would you teU 'or the elfect 
Ihll WEIGHT hlsl 
. 
(Bul . again . us. as lew Irrangements 
as possible ; pUI • Sl~' 'A) naxl IU ~ny 
arriuuJcunol1ll that you don't ,oully 
"a ..... ) 
. . 
A.7 Imag;"e someone Iried Ihlll lWO ~rrang.mlnu iPruJ· ~ 1uJJKL I~ (wilh .nolh" pendulum) 
.oItrnt ~ ~ ~O 
I . What 00 Ih.y tell us .boUI the .lIecl 01 
Ih. PUSIH 
b. II Ihe,e a,. any olh., Irrangemenu Ihll 
you think you woulo , •• lIy n ..... 10 lie 
IU,. 01 th. ,"eCI 01 Ih. push. w,ite 
Ihton down 
(and cron·out any 01 Ihe originll IWO 
arrlngements Ihll you do,t't nttd). 
- -
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Introduction 
Science Reasoning Tasks 
rASKl1i 
THE PENDULUM 
Dietmar KUchemann 
Research Fellow, Chelsea College 
University of Lonoon 
APPENDIX: , 
This Task· is one of a series developed by the team 'Conceots in Secondary Maths & Science' at Chelsea 
College, University of Lonoon in the period 1973nS in oraer ta investigate t/'le relationship between 
the optimum Piagetian level at which a pupil can function ana the understanding of Science which he 
or she can achieve. 
This Task investigates the puails' ability to sort out the effectS of three variables; how the Length, Weight, 
and Push of a pendulum determine the period of oscillation. Of course only the length is important, but 
the student has to overcome strong intuitive feelings in oraer to realise this. The Task is based on chaoter 
4 of Inhelder and Piaget's "The Growth of Logical Thinking," Routledge, London, 1955. 
Allow about 45 minutes to complete the Task. 
Equipment 
Stopclocl< or watch with second·hand 
2 weights (say 100 and 400 gram slotted weights on hangers I 
2 strings looped at 'lither end. (Loop to loop distances of 69 em and 35 em will give about 17 and 22 
swings in half a minute. The numbers are not critical. but try to avoid lengths giving either 15 or 20 
swings.l 
Firm support to hang pendulum from . 
• For information on the use. development. statistics etc. ot t!'lis Task see the Gentlflll Guide. 
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Administration 
There are not many questions in this Task, so your skill as a teacher snould be used for creating a 
comparatively relaXed and slow-moving situation in which your pupiis get the maximum opportunity 
to reflect on the Questions which are asked. At any stage feel free to re·onrase any question in any way, 
so that the problem for the pupils is the one on the page, and not that or understanding wnat the 
question is about. Here we are trying to maximise the possibility of finOing tne same range of responses 
wnich one might obtain by individual interview. 
A.l Introouce the Task as a series of experiments tOJ find out wnat f:lI:tors determine how fast a 
~9~~D" ."~inqs. Talk through the first page showing them ene comoiriations. with your 
apparatus, which are given on the cover of their response-sneets. "Gentle" and "Hard" may 
seem loose to you as a trained scientist but they do not worrY ene pupils. Occasionally 
at the ena of the Task a few students complain that the pusn was not standardised, but there is 
no evidence to indicate that their performances were affected • . Vlake sure they understand thilt 
'how fast' means "How many swings in a given time" and not tne velocitY of the weights while 
swinging. Ask them to tum over, and write in the first comoination of variables in the columns 
in the box "opposite A. I, a.rui,.Ul..make~.il. Wild ciuess about the numo~!:.E.!.~ings. ?erform the 
experiment by starting the weight at the bottom. and swinging it very gently out (keep a slight 
tension on the string so that it doesn 't 'bounce'), TIme whole sWIOgS, "Zero", "One". "Two", 
etc .. and stop the pendulum after liz a minute. Round off the numoer of swings tP a whole 
number. Ask pupils to record the result. 
A.2 Ask them to write in the new combination of variables in the oox ooposite A.2. tell them that 
their guess is again a 'free' one, and is just there to help them think, and perform as in A.l. 
Again, ask the pupils to record the result. 
A.3 Ask for their ideas about how the three variables affect the numoer of swings. We want answers 
at the form: "It its longer then ....••.. " 
• The first three questions (A.l, A.2 and A.31 are not ~ but are designed to help focus 
the pupils' attention on the problem. 
A.4 It is hoped that by asking for their ideas in question A.3 some pupils will then distinguish 
between their ideas and the evidence in A.4. They will probably think that the two questions 
are the same, so point out that "here we are interested in what. if anything, this particular 
couple at experiments show". If they feel they hava already answered this question, then of 
course they can write "see above". The "if anything" is a hint to the intelligent child who 
might be worried that he must deduce something from avery experiment. Do not labour the 
point. 
AA Make sure thay realise that there are THREE parts to their answers. 1) a new combination of 
Length, Weight and Push, 2) a reason for choosing it. and 3) an explanation of how it ties in 
with the tim two. 
A.S This page tests their experimental economy. (a tYpical concrete operational strategy is to 'try 
& 6 everything') and their awareness that variables must be controlled. Explain in your own words 
that here we ant trying to find out how they would have investigated this on their own. "How 
would they plan the experiments?" Let them write their combinations. 3nd then draw their 
attention to the note in brackets. about being economical. 
A. 7 Say that for !l!!!pendulum the "LONG", "HEAVY" etc. weren 't quite the same as for the one 
you demonstrated, ask !!!,em to imagi!l!:-!bev ace looking criticalill at someone "Ise's ~ceriment 
,so they can' t compare tne valuesuwlth A.1 and A.2. In thiS Question we get the 3A resPOii'Se-
from the tist part of the question, so for the question "What do they tell us about th"e effect or 
the ?USHremphasise that it is just these two results they shOUld use, and ask them for a 
fairly explicit answer i.e. their deduction and also their reason for making it. This gives them the 
opportunity to give us a 38 response by pointing out that no proper deduction can be made. 
Read through the last part. Make sure they have all finished. ana only then ask them to turn over 
tP the last side. 
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Section 8. page four is the most crucial part at the Task. Two more combinations of varoaoh~s arPo 
demonstrated. and then a.s tests their ~bilitV to analyse the data reflectivelY. H~re IS where most 
of the evidence is gained as to whether a pupil is using late Formal Operational thinking. 
Note that the 4 combinations set up in Section B control the variables so as to allow for unambiguous 
deductions about the effect of LENGTH (Exp. 2 and Exp. 41. and WEIGHT IExp. 1 ana Exp. 41 , hut 
appear not to control the other variables in respect of PUSH. In fact. once the effect of WE IG HT has 
been deduced. then Exp. 2 and Exp. 3 can be used to deduce the (nonl effect of PUSH , ana the pupil 
is given a chance to show this. either in 13.5e or in a .5g. It IS difficult to spot that the evidence is stili 
sufficient for PUSH. so in B.5g a 3B assessment can be reacned by the alternative strategy of 
explaining that. for PUSH. the other variables were not controlled. 
It is important that the data IS as clear as possible. Ask them to write in the values from A,l Jna A.2, to 
fill in the details for 8.3. and to have a guess about the numoer of swings. Remind them that their guesses 
are not assessed. but are designed to help them in their thinking: if their guess is close to the experimental 
result then their thoughts are probably on the right track. but if not. then they know that they nave to 
think again. Demonstrate 8.3 and ENSU R E that the answer is the same as B.2. ask them to recoro. For 
the Hard push. swing the pendulum about 30· from the vertical. Repeat the above for B.4 and thiS time 
make sure the answer is the same as 8. ,. 
Explain in your own words that using just these four exoeriments we want them to deduce the eitecr. ana 
direction of each factor. e.g. " if you thinl< they show that welgnt has an eitect. then don 't just wflte 'i t 
has an effect' but say 'i f the weight is heavier then you get fewer/more swings in hal f a minute ' " , Exolain 
also that different combinations or the four experimentS may be necessary for their various conClUSionS. 
Ask them to write in the box labelled "dxperimenu" only those (from 9.' - 8.41 they really neeo in 
order to make their deductions. • 
8.5g In your own words point out that "maybe you fauna one of the factors rather more diffiCUlt to 
determine than the other two. If so. say which land if not. that's O.K.I. and then you 've a chOice 
of answers. EITHER show how you used the evidence to make your deduct ion , OR explaIn wnv 
you think the data is insufficient", 
Assessment 
Score each result as "'" for adequate, and "a .. for inadequate and record on the class assessment sheet. 
Treat each answer only for the information it gives at the leYel specified for the question (see Summary 
of Answers and top of Assessment Sheet). Thus if it is a "38" question as in 8.5g ignore ingenious 
replies at the 28 level. Similarly a higher leYei response to a "28" question still only gains credit at the 
28 level. 
Summary of Answers 
Although these notes on assessment cannot be exhaustive. try and follow them as closely as cossible : 
remember however, that we do not want you to be just a scoring'machine, but rather to maXImise 'l our 
undemanding of how your pupils think. 
A.', A.2 & A.3 
A.4a LENGTH 
A.4b WEIGHT & PUSH 
A.4c 
Do not assess. 
Score "'" either for "Can' t tell because you haven ' t controlleo (29) 
variables" (a 38 response) 2r "Longer string; less swings" (a 28 
response). Score "a .. for "Lengtl'1 has a large eHect" . Use A,3 
answer if in doubt. 
Score "'" only for a 38 resoonse: an argued refusal to deauce :381 
anything positive. For example " You can' t tell because you 've 
varied everything at once". 
Score only for a 3A leYel of resoonse. that is, a new experiment 13A) 
which explicitly combinea with A. 1, or A.2 would enable the 
e~ect of one ~amed variaole to be decidea. For example "Lon!!. 
Light, Hard Wit." A.2 tells yOU about PUSH". 
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A.5 
A.6 
A.7a Effect of Push 
A.7b ather arrangements 
B.3 & B.4 
B. Sa. b LENGTH 
S.Sc. d WEIGHT 
B.5e. f. g PUSH 
Score "0" to( a whale list of experiments. Score .. ~ .. if they have (3A) 
given you LONG. HEAVY. GENTLE. ana starrea the othen (if 
any!. Score ."" if they have given one more correct pair (like 
SHORT. LIGHT. GENTLE and laNG. liGHT. GENTLE!. but 
they must be correctly ordered. Ida not allow SHG. lHH. lHG. 
SHHI, or. i!!n such a pair with. the original experiment starred. 
As in A.S. score "0" for a whole list of experiments. Score .. ,.. (38) 
if they have given you SHORT, liGHT. GENTLE. andlor one 
other pair. 
Score "'" for "Nothing, because you 've varied length," etc. (38 I 
Score "0" if they have concluded anything positive about 
PUSH. 
Score "'" for laNG. HEAVY. GENTLE orSHORT. HEAVY. (3A) 
HARD. or both, or anOUler sensible pair. but ignore a long list. 
Do not assess their guesses. 
Score "'" in 2B column if they've given the effect of length 
right i.e. "The longer the string the slower the swing" and 
onlv then 
score "'" in 38 column for "8.2 + BA" ONLY. Do not give 
the 38 rating without the effect correct. 
Score "'" in 3A column for correct deauction that weight 
has no effect and onlv the~ 
score ."" in 38 column for "3., & B.4" ONLY. Do not 
give the 38 rating without the effect correct. 
Score both these questions for one 3A and one 38 response. 
There.a~ twO acc~table strategies: either a deduction that 
cRl,!~J:1_ hjlS nQj~: or a realisation that sillce the variables 
have not been controlled it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions. 
So. score "'" in 3A column for deduction that push has no 
effect. then score "'" in 38 column if they have chosen B. 1 
and B.4. followed by B.2 and B.3 for the experiments. They 
can also gain a 38 rating by arguing in 8.Se or g that since 
they 've eliminated weight as a variable. then by. comparing 
B.2 and B.3 they can see that push has no effect. 
Alternatively, score "'" in 3A column if they have said "You 
cannot tell about push", but only if this is supported by an 
answer to at least the 3A level in 8.Sg e.g. "You need two 
experiments like L.H,G and L.H,H". This r!f)ly is no higher 
than that necessary for the 3A Question A.7. To score "". 
in the 38 column they must argue that no deduction is 
possible since the variables have not been adeauately 
controlled 
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(38) 
(3A) 
(381 
(3A.38) 
Scoring Rules 
(Read from the top; go ~ this list until you find a combination which fits the pupil) 
THREE or more 3B items right 
FOUR or more 3A or 38 items right, with TWO eHects right 
[Remember that the effect of LENGTH {B.5al is a 2B item and 
cannot be counted in the FOUR higher itemc, but the eHects 
of WEIGHT (B.Sc) and PUSH (B.Se or g) .canJ 
FOUR or ~ore 3A or 3B items right, b~ without TWO effects. 
THREE 3A or 3B items right I 
TWO 3A or 38 items right plus 8.Sa LENGTH (28) 
ONE 3A pr 38 item right plus A.4a 
8.Sa LENGTH (28) right 
TWO or less right, without A.4a 
I' 
~/I 3B 
-; 3A 
2B/3A 
.... 
(', 
J ' 2B/3A .-
2B/3A 
2B 
-, i~ - 2B 
,"- , 
28-
APPENDIX 
, , I . 
: ' . 
Note that these rules only formalise a 213 success principle: If the pupils can give responses characterist ic 
of a stage in 2 out of every 3 possible occasions, then we assume that this, at least, is their capacity most 
of the time. 
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Appendix-5 _PuI?ils Responses to Fault Tracing Task 
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Number of valid observations (listwise) = 55.00 
Valid 
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness S.E. Skew Minimum Maximum N 
ACCON 1.64 1.58 .05 .32 .00 4.00 55 
ACOIV 2.20 1. 74 -.21 .32 .00 4.00 55 
ACT 3.84 3.17 -.10 .32 .00 8.00 55 
BOY .60 .49 -.42 .32 .00 1.00 55 
01.2 8.80 2.73 .13 .32 3.00 15.00 55 
01.3 .55 .50 -.19 .32 .00 1.00 55 
01.3LLC .45 .50 .19 .32 .00 1.00 55 
01.3MS .31 .47 .85 .32 .00 1.00 55 
01.3USF .64 .49 -.58 .32 .00 1.00 55 
i\ 
FT .40 .49 .42 .32 .00 1.00 55 "/7 
GIRL .40 .49 .42 .32 .00 1.00 55 
MSRI 1.82 1.38 .52 .32 .00 5.00 55 
.32 8.00 -MSR2 3.65 2.30 .35 .00 55 M 
MSR3 2.60 1.58 .06 .32 .00 6.00 55 
M 
MSR4 3.51 2.0S -.39 .32 .00 6.00 55 
r- MSRT 11.49 6.02 .07 .32 .00 24.00 55 ~ PSL 2.24 .64 -1.13 .32 .00 3.00 55 
• SCIREA 1. 73 .99 -.84 .32 .00 3.00 55 ~ TCON 2.13 2.02 .11 .32 .00 6.00 55 
~ TOCT 5.51 4.46 -.14 .32 .00 12.00 55 
~ TOIV 3.44 2.81 .07 .32 .00 8.00 55 TFT 1.13 1.26 .78 .32 .00 4.00 55 ~ 
~I 
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ACCON ACT 01.3 01 .3MS FT MSR2 MSR4 PSL TCON TOIV 
ACDIV 1 01 .3LLC D1 .3USF MSR1 MSR3 MSRT SCIREA TDCT TFT 
Year 7 Mean Responses 
, 
f") 
f") 
f") 
Number of valid observations (listwise) = 59.00 
Valid 
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness S.E. Skew Minimum Maximum N 
ACCON .29 .87 2.78 .31 .00 3.00 59 
ACDIV .42 1.10 2.36 .31 .00 4.00 59 
ACT .71 1. 92 2.56 .31 .00 7.00 59 
BOY .41 .50 .39 .31 .00 1.00 59 
01.2 9.56 2.91 -.10 .31 4.00 14.00 59 
01.3 .10 .30 2.70 .31 .00 1.00 59 
D1.3LLC .88 .33 -2.42 .31 .00 LOO 59 
D1.3MS .00 .00 .00 .00 59 
01.3USF 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 59 11 FT .34 .48 .70 .31 .00 1.00 59 
t"- GIRL .59 .50 -.39 .31 .00 1.00 59 
I MSR1 2.68 1.67 .00 .31 .00 6.00 59 ~ 
.;l MSR2 3.29 2.46 .09 .31 .00 8.00 59 
~ MSR3 2.51 1.92 .10 .31 .00 6.00 59 
~ MSR4 3.90 2.40 -.79 .31 .00 6.00 59 ~ ~ 00 MSRT 12.36 6.64 -.26 .31 .00 23.00 59 ~ 
~ PSL 2.00 .00 2.00 2.00 59 
~ SCIREA 1.61 1.00 -.74 .31 .00 3.00 59 
Z TCON .31 .91 2.70 
.31 .00 3.00 59 
0 TDCT .98 2.58 2.39 .31 .00 9.00 59 
~ TDIV .68 1. 74 2.24 .31 .00 6.00 59 TFT .61 1.16 3.02 .31 .00 6.00 59 
~ 
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mSTOGRAM MEAN RESPONSES - YEAR 8 
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ACCON ACT 01 .3 01 .3MS FT MSR2 MSR4 PSL TCON TOIV 
ACOIV 1 01 .3LLC 01 .3USF MSR1 MSR3 MSRT SCIREA TDCT TFT 
Year 8 Mean Responses 
\0 
M 
M 
Number of valid observations (listwise) = 48.00 
Valid 
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness S.E. Skew Minimum Maximum N 
ACCON 2.60 1.54 -.86 .34 .00 4.00 48 
ACDIV 2.60 1.50 -.90 .34 .00 4.00 48 
ACT 5.21 2.90 -.95 .34 .00 8.00 48 
BOY .58 .50 -.35 .34 .00 1.00 48 
D1.2 9.50 2.34 -.19 .34 5.00 13.00 48 
D1.3 .38 .49 .53 .34 .00 1.00 48 
C7\ Dl.3LLC .60 .49 -.44 .34 .00 1.00 48 
~ Dl.3MS .00 .00 .00 .00 48 Dl.3USF 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 48 FT .13 .33 2.34 .34 .00 1.00 48 
Q I 
.42 .34 1.00 48 ~ {Il GIRL .50 .35 .00 
'l9 ~ filii MSR1 3.23 2.20 .25 .34 .00 7.00 48 {Il 
..::I Z MSR2 5.29 2.96 -.51 .34 .00 8.00 48 
= 
0 MSR3 3.58 1.93 -.41 .34 .00 7.00 48 
< ~ MSR4 4.85 2.06 -1. 78 .34 .00 6.00 48 E-c 
= 
MSRT 16.79 7.14 -.61 .34 1.00 28.00 48 
I' 
~ 
~ PSL 2.00 .00 2.00 2.00 48 
~ 
~ SCIREA 2.19 .53 -.71 .34 .00 3.00 48 TeON 3.02 1.71 -.78 .34 .00 5.00 48 
TDCT 7.35 3.97 -.85 .34 .00 13.00 48 
TDIV 4.33 2.45 -.58 .34 .00 8.00 48 
TFT .31 .99 3.68 .34 .00 5.00 48 
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ACCON ACT D1 .3 D1 .3MS FT MSR2 MSR4 PSL TCON TDIV 
ACDIV 1 01.3LLC D1.3USF MSR1 MSR3 MSRT SCIREA TOCT TFT 
Year 9 Mean Responses 
.. 
'" r""I r""I 
Number of valid observations (listwise) = 35.00 
Valid 
Variable Mean Std Oev Skewness S.E. Skew Minimum Maximum N 
ACCON 2.60 1. 42 -.94 .40 .00 4.00 35 
ACOIV 3.03 1.48 -1.42 .40 .00 4.00 35 
ACT 5.63 2.77 -1.37 .40 .00 8.00 35 
BOY .31 .47 .84 .40 .00 1.00 35 
01.2 10.57 2.97 .40 .40 5.00 16.00 35 
01.3 .40 .50 .43 .40 .00 1.00 35 
01.3LLC .57 .50 -.30 .40 .00 1.00 35 
<= 01.3MS .11 .32 2.53 .40 .00 1.00 35 
... 01. 3USF .89 .32 -2.53 .40 .00 1.00 35 
~ FT .60 .50 -.43 .40 .00 1.00 35 '/ ,oJ 
~ GIRL .69 .47 -.84 .40 .00 1.00 35 
, MSR1 3.40 1.50 -.24 .40 1.00 6.00 35 
Z MSR2 4.46 2.60 -.01 .40 1.00 8.00 35 
0 MSR3 4.26 1.85 .22 .40 1.00 7.00 35 (:: 
~ MSR4 5.20 1. 41 -2.45 .40 .00 6.00 35 ~ MSRT 17.66 5.B1 -.25 .40 4.00 27.00 35 ...-4 
~ filii PSL 2.11 .32 2.53 .40 2.00 3.00 35 c::I ~ ~ SCIREA 1.86 1.03 -.89 .40 .00 3.00 35 = TCON 2.74 1.54 -.36 .40 .00 6.00 35 ~ ~ TOCT 7.80 4.75 .25 .40 .00 18.00 35 <:) TOIV 5.03 3.62 1.09 .40 .00 15.00 35 'V M TFT 2.00 2.28 1.18 .40 .00 8.00 35 
til 
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mSTOGRAM MEAN RESPONSES - YEAR 10 
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TABLE 15 
MEAN RESPONSES YEAR 10 - LINE GRAPH 
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Appendix-'.7 '. Teachers Rating of the Tests (Validity) 
Nine design and technology teachers were each given a sample of the test to rate on a 
1-5 scale (l=Low, 5=High) according to whether they represented the main core of the 
design and technology work in school . The investigator explained before giving them 
out. 
.. L..c .................................. , ... : ............ _ •......••.... ..• _ .• l ••• C ••••••••••• _ .••••••••••••••••••• I...: ............................... ..l 
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Appendix-8 Average Test Reliability 
24 Aug 97 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0 
R ELI A B I LIT Y A N A L Y SIS 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
ACCON 
ACDIV 
ACT 
01.2 
01.3 
01.3LLC 
01 . .lMS 
01.lJ,JSF 
FT 
MSR1 
MSR2 
MSR3 
MSR4 
MSRT 
SCIREA 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases 197.0 
Alpha - .7861 
1 
seA L E 
N of Items - 15 
Page 4 
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Appendix-9 II Chi-Square Test Results 
Chi Square Test 
- - - Chi-Square Test 
ACCON i.F,>-
Cases 
category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 94 39.40 54.60 
1.00 6 39.40 -33.40 
2.00 6 39.40 -33.40 
3.00 59 39.40 19.60 
4.00 32 39.40 -7.40 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. significance 
143.4315 4 .0000 
Chi-Square Test 
ACT LF( 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 83 21.89 61.11 
1.00 2 21.89 -19.89 
2.00 7 21.89 -14.89 
3.00 4 21.89 -17.89 
4.00 7 21.89 -14.89 
5.00 7 21.89 -14.89 
6.00 23 21.89 1.11 
7.00 41 21.89 19.11 
8.00 23 21.89 1.11 
Total 191 
Chi-Square D.r. Significance 
250.4873 8 .0000 
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Chi Square Test 
- - - chi-square Test 
Acorv 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 84 39.40 44.60 
1.00 5 39.40 -34.40 
2.00 12 39.40 -27.40 
3.00 36 39.40 -3.40 
4.00 60 39.40 20.60 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance 
110.6396 4 .0000 
Chi-Square Test 
01.2 1 Lc/€F 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
_3 .. 00 1 14.07 -13.07 
4.00 2 14.07 -12.07 
5.00 13 14.07 -1.07 
6.00 15 14.07 .93 
7.00 19 14.07 4.93 
J3.00 26 14.07 11.93 
9.00 25 14.07 10.93 
10.00 22 14.07 7.93 
11.00 21 14.07 6.93 
12.00 21 14.07 6.93 
13.00 19 14.07 4.93 
14.00 7 14.07 -7.07 
15.00 2 14.07 -12.07 
16.00 4 14.07 -10.07 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance 
77.1015 13 .0000 
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Chi-Square Test 
01.3 'EF/Lf.;' tJ/f) 
Cases 
category Observed 
.00 129 
1. 00 68 
Total 197 
Chi-square 
18.8883 
- - - - Chi-Square Test 
D1.3LLC LC ' G) 
Cases 
Category Observed 
.00 71 
1.00 126 
Total 197 
Chi-Square 
15.3553 
- - - Chi-Square Test 
D1.3MS E f (tt) 
Cases 
Expected 
98.50 
98.50 
D.F. 
1 
Expected 
98.50 
98.50 
D.F. 
1 
Chi Square Test 
Residual 
30.50 
-30.50 
Residual 
-27.50 
27.50 
.... ,- I 
I , (, . 
\,"' 
., c 
- ' 
?- $ =' ~ -~ 
Significance 
.0000 
.-
Significance 
.0001 
" 
,. 
. . ... . 
/ -, ~ yo : y : 1, 
" 
I ....... 
r ~ 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 
1. 00 
176 
21 
Total 197 
Chi-Square 
121.9543 
98.50 
98.50 
O.F. 
1 
77.50 
-77.50 
::t.- ~/ 
:.. .. '" 
/ " " /, v / - .- , l ( 
Significance 
.0000 
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Chi Square Test 
- -
- Chi-Square Test ; , 
• €.~ ,; , :,.., -- • #!..-o ( ' • 
D1. 3USF / tic 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
- , ~I ~~ !.. 
';/ ~ . ~ 
.00 24 98.50 -74.50 , ~ / ') 
1. 00 173 98.50 74.50 ::, . ~. , .- -
Total 197 
Chi-square D.F. Significance 
112.6954 1 .0000 
- Chi-Square Test 
FT LC/LF' 
/ - . 
,r 
Cases 
, 
category Observed Expected Residual 
.00.1 128 98.50 29.50 
1.00 69 98.50 -29.50 6-r::' :1 \ 
Total 197 
~ - '--
...:J 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance /' 
17 . 6701 1 .0000 
- - - - Chi-Square Test 
MSR1 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 22 24.63 -2.63 
1. 00 35 24.63 10.38 
2.00 46 24.63 21. 38 
3.00 25 24.63 .38 
4.00 32 24.63 7.38 
5.00 24 24.63 -.63 
6.00 9 24.63 -15.63 
7.00 4 24.63 -20.63 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance 
52.6244 7 .0000 
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Chi Sguare Test 
Chi-square Test 
MSR2 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 23 21.89 1.11 
1. 00 16 21.89 -5.89 
2.00 25 21.89 3.11 
3.00 23 21.89 1.11 
4.00 29 21. 89 7.11 
5.00 17 21. 89 -4.89 
6.00 14 21. 89 -7.89 
7.00 15 21. 89 -6.89 
8.00 35 21. 89 13.11 
Total 197 
Chi-square D.F. Significance 
18.4061 8 .0184 
Chi-Square Test 
MSR3 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 25 24.63 .38 
1.00 16 24.63 -8.63 
2.00 41 24.63 16.38 
3.00 27 24.63 2.38 
4.00 36 24.63 11.38 
5.00 31 24.63 6.38 
6.00 13 24.63 -11. 63 
7.00 8 24.63 -16.63 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance 
37.7614 7 .0000 
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Chi-Square Test 
MSR4 
Cases 
Category Observed 
.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
5.00 
6.00 
Total 
Chi-Square 
173.7157 
30 
2 
8 
16 
21 
32 
S8 
197 
Expected 
28.14 
28.14 
28.14 
28.14 
28.14 
28.14 
28.14 
D.F. 
6 
Chi Square Test 
Residual 
1. 86 
-26.14 
-20.14 
-12.14 
-7.14 
3.86 
59.86 
Significance 
.0000 
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Chi Square Test 
Chi-Square Test 
MSRT 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
.00 5 7.04 -2.04 
1. 00 6 7.04 -1.04 
3.00 7 7.04 -.04 
4.00 4 7.04 -3.04 
5.00 4 7.04 -3.04 
6.00 3 7.04 -4.04 
7.00 3 7.04 -4.04 
8.00 8 7.04 .96 
9.00 11 7.04 3.96 
10.00 9 7.04 1.96 
11. 00 14 7.04 6.96 
12.00 10 7.04 2.96 
13.00 8 7.04 .96 
14 .00 13 7.04 5.96 
15.00 5 7.04 -2.04 
16.00 9 7.04 1.96 
17.00 5 7.04 -2.04 
18.00 11 7.04 3.96 
19.00 12 7.04 4.96 
20.00 8 7.04 .96 
21.00 1 7.04 -6.04 
22.00 16 7.04 8.96 
23.00 9 7.04 1. 96 
24.00 10 7.04 2.96 
25.00 1 7.04 -6.04 
26.00 1 7.04 -6.04 
27.00 3 7.04 -4.04 
28.00 1 7.04 -6.04 
Total 197 
Chi-Square D.F. Significance 
68.0761 27 .0000 
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Chi Square Test 
- - - - Chi-Square Test 
PSL 
Cases 
Category Observed Expected Residual 
. 00 
2.00 
3.00 
2 
174 
21 
Total 197 
Chi-Square 
270 . 8325 
65.67 
65.67 
65.67 
D. F. 
2 
- - - - Chi-square Test 
-e If'/ Lr SCIREA 
Cases 
Category Observed 
.00 35 
2.00 126 
3.00 36 
Total 197 
Chi-square 
83.1574 
Expected 
65.67 
65.67 
65.67 
D. F. 
2 
-63.67 - " ," I 
108.33 -'-- "" 
-44.67 -) ' . 
10 . 
Residual 
-30.67 
Significance 
.0000 
60.33 - { .' C _ 
-29.67 
- . 
/ ': ., 
. \ .. ~ 
Significance 
.0000 
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..... 
- - - Chi-Square Test 
ACCON (L f) 
Cases 
Category Observed 
.00 94 
1.00 6 
2.00 6 
3.00 59 
4.00 32 
Total 197 
Chi-Square 
143.4315 
Expected 
39.40 
39.40 
39.40 
39.40 
39.40 
C.F. 
4 
Chi Square Test 
Residual 
54.60 
-33.40 
-33.40 
19.60 
-7.40 
Significance 
.0000 
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Appendix-"10 One-way Analysis of Variance 
(a) Factor-l General Intelligence/Ability 
_ _ - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable ToeT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
source O.F. squares Squares 
Ratio Probe 
Between Groups 1 4.0232 4.0232 
.2163 .6431 
Within Groups 81 1506.5792 
18.5997 
Total 82 1510.6024 
ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable TOIV 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio Probe 
Between Groups 1 9.7836 9.7836 1.0891 .2998 
Within Groups 81 727.6381 8.9832 
Total 82 737.4217 
355 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable ACCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob, 
Between Groups 1 .0004 .0004 .0002 .990( 
Within Groups 81 179.8792 2.2207 
Total 82 179.8795 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable ACDrv 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob 
Between Groups 1 3'.6458 3.6458 1.6365 . 204~ 
Within Groups 81 180.4506 2.2278 
Total 82 184.0964 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable ACT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob, 
Between Groups 1 3.5746 3.5746 .4427 .501' 
Within Groups 81 654.0881 8.0752 
Total 82 657.6627 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable TCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Frob. 
Between Groups 1 1. 5640 1. 5640 .5820 .4477 
Within Groups 81 217.6649 2.6872 
Total 82 219.2289 
356 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
:>le ACT 
:>le GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
rce D.F. squares squares Ratio Probe 
ups 1 535.1218 535.1218 92.4113 .0000 
.ps 105 608.0184 5.7907 
106 1143.1402 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable TCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 195.2039 195.2039 110.5002 .oooe 
Within Groups 105 185.4876 1. 7665 
Total 106 380.6916 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable TDCT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Pro/: 
Between Groups 1 1074.3368 1074.3368 100.3640 .OOC 
Within Groups 105 1123.9622 10.7044 
Total 106 2198.2991 
ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Variable TDIV 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Source Sum of Mean F F D.F. Squares Squares Ratio prob. 
Between Groups 1 353.6482 353.6482 81.1567 . oooe Within Groups 105 457.5480 4.3576 Total 106 811.1963 
357 
- - - - - ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable TDCT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F Source O.F. Squares squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 583.1048 583.1048 44.8318 .0000 
Within Groups 112 1456.7285 13.0065 
Total 113 2039.8333 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable TOIV 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 216.5826 216.5826 40.4012 .0000 
Within Groups 112 600.4086 5.3608 
Total 113 816.9912 
- - - - - ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable ACCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 141.9705 141. 9705 95.8145 .0000 
Within Groups 105 155.5809 1. 4817 
Total 106 297.5514 
- - - - - ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable ACOIV 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio I?rob. 
Between Groups 1 125.8337 125.8337 75.1199 .0000 
Within Groups 105 175.8859 1.6751 
Total 106 301. 7196 
358 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable ACCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob 
Between Groups 1 51. 7412 51. 7412 32.4053 .000 
Within Groups 112 178.8290 1.5967 
Total 113 230.5702 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable ACDIV 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Frob 
Between Groups 1 89.8108 89.8108 43.1326 .000 1 
Within Groups 112 233.2068 2.0822 
Total 113 323.0175 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable ACT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
Source C.F. squares Squares Ratio Prol:: 
Between Groups 1 277.8886 277.8886 41.0802 .00c 
Within Groups 112 757.6290 6.7645 
Total 113 1035.5175 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable TCON 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
Source C.F. squares Squares Ratio 
prol 
Between Groups 1 94.5140 94.5140 39.4076 
.001 
Within Groups 112 268.6176 2.3984 
Total 113 363.1316 
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(b) Factor-2 Perceptual Analysis/Spatial Ability 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR3 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Probe 
Between Groups 1 30.5782 30.5782 8.2662 .0049 
Within Groups 105 388.4124 3.6992 
Total 106 418.9907 
- - - - - ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Variable MSR4 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Source 
Sum of Mean F F D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Probe 
Between Groups 1 24.1824 24.1824 4.7428 Within Groups .0317 105 535.3690 5.0988 Total 106 559.5514 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
variable MSRT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Probe 
Between Groups 1 520.7635 520.7635 11.0388 .0012 
Within Groups 105 4953.4421 47.1756 
Total 106 5474.2056 
360 
- - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
- -
Variable 01.2 1 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
O.F. Squares squares Ratio Prob. source 
1 .0931 .0931 .0130 .909: Between Groups 
105 750.5424 7.1480 Within Groups 106 750.6355 Total 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR1 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 .5907 .5907 .1580 .6921 
Within Groups 81 302.8792 3.7392 
Total 82 303.4699 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR2 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source O.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob 
Between Groups 1 14.0964 14.0964 1. 7769 .186 
Within Groups 81 642.6024 7.9334 
Total 82 656.6988 
361 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
variable MSR3 
By variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 9.1898 9.1898 2.5461 
.1145 
Within Groups 81 292.3524 3.6093 
Total 82 301.5422 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR4 
By variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 2.4208 2.4208 .7328 .3945 
Within Groups 81 267.5792 3.3034 
Total 82 270.0000 
- - - - - ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable MSRT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 15.1615 15.1615 .3467 .5576 
Within Groups 81 3541.8024 43.7260 
Total 82 3556.9639 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR2 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 106.2433 106.2433 14.6012 .0002 
Within Groups 105 764.0184 7.2764 
Total 106 870.2617 
362 
variable D1.2 
By Variable GROUP 
source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 
By Variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 
By Variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 
By Variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
MSR1 
GROUP 
MSR2 
GROUP 
MSRl 
GROUP 
1 
Group 
ONEWAY 
Analysis of variance 
sum of Mean 
C.F. squares squares 
1 23.2358 23.2358 
81 558.5714 6.8959 
82 581.8072 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
C.F. Squares Squares 
1 21. 0421 21. 0421 
112 263.0632 2.3488 
113 284.1053 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 3.8216 3.8216 
112 636.5381 5.6834 
113 640.3596 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 8.0413 8.0413 
105 387.3605 3.6891 
106 395.4019 
363 
F F 
Ratio prob. 
3.3695 .0701 
F F 
Ratio Prot 
8.9587 .003 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
.6724 .414C 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
2.1797 
.142E 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
variable MSR3 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Mean F F sum of Ratio Prob. 
D.F. squares squares source 
.0768 .7823 
1 .2384 .2384 Between Groups 112 347.9458 3.1067 Within Groups 113 348.1842 Total 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSR4 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 4.3121 4.3121 .8576 .3564 
Within Groups 112 563.1353 5.0280 
Total 113 567.4474 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable MSRT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 21. 2993 21.2993 .5283 .4688 
Within Groups 112 4515.2709 40.3149 
Total 113 4536.5702 
- - - - - ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Variable D1.2 1 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F Source D.E'. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 16.4120 16.4120 2.0530 .1547 Within Groups 112 895.3424 7.9941 
Total 113 911.7544 
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(c) Factor-3 Function/Structure 
Variable Dl.3MS 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable D1.3USF 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable FSL 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
- - - - -
ONEWAY - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 .2644 .2644 
81 3.5429 .0437 
82 3.8072 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 .2644 .2644 
81 3.5429 .0437 
82 3.8072 
- - - - - ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 .2644 .2644 
81 3.5429 .0437 
82 3.8072 
365 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
6.0443 .0161 
F F 
Ratio Frob. 
6.0443 .0161 
F F 
Ratio Frob. 
6.0443 .0161 
Variable 
By Variable 
source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 
By Variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 
By Variable 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
D1.3MS 
GROUP 
D1.3USF 
GROUP 
PSL 
GROUP 
ONE WAY 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
1 .0000 .0000 
105 .0000 .0000 
106 .0000 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
1 .0000 .0000 
105 .0000 .0000 
106 .0000 
ONE WAY - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
1 .0000 
.0000 
105 .0000 
.0000 
106 .0000 
366 
Variable D1.3MS 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable D1.3USF 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable PSL 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
ONE WAY - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
D.F. Squares Squares Ratio prob. 
1 2.7195 2.7195 25.9317 .0000 
112 11.7455 .1049 
113 14.4649 
ONE WAY - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
1 3.7640 3.7640 33.1228 .0000 
112 12.7273 .1136 
113 16.4912 
- - - - - ONE WAY 
- - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
1 1. 5903 1. 5903 8.1228 .0052 112 21. 9273 
.1958 
113 23.5175 
367 
(d) Factor-4 Practical Ability 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable 01.3 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable Dl.3LLC 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 01.3 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 1. 9770 1. 9770 
105 16.6398 .1585 
106 18.6168 
- - - - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
O.F. Squares Squares 
1 .0217 .0217 
81 20.0506 .2475 
82 20.0723 
- - - - - ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
O.F. Squares squares 
1 .0127 .0127 
81 19.6500 .2426 
82 19.6627 
368 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
12.4751 .0006 
F F 
Ratio Frob. 
.0876 .7680 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
.0521 .8199 
_ _ _ - - 0 NEW A Y - - - - -
Variable 01.3LLC 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable 01.3 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Variable Dl.3LLC 
By Variable GROUP 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
O.F. Squares squares 
1 5.1854 5.1854 
112 19.8059 .1768 
113 24.9912 
ONEWAY 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
O.F. squares Squares 
1 5.6054 5.6054 
112 19.0262 .1699 
113 24.6316 
ONEWAY 
Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
D.F. Squares Squares 
1 2.0336 2.0336 
105 17.6487 .1681 
106 19.6822 
369 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
29.3227 .0000 
F F 
Ratio Prob. 
32.9968 .0000 
F F 
Ratio I?rob. 
12.0987 .0007 
(e) Factor-6 Logical/Systematic 
- - - - - ONEWAY - - - - -
Variable TFT 
By va~iable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 2.3452 2.3452 1. 9803 .1623 
Within Groups 105 124.3464 1.1843 
Total 106 126.6916 
- - - - - ONE WAY - - - - -
Variable FT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio prob. 
Between Groups 1 4.5669 4.5669 27.1001 .0000 
Within Groups 81 13.6500 .1685 
Total 82 18.2169 
- - - - - ONEWAY 
- - - - -
Variable TFT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F Source C.F. Squares Squares Ratio prob. 
Between Groups 1 57.6393 57.6393 21.0010 .0000 
Within Groups 81 222.3125. 2.7446 
Total 82 279.9518 
370 
ONEWAY 
Variable FT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares squares . Ratio Prob . 
Between Groups 1 .1060 .1060 .4493 .5041 
Within Groups 112 26.4203 .2359 
Total 113 26.5263 
ONEWAY 
Variable TFT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Frob. 
Between Groups 1 7.6114 7.6114 5.1935 .0246 
Within Groups 112 164.1430 1. 4656 
Total 113 171.7544 
ONEWAY 
Variable FT 
By Variable GROUP Group 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source D.F. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between Groups 1 1.2ll9 1.2ll9 6.8894 .0100 
Within Groups 105 18.4703 .1759 
Total 106 19.6822 
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Appendix-:t 1 . Design Process Illustrations 
(a) Technological Process Matrix 
, 
DEVELOPMENT QUADRANT 
·Long term trl.1 & error 
Heuristic Procl!dur., 
sryt. Chltaatnsllcs: PerSlst,nc, 
T.n,clty 
e ... tnplt : hrl9rovinc;J mat"llioid eonOou,.ucw" 
IOf maslmum ~r1ormanc. 
·Routlne procedural eppllc,tlon$ 
Algorythmic Proceduru 
StylI Ch.'IC\.rl,Ucs: Con"'.'9an4 TNrI1ur-o 
P"I'ftnCl 10' 
$II'\JC1Uf' 
e.'I'npI. : Mak' I" 00j1Ct hom • dtl"""'O 
compl'l' wtth ptoctdu • • ,h.et., 
.rp''1NltOnt.. eomoI.ta pta,... 
INVENTION QUADRANT 
~.. . .~. 
·ComplIX design .ltuatlona 
Exper:mentll Procedur •• 
s¥. CNrlet,ri'tles: C".t ...... 
0Iv'1QII"C INr*r.g 
E .. mplo: Corc.ptuoN.1ng ,fttma_ to 
diO!t'lioQlc IOf _.It 
·Well defined de$lgn problems 
HeurIStic Procedures 
Styl. CNtlc:"~II"" Artlt11c 
Ofy.'II ..... ""'*In; 
Sp,UII VllualuiJon 
,. 
(Cust .... 1994) 
Fig. S. Technological Process Malrilt. 
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(b) Problem Space Model 
Technological Problem Space 
Resources 
Technological Knowledge 
Non-technological Knowledge 
Cr.ati,'. Energy 
Ingenuit), 
Pcrsi!tlenCt 
Experiencel cap.bility 
M.,teri.,ls 
Touls, Etc. 
are 
directed 
specifically 
at 
Primary 
Processes 
Designing 
Making 
Trouble-shooting 
Repairing 
Inventing 
Impro\'ing 
Del'eloping 
Etc. 
-Social/Personal Problem Space 
Resources 
Social Science Knowledge 
Non-social science knowledge 
Cr.ati\'e Energy 
Ingenuity 
Persistence 
Experience / ca pability 
Etc. 
are 
directed 
specifically 
at 
Primary 
Processes 
re~o"'ing 
nege>tiating 
organizing 
planning 
directing 
coun~ling 
nurturing 
interacting. etc. 
Natural/Ecological Problem Space 
Resources 
Scienll/ic Knowledge 
Non·nahJral science 
knowledge 
Creativt Energy 
Ingenuity 
Persistence 
Experience/capability 
Etc. 
are 
directed 
specifically 
at 
Primary 
Processes 
re .. arching 
ob.en'ing 
hypothesis testing 
exploring 
inl'estigating 
etc. 
... . .. ...... 
Goal Thrust 
(Motivation) 
Artifacts 
(including physical 
To Yield human mad. obje<:ts as 
well ..., programs which 
.. drive physical objects) 
• Goal Thrust 
(Motivation) 
hulthy. emdent, 
satblylng. meaningful 
To Interpers""a1 and 
Yield intrapersonll 
relationships (including 
.. cUI~re and nations>, 
To 
Yield 
Goal Thrust 
(Motivation) 
understanding of 
natural world and 
homeostuis (between 
humans and 
enl'ironment. between 
~ human madt artilacb 
...,..- and the natural world. 
and within the natural 
world) 
(C ... br1.1994) 
Fig. 4. Problem Space Model. 
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